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"The advantage of the general theory is that it provides a 
concrete and rigorous starting point, from which successive 
approximations can be made." 
Caramanis et al {1982, p. 3236} 
May the contents of this thesis be used with wisdom, understanding and compassion 
when regarding those whose lives may be affected. 
Corrections: 
Errata 
(20 June 1999) 
Page 65, third bullet point: "identifing" should be "identifying". 
111 
Page 78, second bullet point: "all v* terms have been removed;" should read "all 
I: terms have been removed;". 
nEPvG 
Page 143: the equations: 
should read: 
Q D3 = Q;: + 4 MW 
QD15 = Q;:5 + 4 MW 
QD24 = Q::4 - 4 MW 
Qv3 = Q;: + 4 MVAr 
Q ms= Q::s + 4 MVAr 
Q v 24 = Q;:4 - 4 MVAr 
Q = Q
0
pt -4 MW 
DB DB 
Q = Q 0 pt - 4 MW 
D17 D17 
opt 
Q D26 = Q D26 + 4 MW 
Q = Q
0
pt - 4 MVA 
DB DB r 
QD 17 = Q;:1 - 4 MVAr 
opt 
Qv26 = Q v 26 + 4 MVAr 
Figure 6.1, Page 64: The filename '(IMPEDANCE.DAT)' should read '(LINKDATA.DAT)'. 
Page 184: The sentence "Often this constrained relative minimum is also the absolute 
minimum, especially when f(x, y) is a function of generation costs." has not been 
experimentally substantiated and must be removed. 
Addition To Future Work: 
Section 8.2.3.3 concluded that the equations of "the pq pricing model and the PvG 
pricing model are not equivalent". This conclusion was extrapolated to the correspond-
ing equations of the pq-type and PvG-type OPFs. Experiments were used to establish 
the conclusion. However, the experiments actually only establish that pq-type and 
PvG-type OPFs can produce numerous valid optimal dispatches. The experiments do 
not prove the non-equivalence of the two OPF equation sets. 
Future work must therefore determine whether or not the two OPF types are 
equivalent. If the two OPF types are equivalent the pq-type spot market and the 
PvG-type spot market will also be equivalent (ref. Section 12.3). This implies the two 
markets can produce identical optimal dispatches and identical spot prices. Note that 
lV 
OPF equivalence does not imply redundancy of the PvG/pq classification system. The 
original purpose of this system will remain, to describe the behaviour of OPF power 
system variables. It will also remain that this classification system indicates whether 
the focus of the spot market is on independently controlling voltage magnitude or 
reactive power generation. 
Future work should initially investigate the natures of the objective functions and 
equation sets of the two OPF types. Furthermore, the nature of the underlying con-
strained optimisation function used by l\/Iatpower and QOPF must be investigated. 
One starting point is to determine whether the different dispatches reflect different con-
strained relative minima or different absolute minima. Different relative minima would 
indicate the constrained optimisation algorithm is influenced by initial conditions. This 
result can mask (but does not prove or disprove) OPF equivalence. Different absolute 
minima would demonstrate that the two OPF types are not equivalent. 
The following investigations have already been made: 
• LaGrange multiplier theory finds constrained relative minima [Anton 1988, Sec-
tion 16.10]; 
• The Ma.thworks constrained optimisation function used by Ma.tpower and QOPF 
may sometimes only give local solutions1 . 
• An experiment: QOPF was used to solve the IEEE 30-bus power system. Q::x 
was non-binding. Increasing Q::x from 50 MVAr to 500 MVAr and resolving 
results in different values of Bi, P Gi and Q Gi at the third and fourth decimal 
places. 
• The pq pricing model and PvG pricing model a.re equivalent whe the cost of 
reactive power generation is zero2 • 
1 '0ptimisation Toolbox User's Guide' (1994), p. 3-12 'Limitations', Matlab Ver. 4.2c; Toolbox Ver-
sion l.Od, The Mathworks Inc., 24 Prime Park Way, Natick, MA 01760-1500. 
2 WARD, A. G., 'NODAL2 Training Manual', Prepared for Transpower New Zealand Ltd, PO Box 
1021, Wellington, New Zealand, May 1999, Chapter 6. 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the behaviour of marginal prices for reactive power in a com-
petitive electricity spot market. In the proposed spot market, non-zero unit costs are 
assigned to the generation of reactive power as a method of paying for reactive power 
ancillary services. These costs enable reactive power to be optimally dispatched in 
the same manner as real power. This is unlike previous research, which has only de-
scribed the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices in spot markets where the unit 
generation costs of reactive power equal zero. 
The theory of Dispatch Based Pricing, proposed by Ring [1995] is used to calculate 
and describe the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices for this spot market. 
Dispatch Based Pricing is an ex post variant of spot pricing, with the rare ability to 
accept non-zero unit generation costs for reactive power. It was originally derived from 
an optimal power flow (OPF) formulation. A new classification system for power system 
nodes in any OPF formulation is defined to enable the behaviour of reactive power 
marginal prices to be clearly described. Hence, Dispatch Based Pricing is redefined with 
respect to this classification system. An OPF is developed to validate this redefined 
Dispatch Based Pricing model and the marginal prices generated thereby. This OPF 
accepts non-zero unit generation costs for both real and reactive power, a_nd uses them 
to optimally dispatch real and reactive power generation. 
The mechanisms determining the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices are 
investigated for optimal and sub-optimal dispatches of an unconstrained power system. 
Price behaviour is also investigated for op~imal dispatches of voltage-constrained and 
reactive-power-generation-constrained power systems. The implications of this react-
ive power marginal price behaviour are discussed. It is shown that Dispatch Based 
Pricing can be used to calculate marginal prices when a load-following generator is 
used to supply reactive power. 
The conclusions regarding the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices are used 
to propose a spot market with non-zero reactive power unit generation costs, for the 
South Island section of New Zealand's National Grid. The use of Dispatch Based 
Pricing to calculate reactive power marginal prices for this spot market is detailed. 




1.1 REACTIVE POWER SPOT MARKETS 
The generation of reactive power has been traditionally viewed as costless. However, 
this view is changing as deregulation of the power sector continues. Deregulation of 
a power sector allows for the introduction of competitive electricity markets. But, it 
must also address the question of responsibility for the ancillary services of system 
security, power quality, and voltage support [Baughman et al 1997a). These ancillary 
services and others, depend on reliable sources of reactive power generation. In New 
Zealand, extraordinary levels of voltage support were required in recent hot weather 
conditions [Inder 1997). Such incidents highlight the need for a pricing regime that 
will compensate those who generate the necessary reactive power for these ancillary 
services. 
The primary aim of an electricity market is to foster competition, so as to encour-
age 'efficient use of resources and improve ancillary services to the consumer [Hogan 
et al 1996]. To achieve this aim, any pricing ~egime used within this market must be 
able to provide economic signals that reflect both the short-run and the long-run re-
quirements of the power system. This thesis is concerned with 'short-run marginal cost 
spot pricing', which is designed to encourage efficient day-to-day usage of resources. 
A spof pricing regime produces spot prices that announce to the market the mar-
ginal costs of power system resources. These spot prices are designed to encourage 
market participants to consume or generate only what they can afford, or alternatively, 
what they are willing to sell. In a deregulated electricity market therefore, a spot 
pricing regime affects the daily dispatch of all resources in the power system. 
The mathematical model for any spot pricing regime produces marginal prices 
(i.e. spot prices) that act as signals to encourage the efficient and economic dispatch of 
real power. These real power marginal prices are effective signals because the costs of 
real power generation from all of the generators are described by real power generation 
cost functions within the model. These cost functions (in various forms) a-re ~nherent 
in all spot pricing models. 
2 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Most spot pricing models also calculate reactive power marginal prices. However, 
almost all models do not accommodate reactive power generation cost functions. This 
is because reactive power supplied by generators has been traditionally assumed to 
have a zero unit generation cost. Without reactive power generation cost functions, 
reactive power marginal prices are insignificant, rendering them ineffective as economic 
signals. For this reason, reactive power marginal prices have generally been regarded as 
by-products of the spot pricing model and not utilised as a means of funding ancillary 
services. 
Little is therefore known about the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices 
because they are not used. This absence of knowledge has not been helped by the 
lack of published experime:µtal work on this topic. Moreover, any work that has been 
published is often related to very specific experiments with little generality for the 
application of reactive power marginal prices to actual spot markets. 
1.2 THESIS OBJECTIVES 
-The central objective of this thesis is to increase the understanding of how reactive 
power marginal prices behave. In particular, the emphasis is on the behaviour of 
marginal prices calculated for a dispatch from a hypothetical spot market in which 
both real and reactive power have non-zero unit generation costs at the generators. 
That is, the price behaviour is investigated in a spot market where real and reactive 
power generation cost functions are used to economically dispatch real and reactive 
power. To achieve this objective, the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices is 
investigated for optimal and sub-optimal dispatches, unconstrained and constrained 
dispatches. bnce investigated, the implications of this price behaviour are discussed 
with reference to the South Island section of New Zealand's National Grid. 
The behaviour of real and reactive power marginal prices is dependent, to a certain 
extent, on the spot pricing model used to generate the marginal prices. Dispatch Based 
Pricing, a variant of spot pricing,- is used in this thesis to investigate price behaviour. 
This is because Disp·atch Based Pricing is curre~tly being considered for use in wholesale 
electricity markets similar to the New Zealand spot market. Hence, the behaviour of 
reactive power marginal prices in the context of the Dispatch Based Pricing framework 
is the focus of this thesis. However, the conclusions of this thesis are applicable to 
reactive power marginal price behaviour in general. 
The Dispatch Based Pricing framework was proposed by Ring [1995] (see also Read 
and Ring [1995d]). It has two features that make it particularly suited to the research 
described in this thesis. First, it is one of the few spot pricing regimes capable of 
accommodating reactive power generation cost functions when calculating marginal 
prices for real and reactive power. Second, any spot pricing model developed usi.u.g 
Dispatch Based Pricing is highly transparent. This makes it possible to identify which 
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marginal costs of the power system are dictating the behaviour of real and reactive 
power marginal prices. 
Read and Ring developed Dispatch Based Pricing using linear programming op-
t.imisation techniques. In the context of Power Systems Engineering, these techniques 
equate to optimal power flow (OPF) techniques. However, the Dispatch Based Pri-
cing equations do not conform to Power Systems Engineering practises, even though 
they are used to calculate real and reactive power marginal prices. Specifically, the 
OPF-type Dispatch Based Pricing equations have been formulated using power-flow 
node classifications (i.e. PV, PQ, S). This results in a conflict of definitions, making 
the equations very difficult to use. Therefore, an initial objective in this thesis is to 
redefine Dispatch Based Pricing in terms of OPF node nomenclature, developed spe-
cifically for this purpose. This OPF node classification system is developed because of 
the apparent absence of any sort of OPF node nomenclature in literature. 
Transpower New Zealand Ltd has implemented the Dispatch Based Pricing equa-
tions in a software package called N ODAL2. This software therefore, is used to calculate 
the reactive power marginal prices presented in this thesis. Dispatch Based Pricing ( and 
NODAL2) is based on OPF techniques. Therefore, OPF software is used to generate 
benchmark prices required to establish the reliability of real and reactive power mar-
ginal prices from N ODAL2. This OPF has to be capable of accepting both real and 
reactive power generation cost functions, to calculate marginal prices that match the 
marginal prices from N ODAL2. 
The search for an OPF capable of accepting reactive power generation cost func-
tions proved fruitless. This was due to the common assumption that reactive power 
generation must be costless. Hence, a benchmark OPF was developed for this work, 
where development consisted of modifying an OPF so that it will accept r~active power 
generation cost functions. Development was undertaken with the permission and as-
sistance of the OPF authors from PSERC of Cornell University1. 
By validating the NoDAL2 marginal prices using this modified OPF, the redefined 
Dispatch Based -Pricing equations are also validated. The validation demonstrates 
that the equations are consistent with Power Systems Engineering practises. Until 
these processes of redefinition and validation have been performed, it is not possible to 
adequately fulfil the central objective of this thesis. 
1.3 THESIS OUTLINE 
The main body of this thesis can be divided into four sections: Chapter 2; Chapters 3 
to 5; Chapters 6 to 8; Chapters 9 to 11. 
1PSERC is an acronym for the Power System .Engineering Research Center. 
4 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 documents the development of spot pricing from its origins through to 
spot pricing models that include reactive power generation cost functions. An emphasis 
is placed on spot pricing models that produce marginal prices for reactive power. This 
historical .development is applied to spot pricing in its most general sense. That is, 
not being limited to the philosophy or operating conditions of any one country. The 
purpose of this is two-fold: to identify the current understanding of how reactive power 
marginal prices are generally perceived to behave and to place Dispatch Based Pricing 
in the wider context of spot pricing. A history of electricity pricing in New Zealand 
and its current spot pricing market are also presented. 
The general methodology of Dispatch Based Pricing along with other general power 
system theory are presented in Chapter 3. The new OPF node classification system is 
also presented in Chapter 3. 
Dispatch Based Pricing is derived from an OPF formulation. Hence, Chapters 4 
and 5 are used to redefine Ring's Dispatch Based Pricing model with respect to the 
OPF node nomenclature. In Chapter 4 a redefined version of Ring's OPF formulation 
is presented. This OPF formulation is then linearised to form the linear program 
required for deriving the Dispatch Based Pricing model. Also in this chapter, the 
concept of linear programming optimisation is summarised with respect to Dispatch 
Based Pricing. 
Chapter 5 is used to derive a Dispatch Based Pricing model (referred to as the 
pq/PvG pricing model) from the OPF linear program of Chapter 4. This derivation is 
based on linear programming duality theory. Hence, duality theory is described here. 
In addition, Dispatch Based Pricing is described in the context of using u,nit generation 
costs to economically (i.e. optimally) dispatch reactive power. Even Read and Ring 
assumed zero unit costs and thus focussed their discussions primarily on using Dispatch 
Based Pricing only for real power spot pricing. 
From Chapter 6 onwards, all work with respect to Dispatch Based Pricing is ori-
ginal. In Chapters 6 to 8, the new Dispatch Based Pricing model and its software 
implementation (called NODAL2) are validated. In Chapter 6, the benchmark OPF 
and its software implementation ( called QOPF) are presented. The work of Chapter 7 
onwards was only possible after the development of the QOPF software. 
The Dispatch Based Pricing model is identified in this work as the combination of 
two other Dispatch Based Pricing models. These arc presented in Chapters 7 and 8 
respectively with examples of their application. The first pricing model is successfully 
validated using QOPF in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 describes why the second pricing model 
cannot be fully validated. 
The investigation into the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices is detailed 
in Chapters 9, 10 and 11. In Chapter 9, Dispatch Based Pricing is used to identify 
the power system marginal costs influencing the behaviour of reactive power marginal 
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prices. Pr tsidered for optimal dispatches of unconstrained, voltage 
constraine - eneration constrained, fixed generator v 
able generation voltage, power systems. 
vmtpter 10 presents reactive power price behaviour for sub-optimal dispatches. 
This behaviour implies a load-following generator scenario. It is demonstrated that a 
Dispatch Based Pricing model can be used to calculate the true cost to the power system 
of supplying the next unit of real or reactive power from a load-following generator. 
The results of Chapters 9 and 10 are used in Chapter 11 to propose a spot market 
for the South Island section of New Zealand's National Grid. It is discussed how the. 
pq pricing model and PvG pricing model can be used to calculate real and reactive 
power marginal prices for this spot market. Some implications regarding the effect of 
reactive power spot pricing on the operation of this power system are also discussed. 
1.4 TERMINOLOGY 
The following terms are used in the place of Power Systems Engineering terms. They are 
used to maintain continuity with the work of Ring [1995), and of Read and Ring [1995d). 
'Busbar' defines the connection point of a number of power system components. This 
has been replaced with the term 'node'. 'Node' includes the artificial nodes created 
in Dispatch Based Pricing by using pi-models to model devices such as three-winding 
transformers. The two exceptions are the 'Swing Bus' and in Chapter 11 where 'busbar' 
is used to identify actual busbars in the New Zealand National Grid. It must be noted 
however, that 'node' and 'busbar' are used inter-changeably within literature . 
• 
'Demand' is used instead of 'load' to indicate the consumer's demand for more 
power at a particular node. Again, the exception is in Chapter 11 when discussing 
physical loads. 
Prices are usually d~scribed for power usage over a defined period of time, such as 
an hour. Ring [~995) however, assumes an arbitrary, unitless period. Hence, $/MW 
and $/MVAr are used in place of $/MWhr and $/MVArhr in this thesis, except when 
quoted from other works. 
The following terms differ from those in Ring's work. Physical generating turbines 
are referred to as 'generators' and the companies owning these machines are referred 
to as 'generating companies'. 
In spot pricing, 'marginal price' and 'spot price' are synonymous. However, 'mar-
ginal price' is used herein, as it describes the marginal nature of the resource associated 
with that price. T.hat is, the marginal price is the price of obtaining one more unit of 
that resource. The exception is Chapter 2 where 'spot price' is used for consistency 
with the cited literature. 
6 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
A distinction is made. between 'marginal price' and 'marginal cost', where the 
marginal price is equal to the marginal cost plus some profit. For example, the marginal 
price of reactive power at a node is equal to the costs of marginal losses, plus the 
marginal costs of any binding power system constraints, plus any unit generation costs 
of reactive power, plus any profit added to the unit generation cost by the generating 
company. 
Chapter 2 
SPOT PRICING OF REACTIVE POWER 
2.1 AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
A well-designed pricing system is essential to the effective operation of a power system. 
Many influences impact on the design process of a pricing system that will meet the 
needs of both energy supplier and customer. In the past thirty years two influences 
have had a continued impact: the need for efficient power system operation, and the 
steady increase in reliance on and demand for power. 
Efficient operation of the power system has been a primary focus since the 1930s, 
with the introduction of Economic Dispatch. This was one of the earliest forms of pri-
cing and the precursor to the present Optimal Power Flow [Huneault and Galiana 1991]. 
By dispatching power, so as to minimise operational costs, the power system can be 
operated to make more efficient use of resources and equipment. In the United States 
of America, efficient power system operation was traditionally achieved through cent-
ralised planning by a single, vertically integrated, organisation. Although not vertically 
integrated in New Zealand, the New Zealand Electricity Department provided central-
ised planning and dispatch, being the entity owning and operating the generation and 
transmission system. 
In the past two decades, the approach used to obtain efficient power system op-
eration has· changed dramatically. Scherer [1977] used electricity prices in the United 
States as an example to help explain this change. In the mid-1920's electricity prices 
were very high. Primarily, this was due to the state of infancy of the power sys-
tem industry. Over the next four and a half decades the price in electricity dropped 
dramatically, even with a steady rise in the consumer price index, until 1969. This 
price decrease was seen as the combined result of economics of scale, and the dramatic 
advancement and refinement of technology over this period. 
During the 1960s and 1970s however, environmental and technological issues began 
to impact on the price of electricity. In particular, an increasing awareness for the need 
to reduce pollution from power stations, coupled with crises such as the oil shortages 
of the 1970s began to push the cost of electricity up. During this period, power sys-
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tern technology was seen by. Scherer to making less and less efficiency gains for cost of 
development. As a consequence, the financial benefits obtained through gains in effi-
ciency were no longer able to counteract this price increase. Therefore, new methods 
of obtaining efficiency gains in the power system had to be found. 
Caramanis et al [1982] of the Massachusets Institue of Technology, suggested that 
a market-based pricing system held the key to efficient power system operation. This 
novel pricing system (named the MIT Model due to its origins and discussed later in 
this chapter) was based on the philosophy that only the physical power system was 
a natural monopoly, and that efficiency gains could be made by setting up an energy 
market place, through deregulation. In this energy market generating companies and 
customers would buy, sell ~nd trade energy, just as in any other economic market, in 
order to foster competition within the generation and consumption sectors. The aim 
of such a market was: 
" to maximise social welfare, that is to maximise consumers' plus 
producers' surplus, subject to the operational constraints {of the power 
system)." [Baughman and Siddiqi 1991] 
Various forms of this proposed energy market have since been implemented in coun-
tries such as Chile, the UK, Norway, Argentina, New Zealand and Australia [Hogan 
et al 1996]. Consequently, there has been a proliferation of publications on pricing 
systems. Some new pricing systems reject the concept of an energy market and de-
regulation. Some refine, extend, or modify the original MIT pricing model. All differ 
in order to meet the needs of the individual power system. However, all are designed 
to economicctlly optimise the operation of the power system. A discussion on some of 
these pricing systems follows. 
2.2 THE DESIGN OF A PRICING SYSTEM 
Computer models of physical power systems need to be accurate if the system operator 
is to determine the current state of the physical network. In contrast, pricing systems 
need not calculate prices for every quantity within the power system. In fact, a pricing 
system that produces a price for every part of a power system will be in danger of 
becoming too complex and impractical to implement in an energy market. The main 
purpose of a pricing system therefore, is to generate energy prices that give signals 
encouraging welfare maximisation. If a market is to encourage efficient operation, these 
prices must represent physical quantities (i.e. resources) that all market participants 
have the ability to influence by modifying their. electrical behaviour. It is the price 
signals that force participants to behave according to the objectives of the energy 
market. 
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In the two decades following the proposal of the MIT pricing model, many authors 
have proposed different resources ( and their availability) that should be considered for 
a pricing system that encourages efficient power system operation. Some examples 
a1·e: real power losses and constraints on power flow, voltage and real power genera-
tion [Caramanis et al 1982]; pre/post contingency power system conditions [Dandachi 
et al 1996]; fixed assets such as capacitor banks [Chattopadhyay et al 1995]; control 
of frequency and tieline flows, power harmonic control and removal, and spinning re-
serve [Baughman et al 1997a]. 
There is growing concern for system security and quality of supply in deregulated 
markets. Thus, an emphasis has also been placed on pricing reactive power resources 
such as reactive power reserves; supply of capacitive and inductive reactive power; 
dynamic and static reactive power devices; reactive power capacity and generation costs 
of generators; and joint allocation for reactive power [Hao and Papalexopoulos 1997]. 
However, it is the needs of the individual power system that influences which of these 
resources will be priced. 
Green [1997] proposed six principles that should be considered when designing 
a pricing system. These principles aid the process of identifying the resources that 
are relevant to a specific power system. Green said that if a pricing system was to 
be effective in signalling relative costs of power from different energy suppliers, and 
effective in determining the amount of power transferred in each transaction, prices 
should: 
1. promote the efficient day-to-day operation of the bulk power market; 
2. signal locational advantages for investment in the transmission system; 
3. signal the need for investment in the transmission system; 
4. compensate the O\\'.:ners of existing transmission assets; 
5. be simple and transparent; 
6. be politically acceptable and able to be implemented. 
In essence, pricing systems should be practical from the perspective of the people who 
will use it. For example it is not practical for domestic power users to participate in 
a pricing scheme based on spot prices if the costs of metering and other equipment 
required out-weighs the cost benefits those users will ever gain from buying power at 
the spot price. In particular, a pricing scheme along with its associated software and 
equipment must be accepted by all parties involved. It must be able to withst~nd any 
challenges made against any part of the pricing system (Principle 6). 
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2.3 REAL TIME SP.OT PRICING 
In 1982, Caramanis et al (1982) attempted to address these pricing scheme requirements 
with a pdcing system called 'Optimal Spot Pricing' (the MIT Model). This model 
.was based on two earlier variants of spot pricing by Vickrey (1971) and Schweppe 
et al [1980]. It used a full ac optimal power flow to produced spot prices for both real 
and reactive power1 . Caramanis et al used the word 'optimal' to describe the function 
of spot pricing theory in their proposed deregulated energy market. In particular, 
spot prices were designed to send signals to all participants in this energy market 
(i.e. generating companies and customers), encouraging them to make efficient use of 
electricity resources. As a ~esult, spot prices utilise competitive market forces so as to 
maximise the value of a global social welfare function. The welfare function used by 
Caramanis et al is essentially: 
\:Velfare = Value of Electricity Usage 
Variable Power System Operating Costs and Fuel Costs 
Cost c:if Rationing 
Cost of Equipment 
The components of this welfare function represent the cost of resources that all market 
participants see as beneficial to use efficiently. In maximising the value of this welfare 
function an optimal spot price for electricity is obtained, which is agreed on by both 
generating companies and customers. This optimal price occurs because customers 
will not use power if the spot price is seen as too expensive and generating companies 
may not generate power if they decide the spot price is too low. Thus, the process of 
supply and demand to obtain optimal prices causes power within the power systei:;n to 
be dispatched economically, at minimum cost. If the dispatch is not economic ( or sub-
optimal) someone will loose money, either the generating companies or the customers. 
The optimal spot price for both real and reactive power (suggested by Caramanis 
et al) has the follo,ving components in order to provide signals encouraging market 
participants to behave efficiently and competitively: 
Optimum Spot Price = Marginal Fuel Cost 
+ Cost of System Marginal Losses 
+ Cost of System Constraints (2.1) 
Each component represents the marginal cost of a power system resource. Each mar-
ginal cost reflects the increment in total cost to the power system when meeting the 
1The marginal prices for reactive power demand are calculated using the costs of the real pm\;-er . 
losses caused by changes in demand. Reactive power cost functions were not accommodated in this 
OPF ... 
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demand for an additional unit of the corresponding resource ( or its availability when 
considering constraints) [Riggs and West 1986]. Therefore, marginal fuel costs represent 
the change in total generation cost when the power system meets the customer-demand 
for one more unit of real or reactive power. In generating that extra unit of power, 
the real and reactive power losses in the system will also change. The cost of the ex-
tra power generated to meet this change in losses is represented by the marginal loss 
component of the spot price. Customers in different areas will therefore incur different 
prices, since spot prices are a function of system losses. 
The cost of system constraints is included in the spot price to reflect the ·1:mrden 
a customer places on the system. If that burden forces the operation of the power 
system to be constrained in some way, the marginal costs of these constraints will be 
non-zero. For example, overloaded transmission lines and binding voltage limits are 
common constraints. These marginal costs represent the price customers are willing to 
pay to relax each constraint by one unit. Hence, marginal costs of constraints are used 
to encourage customers to reduce their electricity consumption in order to i;elieve these 
constraints on the system. 
In reflecting the actual operation of the power system in the price of electricity, 
the MIT Model was "shown to encompass and achieve more fully the objective of 
rate structures and load management techniques proposed". Caramanis et al believed 
that spot prices would encourage more efficient use of fuels, provide incentives to use 
power at less expensive times and locations and make cogeneration and energy sources 
such as solar power viable options. Since the MIT proposal, experience has shown 
that spot pricing must be accompanied by two other mechanisms if efficient market 
operations are to occur: financial hedging for protection against spot price volatility and 
a recovery systen! of fixed network costs which provides efficient long run investment 
signals [Hogan et al 1996]. 
For spot pricing models to achieve an optimal dispatch, prices must be published to 
market participants in rnal-time. This means that prices must be announced moment 
by moment· to market participants, arid the participants must respond instantaneously 
to these prices. This cannot be achieved with current technology. However a suggested 
solution to this problem was to calculate prices either prior to the dispatch ( ex ante) 
or after the dispatch (ex post) [Read and Ring 1996]. 
Ex ante prices are determined by taking the customer bids and generating company 
offers of market participants and going through a clearing process to determine optimum 
spot prices which are acceptable to both parties. These spot prices are usually published 
for certain time periods such that, market participants know the cost of power prior 
to consumption. A period of time could be a year, 24 hours, 1/2 hour, or 5 minutes. 
However, using time periods can result in problems if inter-temporal constr~ints are 
not considered [Read and Ring 1995b]. The term 'inter-temporal' identifies constraints 
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that can span several time periods. Two examples of inter-temporal constraints are the 
ramping requirements of thermal generators, and the water storage of hydro generators. 
Therefore, Caramanis et al included equations to constrain power system quantities 
from one .period of time to the next2 . The aim of such constraints is to influence 
energy consumption decisions across several time periods, especially during periods of 
heavy loading on the electricity network. · 
Prices calculated ex post allow the power system to be co-ordinated by a central 
dispatcher, in a more or less traditional manner. The power system is dispatched using 
supply and demand curves based on offers from generating companies and bids from 
wholesale customers. Ex post prices are calculated after the dispatch has occurred, for 
each time period. The time. period for calculating spot prices in the Australian market 
is 5 minutes. Hence, these prices reflect the cost of the actual dispatch [Read and 
Ring 1996]. 
Since the initial proposal for Optimal Spot Pricing of real power, many different 
formulations have been suggested for calculating ex ante and ex post marginal spot 
prices. Variations in formulations are the result of extra cost components. These 
-components represent the cost of resources such as reactive power generation, and are 
added to the basic spot price equation (2.1). 
2.4 SPOT PRICING OF REACTIVE POWER 
2.4.1 A Spot Market 
A 'Spot Market' is usually associated with the trading of real power using marginal 
pricing techniques. In this thesis, the concept of a spot market is extended to include 
the trading of reactive pO\yer. In this extended spot market, market participants are 
able to buy and sell reactive power in an identical manner to the usual buying and 
selling of real power. 
The extended spot market c~n be divided into a sub-market for real power and a 
sub-market for reactive p~:nver. This allows market participants to trade solely in real 
power, or solely in reactive power, or both. However, the spot prices in the sub-markets 
must be calculated together as they are co-dependent, reflecting the co-dependent 
nature of real and reactive power. 
2.4.2 Optimal Power Flow Formulations as Spot Pricing Tools 
A spot price market effectively optimises power system resources subject to system 
constraints, so as to maximise a global social welfare (or objective) function. This 
describes the function of optimal power flow (OPF) technology. 
2These constraint equations use time as a frame of reference. Constraints representing losses, -
thermal limits, voltage limits use space (that is, the location of the customer in the power system) 
as a frame of reference. · 
2.4 SPOT PRICING OF REACTIVE POWER 13 
Optimal Power Flow formulations have been used as dispatch planning tools for 
decades with Economic Dispatch, the precursor to the OPF, being introduced in the 
1930s [Huneault and Galiana 1991]. The Economic Dispatch model represented the 
power system as a single equality constraint. Since then, OPFs have been developed 
to describe the ac power system in full. 
The aim of an OPF is to optimise the resources of a power system so as to minimise 
some objective function, with respect to a set of resource constraints. Common object-
ive functions are the total cost of system losses, and the total real power generation 
costs. The latter is generally the summation of the offers that set the price at-which 
each generation company is willing to sell their real power in the spot market. 
Constraints are used to describe the power system. The equality constraints are the 
(ac) power balance equations. The inequality constraints represent the finite nature (or 
amount available) of resources such as real power generation, reactive power generation 
and voltage magnitude. The objective function and the constraints comprise an 'OPF 
formulation'. Therefore, a full ac OPF incorporates both real and reactive power sub-
markets ( and correctly models their co-dependence) through the ac power balance 
equations. Furthermore, OPF technology models the primary aim of an ideal spot 
market, to optimise the dispatch of real and reactive power generation with respect to 
an objective function and a set of constraints. 
When solving any economic dispatch problem, the OPF assigns a cost to each 
resource constraint3 . These costs reflect the change in the objective function for an 
incremental change in the relevant power system resource. Therefore, each cost is the 
marginal price or spot price of that resource. An OPF therefore, calculates the real 
and,reactive power spot prices for each sub-market. 
The introduc~ion of spot pricing has caused a change in emphasis in the develop-
ment of OPFs. Before the work of Caramanis -et al [1982], most of the research was on 
producing faster, more accurate, and more reliable numerical algorithms for solving the 
optimisation problem described by the OPF formulation. However, with the realisation 
that OPFs __ can be used-as spot _pricing tools, there has been a certain change in the 
direction of OPF research. There is now a significant emphasis on developing OPF 
formulations to meet the pricing needs of individual power systems. In particular, a 
number of papers have been published which focus on developing OPF formulations to 
obtain reliable reactive power spot prices. 
2.4.3 De OPF Approximation 
Caramanis et al [1982] proposed a full ac OPF spot pricing model. Until 1993 however, 
most of the literary emphasis was on calculating real power spot prices for a real 
power sub-market, using a de OPF. The de OPF is based on standard de power-flow 
3These costs are the LaGrange multipliers described in Appendix B. 
14 CHAPTER 2 SPOT PRICING OF REACTIVE POWER 
equations. These equations. ignore the flow of reactive power by assuming that reactive 
power, costs almost nothing to generate and assuming that there 'is a weak relationship 
between real and reactive power' [Hogan 1992] (see Section 3.6). Consequently, reactive 
power was not considered as absolutely necessary in the development of spot pricing 
models, such as the model developed by Schweppe et al [1988]. These simplifications 
were important at that time because OPF technology and computers were slow. 
Hogan [1992] used a de OPF approach for illustrative purposes when addressing 
serious problems with regard to wheeling transactions in the United States4 . How-
ever, Hogan [1996] showed that real power spot prices were heavily dependent on re-
active power flows and reactive power spot prices. 
In particular, Hogan showed that a de OPF only produces prices comparable to 
prices from an ac OPF when a power system is either unconstrained, or congested as 
a result of thermal constraints. When a power system is congested by binding voltage 
constraints, Hogan demonstrated that reactive power prices can be 800% greater than 
their corresponding real power prices, thus negating the above assumptions of the 
de OPF. Therefore, Hogan concluded that the de OPF cannot be used to calculate real 
power spot prices if voltage constraints and reactive power are issues. He stated that 
an ac OPF must be used because it calculates reactive power prices, upon which real 
power prices are dependent. 
De OPF formulations can be either ex ante or ex post. Hogan's ac and de formu-
lations calculated ex post spot prices. 
2.4.4 Ex ante Reactive Power Spot Pricing Models and Results 
Generally fuil ac OPFs are now used to calculate reliable spot prices for real power. 
Until recently however, reactive power has been assu1!1ed to have a zero generation 
cost. Any non-zero reactive power spot prices were only a function of the marginal 
costs of real power losses and binding constraints, and thus treated as a by-product. 
These reactive power spot prices were recognised as necessary for calculating real power 
prices when optimising the real power dispatcli, but were not further utilised. 
With the deregulation of the power sector, there has been much discussion over who 
should pay for ancillary services that depend on reactive power, and how these services 
should be financed. Since many spot pricing markets ( designed solely to economically 
dispatch real power) are already operating, the use of reactive power spot prices to 
charge for these services is being seriously considered. This would require the addition 
of a reactive power sub-market to the existing spot market. 
In this section, a number of OPF formulations are presented, which were designed 
to investigate the feasibility of using reactive power spot prices to pay for reactive power. 
4\Vheeling is defined as the transmission of real power (or reactive power) from a seller to a buy-er _ 
using a transmission network belonging to a third party [Muchayi et al 1995). 
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Figure 2.1 The real-time price of reactive power at a voltage constrained load bus increases 
as the lower voltage limit is tightened 
The formulations have been designed either as planning tools or as tools for calculating 
prices in a real-time spot market. Therefore, these formulations calculate spot prices 
ex ante. Reactive power generation is still costless in most of these formulations. Only 
two known formulations accommodate reactive power cost functions to allow non-
zero reactive power generation costs. These are proposed respectively by Dandachi 
et al [1996], and Read and Ring [1995d], and are discussed later in this chapter . 
• 
Baughman and Siddiqi [1991) highlighted one of the major concerns with reactive 
power spot prices· - price volatility. Using a 4-,-bus test system Baughman and Siddiqi 
showed that a binding voltage limit can cause high reactive power prices. Figure 2.1 
shows the effect of a binding voltage constraint on the cost of reactive power at a 
load bus. Note that the· voltage at this bus was forced against a lower voltage limit. 
As the lower voltage limit is in.creased the voltage increases and the reactive power 
price increases from approximately $0/MVArhr to $700/MVArhr. The increase in spot 
price demonstrates that relieving the voltage constraint becomes more important to 
the power system as the voltage limit is raised. 
Baughman and Siddiqi showed that spot pricing of reactive power can be a useful 
pricing mechanism despite the apparent volatility of reactive power prices under voltage 
constraints. This is because reactive power spot prices accurately represent the true 
state of reactive power in the power system. Baughman and Siddiqi also stated that 
penalties based on power-factors are not accurate representations of reactive power 
usage. For example, a large company may have an excellent power-factor and y_et, draw 
more reactive power than a small company with a poor power-factor. Consequently, 
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the small company will end up paying more than the large company even though the 
large company is putting a larger burden on the power system. However, spot pricing 
of reactive power will charge these companies for their actual reactive power usage, a 
fairer pricing scheme. 
Muchayi et al [1995) provided a summary of formulations that include reactive 
power pricing. Their focus was on drawing attention to the importance of reactive 
power spot prices in wheeling transactions. They emphasised that the wheeling rate 
of reactive power is not a negligible factor, even though the marginal cost of reactive 
power may be much smaller than the marginal cost of real power,. Like Hogan [1996], 
and Baughman and Siddiqi [1991), they noted that de OPF models fail to capture some 
of the pricing effects attrihµtable to reactive power. 
Chattopadhyay et al [1995) recognised that voltage constraints result in high re-
active power prices, which in turn can cause stability problems in a spot market. To 
combat these problems a modified OPF was proposed. This OPF acted as a planning 
tool for the placement of capacitors to relieve voltage constraints. 
One problem inherent in spot pricing models is that the high spot prices drop 
once a voltage constraint has been relieved through a fixed capacitor. This makes 
capacitor cost recovery impossible. In order to recover the installation and capital 
costs of capacitors placed by the OPF, Chattopadhyay et al added a fixed component 
to the variable spot price of reactive power. 
Table 2,1 Results of spot pricing case studies for reactive power using the PTI optimal power 
flow program. 
Average % Change % of System 
Scenario Marginal from Base Average 
• Price per Case Marginal 
MVArhr Price $ /MWhr5 
Base Case: $ 0.45 3% 
,Vith no generator reactive limits $ 0.07 .JJ. -85% 2% 
With reactive capability curves $ 1.66 1r +272% 6% 
,Vith local area spinning reserve requirements $ 0.36 .JJ.-19% 3% 
,Vith an interface constraint $ 0.40 .JJ.-10% 3% ,. 
With load (P&Q) decrease 10% . $ 0.05 .JJ.-89% 2% 
With load decrease 20% · $ 0.05 .JJ.-90% 2% 
The behaviour of real power marginal costs and the behaviour of reactive power 
marginal costs were also investigated by Mitsche [1996]. Results were obtained using a 
20-bus, 30-transmission line, 6-generator power system model. Two of the generating 
companies were represented as fixed output units. The other four were represented 
by a combination of linear or quadratic real power cost functions. The reactive power 
marginal price results are given in Table 2.1. 
Mitsche confirmed the results of other authors. He showed that marginal prices 
for real power are closely linked to marginal prices for reactive power, thus highligl~_t-
5The system average marginal price is obtained by taking the average of all real power spot prices. 
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ing the importance of reactive power spot prices. He also noted that reactive power 
spot prices are trivial if the generation units have not reached their respective reactive 
power generation limits, but are extremely volatile for changing load levels and gener-
ation patterns. Even so, his test results show that reactive power prices remain small 
compared to the system average marginal price. 
El Keib and Ma [1997] produced experimental results confirming the behaviour 
of reactive power spot prices highlighted in previously reported papers. These results 
were obtained using a decoupled OPF formulation. This decoupled OPF was created 
by separating the real and reactive constraints in a coupled OPF formulation- (such 
as the one used by Baughman and Siddiqi [1991]), to form P- and Q-subproblems. 
El Keib and Ma believed that this formulation shows the individual components that 
comprise the real and reactive marginal prices at each PQ node. This is in contrast to 
Baughman and Siddiqi's model which does not show the composition of each marginal 
price. The decoupled OPF was also chosen for its well-recognised superiority of speed. 
Reported results of OPF simulations for IEEE 30-bus and 118-bus power systems, 
showed small variations of less than $1/MWhr in the real power marginal cost profiles. 
Reactive power marginal cost profiles show variations of up to $1.5/MVArhr due to 
flow constraints and voltage violations, with reactive power spot prices being either 
positive or negative in the 118-bus profile. 
One of the most comprehensive OPF spot pricing models formulated to date ad-
dresses the fact that most spot pricing models do not produce prices linked over 
time [Baughman et al 1997a, Baughman et al 1997b]. In their formulation, the authors 
identify the following ancillary services for which spot prices might be calculated: 
1'. voltage regulation; 
2. maintenance of generation and transmission reserves; 
3. regulation of frequency and tieline flows; 
4. remoyal and/or control of_ power harmonics - that 1s the amount of harmonic 
distortion; 
5. amount of spinning reserve necessary; 
6. enviromental impact associated with producing and delivering electricity. 
In order to calculate spot prices for ancillary services 3 and 4, dynamic con-
straints were included that relate one point in time to subsequent points in time. 
However, Baughman et al stated that prices must be published to the market parti-
cipants several times a second for these constraints to be effective. These two papers are 
an excellent example how the accurate representation of the power system in ~ pricing 
model, reaches a limit. Although mathematically feasible, the authors recognised that, 
18 CHAPTER 2 SPOT PRICING OF REACTIVE POWER 
at that time, technology and other practical aspects prevented the pricing of rapidly 
changing aspects of the power system (such as system frequency). Nevertheless, this 
model can be used to produce real and reactive power prices without loss of accuracy, 
while ignoring the dynamic prices. 
Baughman et al affirmed the need for reactive power pricing. In their formulation 
the price of reactive power at a node is equal to the marginal cost of producing any 
real power required by an increment of reactive power load at that node. This is 
in absence of binding power system constraints. Therefore, they concluded that the 
optimal transaction price in a wholesale electricity market should reflect the value of 
both real and reactive power. 
Dandachi et al [1996] also reported a similar approach in the design of a security 
constrained OPF (SC-OPF) for the National Grid Company (NGC). This SG-OPF 
has pricing components based on both var-utilisation and var-capacity. Dandachi et al 
proposed that the utilisation payments should replace the fixed payments used by NGC 
to compensate generating companies for their reactive power contribution to the system. 
Part of the utilisation payments to be made to generating companies for reactive power 
-support is based on reactive power generation cost functions. These were included in 
the SC-OPF objective function, and allow reactive power to be economically dispatched 
in the same way that real power is economically dispatched. It was planned that: 
"Under a market operation, these MVAr cost curves (i.e. functions), nor-
mally for individual generating units, would be offered by the generating 
companies for NGC to optimise the cost of reactive power." 
Unlike the ptevious formulations, this SC-OPF implies that reactive power has a gen-
eration cost, as described by these reactive power cost functions. Thus, reactive power 
generation is no longer free. 
Dandachi et al is one of two known publications where a spot market for reactive 
power is proposed that allows companies to offer a non-zero generation cost for reactive 
power. The other publication is that of Read a11d Ring [1995d] (the focus of this thesis). 
Other features of the SC-OPF are limits on pre- and post-contingency voltages, 
local voltage control solutions, station var control and handling infeasible constraints. 
Two objective functions were used for different parts of the load profile: a cost-
optimised, security constrained, reactive power dispatch objective function used only 
at the main load changes, and a minimum control action objective function used for 
reactive power refinement between major load changes. 
Dandachi et al reported three cases solved by this security constrained OPF, using 
NGC's 713-bus system: 
·1. ·base case OPF with voltage limits 
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2. pre-contingency reactive power reserve constraints added to Case 1 
3. contingency constraints added to Case 2 
NGC's system was divided into eight zones of self-sufficient reactive power spinning 
reserve. For each case, the most expensive marginal price in each zone was reported. 
These cases highlighted an interesting behaviour of reactive power prices, namely the 
wide variation in reactive power prices across a power system: 
• In Case 1, prices varied widely across the eight zones. Prices ranged from almost 
£0/MVArhr to approximately £60/MVArhr. 
• Adding pre-contigency constraints altered the marginal prices of the zones dra-
matically. Some prices showed very little variation while others changed by almost 
100%. 
• Adding contingency constraints resulted in four zones experiencing price increases 
of up to 800%. The other zones saw very little price increase. Maximum prices 
across all zones ranged from £5/MVArhr to £400/MVArhr. 
The main conclusion to be derived from these results is that reactive power prices 
are very sensitive to binding constraints. This is particularly true of contingency con-
straints, as these require dispatches that are conservative and not necessarily economic. 
Reactive power prices were also found to vary widely across the power system. 
2.4.5 Ex post Pricing 
OPFs are generally used either as planning tools or for real-time dispatch of power. 
Therefore prices from OPFs are usually calculated ex ante. However, Hogan et al [1996) 
stated that there is a general trend away from single organisations using centralised 
planning and ex ante prices to control the dispatch of power. The reason behind this 
trend is the belief that efficiencies in a power system can be gained through market 
and incentfve mechanisms, rather than through top-down planning. Hogan et al said 
that this can be achieved by using ex post prices in a wholesale electricity market. 
In an ex post pricing scheme, ex ante prices derived using supply and demand 
curves can be used "as forcasts of, or hedges against, ex post prices". Note that, 
it is possible to use a standard OPF to obtain ex post prices by tightening power 
system constraints. However, convergence to a feasible solution can be a problem if the 
optimisation algorithm is not carefully designed for optimal power flow applications. 
Such is the nature of the OPF from Cornell University, and used for this thesis (see 
Section 10.2). 
The de and ac spot pricing models proposed by Hogan [1992) calculate -spQt prices 
ex post (see Section 2.4.3). The approach used to calculate ex post spot prices is 
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different to that used to calculate ex ante spot prices. Ex ante spot prices are calculated 
for a predicted dispatch. This predicted dispatch is generated with a standard OFF 
using bids and offers, prior to the actual dispatch. Ex post spot prices however, are 
calculated for a dispatch that has already occurred6 . Thus, Hogan obtained his ( ex post) 
ac spot pricing model by linearising an OFF formulation around an operating point 
(the observed dispatch). The equations of his de pricing model were already linear. 
In an OFF, the objective is often to minimise the total cost of generation. The 
OFF achieves this by redispatching the whole power system. In contrast, the dispatch 
cannot be changed with ex post pricing because the observed dispatch has already .. 
occurred. Therefore, the objective of the ac spot pricing model is to determine the 
least expensive source fro~ which to generate the next unit of real or reactive power. 
In both approaches, the most expensive generator available for generating _power 
sets the marginal price of the next unit of power. This is because the most expensive 
generator currently generating is used to supply that next unit of power. Also, the 
behaviour of ex ante and ex post prices are the same. Only the point in time when the 
prices are calculated differs. Therefore, the price behaviour reported in the previous 
-se-ction applies equally to the behaviour of ex post prices. 
Read and Ring [1995d] formalised Hogan's work, by creating an ex post pricing 
framework called 'Dispatch Based Pricing'. Read and Ring's model differs from Hogan's 
model in two important aspects: 
1. Using power-flow terminology, Read and Ring modelled generator nodes as PV 
nodes, and all other nodes as PQ nodes. Hogan however, modelled all nodes as 
PQ nodes. 
2. Read and Ring enabled marginal generation costs to be specified for react-
ive power, viz. the ex post equivalent of the SC-OFF proposed by Dandachi 
et al [1996]. 
The Dispatch Based Pricing philosophy and mathematics are presented in subsequent 
chapters. 
The role of the objective function is to determine how the total wealth is distrib-
uted among the market participants when dispatching the power system [Ring 1995). 
Since the dispatch already exists, both Hogan, and Read and Ring allow the objective 
function of the ex post model to have an arbitrary form (assuming that the dispatch is 
optimal). Hence, the choice of objective function is influenced by the goals of the spot 
market. 
6 Sometimes, not all the necessary dispatch data is available. For example, there may be unknown 
binding constraints, or details regarding some minor actions/decisions of the system operator may not 
have been recorded. In these cases, the data describes a dispatch that differs from the actual dispatch. 
Hence_,_ this dispatch is called the "observed dispatch". It reflects the dispatch that is thought to have _ 
occurred. 
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2.4.6 Concerns Regarding Reactive Power Spot Prices 
To date, three main criticisms of reactive power spot pricing have been identified in 
ljterature: 
1. A sub-optimal dispatch may result in high reactive power prices [Kahn and 
Baldick 1994). 
2. Reactive power spot prices are negligible compared to real power spot prices 
in an unconstrained, optimally dispatched power system [Hao and Papalexo-
poulos 1997). 
3. Reactive power prices can be extremely volatile, causing unfavourable market 
conditions [Mitsche 1996). 
Kahn and Baldick focussed on the effect of a sub-optimal reactive power dispatch 
on reactive power prices. They used the 3-bus examples from Hogan [1996] to show that 
artificially constraining the dispatch of reactive power can result in high reactive power 
prices. Further, this inflated reactive power spot price dropped from $0.67 /MVArhr to 
$0.038/MVArhr when they removed the artificial constraint; the real power price at the 
same node dropped from $1.427 /MWhr to $1.314/MWhr. Kahn and Baldick stated 
therefore, that reactive power prices are small for an optimal dispatch. However, they 
assumed a zero reactive power generation cost. 
Spot pricing assumes an optimal dispatch. Kahn and Baldick questioned whether 
such a dispatch would be realised in practice. They also identified the potential for 
maiket participants to set artificial reactive power constraints. The objective being 
to manipulate reactive power prices for perso~al gain. Hence, they concluded that an 
audit function must be a necessary part of any spot pricing arrangement. 
Chattopadhyay et al, Baughman and Siddiqi [1991), and Mitsche also demonstrated 
that spot prices of reactive power are trivial in an unconstrained (well designed) power 
system. Hao and Papalexopoulos opted for a different pricing system, having experi-
enced reactive power spot prices to be 1 % of real power spot prices. They reasoned that 
low reactive power spot prices represent only a small portion of the true cost of provid-
ing reactive power services. Moreover, they opined that the capital costs incurred as 
part of these reactive power services should be used in the reactive power price calcu-
lation in order to sufficiently compensate generators of reactive power. Consequently, 
they proposed two new pricing methodologies, both based on a unit cost measure of the 
total reactive power capacity of a generator rather than on reactive power utilisation. 
NGC decided to solve the problem of negligible reactive power spot prices within a 
spot market framework, with payments for reactive power utilisation (i.e. usin_g gener-
ation cost functions), and payments for reactive power capacity [Dandachi et al 1996]. 
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Most literature recognise the volatility of spot prices for reactive power. The causes 
are shown to range from sub-optimal dispatch, to binding reactive power generator 
limits [Mitsche 1996], to binding voltage limits. A solution to this issue of volatility 
must be provided if a reactive power sub-market is to operate effectively7 . This was 
~mother reason why Hao and Papalexopoulos proposed a new pricing system. 
Chattopadhyay et al showed that price volatility can be removed through optimal 
placement of capacitors (or other reactive power sources) at load centers. Such place-
ments were demonstrated to improve the voltage profile of the power system by relieving 
binding voltage constraints. In turn, this relief drops the reactive power spot prices by 
providing a cheap reactive power source. Chattopadhyay et al recovered the capital 
costs through fixed paymen.ts added to all reactive power spot prices. 
2.5 ELECTRICITY PRICING IN NEW ZEALAND 
2.5.1 An Historical Overview of Real Power Pricing 
-
The structure of the real power pricing system in New Zealand has undergone a succes-
sion of changes. The most recent change was the inception of the Wholesale Electricity 
Market in 1996. Figure 2.2 highlights the main changes in the power sector that have 
influenced New Zealand's power system. 
The changes to New Zealand's real power pricing system have been motivated by 
the need to more accurately emphasis and describe the costs of energy supply [Tar-
iffs 1983]. These changes began in 1967 with the introduction of a 2-part bulk tariff 
reflecting enargy usage and peak demand at the wholesale level. The Ministry of En-
ergy changed this to a 4-pc:rt tariff in 1984, producing four time-of-use (TOD) charges. 
At the same time, a differential in wholesale electricity prices between the South ·and 
North Islands was introduced. The price differential described the marginal cost of 
transmission between the two islands. 
Since 1987, majDr ref<?rms have occurred. Corporatisation, deregulation and splits 
have occurred with the objective of returning competitive real power prices to the con-
sumer. For example, the Electricity Division of the Ministry of Energy was corporatised 
to form the Electricity Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ) in 1987. 
The following year, ECNZ began signalling expected half-hourly spot prices to in-
dustry. Retail distribution customers and very large industrial customers announced to 
ECNZ, their expected half-hourly power demands for the following year. The custom-
ers then entered into a one year contract to purchase between 90% and 110% of their 
expected demand from ECNZ, at a TOD rate [Ring 1995]. Any shortfall or surplus in 
7New Zealand's wholesale electricity market uses a system of ex ante bids, offers and financial hedges 
to help protect against spot price volatility [Alvey et al 1998]. -









1st July 1994 
1st February 1996 
1st October 1996 
Electricity Division recovers its operating costs by peak demand charges 
only. [Tariffs 1983] 
2-Part Bulk tariff introduced to charge for energy used and peak demand. 
[Tariffs 1983] 
Greater emphasis placed on the energy charge and less on peak demand. 
[Tariffs 1983] 
- 4-Part tariff introduced: Energy charge 7am- llpm; !!pm- 7am 
Peak Demand (7am - llpm) Summer; Winter 
[Tariffs 1983] 
- South Island - North Island price differential introduced. [Ring 1995] 
Electricity Division of the Ministry of Energy, coporatised to ECNZ. 
[McLay 1996] 
- Generation sector is deregulated. [McLay 1996] 
- April - ECNZ begins signalling expected half-hourly marginal prices to 
industry. [Turner 1995] 
A study to examine how a competitive WEM could operate.[EMCO 1996] 
- Coporatisation ofretail electricity distribution companies [McLay 1996] 
- EMCO created to design the WEM [EMCO 1996] 
- EMCO begins to facilitate contracts between ECNZ and retail 
distribution companies [Ring 1995] 
Separation of the national grid operating company, Trans Power NZ Ltd, 
from ECNZ to form a separate State Owned Enterprise (SOE). 
[McLay 1996] 
The NZ government, transfer significant generation assets from ECNZ to 
establish major new supply side competitor, Contact Energy Ltd. 
[McLay 1996] 
Competitive wholesale electricity spot market begins; it is administered 
by EMCO. [Alvey et al. 1997] 
Figure 2.2 Major transitions in wholesale pricing of real power within New Zealand. 
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these annual contracts was. traded at the spot price. This pricing structure continued 
until the commencement of the Wholesale Electricity Market on ist October 1996. 
2.5.2 The New Zealand Wholesale Electricity Market 
The New Zealand electricity market (NZEM) is designed for wholesale trade of real 
power. The market initially had two components: the "Day-Ahead Financial Com-
mitment Market", and the "Real-Time Physical Spot Market" [NZEM 1996]. The 
Day-Ahead market was discontinued as at 30 September 1998, due to lack of particip-
ation from spot market participants. 
2.5.2.1 The Day-Ahead Financial Commitment Market 
This was a voluntary market. It provided a framework for spot market participants 
to establish financial hedge positions a day in advance of the actual, dispatch and 
transmission of real power. Such hedges protect participants against the volatility of 
ihe spot prices. 
Participants in this market were to submit bids for specific quantities of real power 
at certain prices, or submit offers to sell financial hedges. The settlement of these bids 
and offers determined the price of power sold in this market. This market was similar 
to the TOU prices set by ECNZ between 1988 and 1996 (See Section 2.5.1). 
2.5.2.2 Real-Time Physical Market 
In this market, real power is sold at the spot price. A security-constrained, bid-clearing 
system (SG-BCS) is used in the scheduling process of this market [Alvey et al 1998]. 
Bids and offers (which reflect the unit costs of generation) are submitted daily by 
purchasers and generating companies respectively, for every half-hourly trading period 
in that day. Bids a11.d offers reflect the expected quantity to be bought ( or capacity to 
be sold) in each trading period. From these bids and offers, the SC-BCS determines an 
optimal generation dispatch schedule for that day. This schedule sets the provisional 
spot prices for real power. The grid dispatcher, Transpower New Zealand Ltd, 1s 
required to co-ordinate the dispatch of generation according to this schedule. 
A clearing manager, the Electricity Market Company (EMC08 ) calculates final 
spot prices, ex post. These are based on the provisional spot prices, but account for 
any deviations from the dispatch schedule. The final spot price at a node is the cost 
of any power not sold in the Day-Ahead market, at that node. 
8 EMCO is now known as M-co, The Marketplace Company, as at 16 November 1998. 
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The bid-clearing system is designed around a de OFF-based algorithm, as it is re-
quired to optimise only the dispatch of real power generation. The dispatch is optimised 
subject to stringent constraints on: 
• physical power system quantities; 
• real power flow and generation; 
• reserve requirements. 
Other electricity services (frequency-keeping reserve and reactive and voltage support) 
are managed through side-contracts. 
2.5.3 Reactive Power Pricing in New Zealand 
In New Zealand, very little attention has been given to reactive power pricing at a 
wholesale level. Similarly, there is very little documentation on the history of any 
reactive power charges that may have been implemented. 
Since the introduction of the NZEM however, New Zealand's high voltage network 
has been divided into four reactive power zones. These zones are used to pay for the 
different levels of voltage support required throughout the country. At each offtake, 
a fixed usage charge is added to the spot price9 . Until mid-1998, the Zone 1 charge 
was 0.07 cents/kWhr/offtake/month. The charges for Zones 2, 3 and 4 were all 0.01 
cents/kWhr/offtake/month. This pays the real power generation costs of stations dis-
patched only to provide reactive power generation, for voltage support. For example, 
part of these charges is used to finance the operation of Marsden and Otahuhu power . 
stations. These stations must be dispatched to provide voltage support for the Auck-
land region, even· when the NZEM does not want to purchase real power from these 
stations. 
At a retail level (that is, between a retail power company and the end-users) react-
ive power is often incorporated in the price structure used for large business customers 
and indust~:ial cu·stomers. This may take the form of a power demand charge based on 
the customer's maximum half-hourly kVA demand per month (cents/kVA/day). This 
is in addition to the usage charge for real power [Retail 1994]. 
During the summer, loads such as motors on irrigation equipment are common. 
These loads usually have a low power-factor. Having a low power-factor can cause an 
unacceptably low voltage at the point of load connection. Thus load owners are en-
couraged through incentives to install power-factor correction capacitors. An incentive 
may take the form of a rebate on the reactive power rating of connected capacitance, 
where the price of the rebate might have units of $/kVAr/year. 
9 An offtake is the point of connection in the high voltage network, from which a- retail power 
company draws its power. 'Offtake' is also known as the 'supply-point' or 'point-of-connection'. 
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2.6 CONCLUSIONS. 
Spot pricing has evolved greatly over the past three decades. Even though a spot pricing 
model for: both real and reactive power was first introduced in 1982 by Caramanis 
et al [1982], spot pricing of reactive power has only received widespread attention 
'since 1991. This attention has intensified with the need to find an acceptable pricing 
structure for reactive power ancillary services in a deregulated market. 
As spot pricing models have developed, the importance of calculating spot prices for 
reactive power has become apparent, especially when binding voltage limits are present 
within the power system. De OPF models have been found to be highly inaccurate 
when reactive power flows and voltage limits are an issue. Consequently, ac OPF 
formulations have been extensively developed. 
To date, literature have identified three main behavioural characteristics of ex ante 
reactive power spot prices, when reactive power generation is assumed as free. Reactive 
power spot prices are: 
1. generally negligible for an unconstrained dispatch, representing only a portion of 
the true cost of providing ancillary services; 
2. volatile in the presence of voltage constraints or reactive power generation con-
straints; 
3. potentially volatile in a sub-optimal dispatch. 
However, experimental results and the theory describing the mechanism behind this 
price behaviour are non-existent. Further, there is no literature demonstrating the 
behaviour of •ex post reactive power spot prices for optimal and sub-optimal dispatches. 
Read and Ring [1995a] doe~ however, use the behaviour of ex post real power spot prices 
to predict the behaviour of reactive power spot prices. · 
In response to the problem of negligibility, Dandachi et al has shown that the spot 
pricing methodology can be used_to pay for reactive power services by using a form of 
reactive power generatio~ cost functions. However, no adequate results are provided 
to demonstrate the effect of these functions on the behaviour of reactive power spot 
prices. 
Read and Ring's ex post Dispatch Based Pricing model provides an excellent frame-
work in which to investigate the behaviour of reactive power spot prices, because it 
allows non-zero generation costs to be specified for reactive power. Hence, this thesis 
uses a form of the Dispatch Based Pricing model to describe the behaviour of react-
ive power ex post spot prices. The emphasis is on price behaviour in a market where 
generation cost functions are used to economically dispatch reactive power, so as to 
fund the required ancillary services. Reactive power price behavioural descriptions are 
provided for optimal and sub-optimal, unconstrained and constrained dispatches of -
real apd reactive power. 
Chapter 3 
POWER SYSTEM THEORY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter identified the need for further investigation into the behaviour of 
reactive power prices in the context of a spot market where reactive power is econom-
ically dispatched using reactive power generation cost functions. The Dispatch Based 
Pricing model of Ring [1995) (and reproduced in Read and Ring [1995d]) was identified 
as a suitable framework in which to conduct such an investigation. The Dispatch Based 
Pricing model has the equations necessary to calculate ex post prices for reactive power 
in a reactive power sub-market, in addition to the equations used to calculate ex post 
prices for real power. These reactive power equations are also necessary for correctly 
calculating real power marginal prices. 
In this chapter, the philosophy behind the Dispatch Based Pricing model is applied 
to the economic dispatch of both real and reactive power. This is followed by the 
definition of power system nomenclature used in the context of the Dispatch Based 
Pricing framework. 
Discussions with Read and Ring have revealed that it is not clear how the reactive 
power equations should be interpreted and applied in the context of a spot market 
having both real and reactive power sub-markets. Hence, the content of this chapter 
and Chapters 4 and 5 are used to form a theoretical foundation for the work presented 
in Chapters 6 to 8. In Chapters 6 to 8, an interpretation of the Dispatch Based Pricing 
model in the context of a spot market with real and reactive power sub-markets is 
proposed. 
3.2 DISPATCH BASED PRICING 
Dispatch Based Pricing enables the Clearing Manager (i.e. the Dispatch Based Pri-
cing operator) to provide a rational economic explanation for an observed dispatch 
of real and reactive power generation [NZEM 1996]. Dispatch Based Pricing ~chieves 
this by providing a framework in which the Clearing Manager uses power system con-
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straints to explain the observed dispatch. The Clearing Manager invokes constraints 
he/she perceives (correctly or incorrectly) as having restricted the dispatch when it 
occurred [Read and Ring 1995b, Ring 1995, Read and Ring 1996]. The Dispatch Based 
Pricing model then generates a set of real and reactive power marginal prices based on 
the marginal costs of these perceived constraints. Hence, the marginal costs of these 
constraints economically explain the observed dispatch. 
It is not important that these perceived constraints do not accurately match reality, 
as long as all market participants agree with these perceived constraints. This is vital 
because, if the Clearing Manager were forced to include every binding constraint the 
pricing problem would not be solvable. The reason for this is because constraints as 
subtle as the Dispatcher adjusting reactive power generation to avoid a voltage limit 
are often overlooked. 
In this thesis, a generic spot market is assumed for all discussions. This market is 
composed of real and reactive power sub-markets. The assumed goal for this generic 
market is to optimally (i.e. economically) dispatch real and reactive power by minim-
ising the total cost of real and reactive power generation. The total cost is obtained by 
summing the real and reactive power generation cost functions of all the generators; 
this summation is the social welfare function (ref. Section 2.3). The cost functions are 
assumed to have been submitted by generating companies as offers in the 'Real-Time 
Physical Market' (described in Section 2.5.2.2). These offers, coupled with bids from 
consumers and binding constraints determine the actions of the dispatcher. They cause 
real and reactive power to be optimally dispatched. 
After the fact, the Dispatch Based Pricing model is used by the Clearing Manager 
(see Section ,2.5.2) to calculate ex post marginal prices for real and reactive power. 
These prices are based o~ the final dispatch, all bids and offers, all known binding 
constraints, and any known dispatcher actions that are not explained by the binding 
constraints. 
3.3 REACTIVE POWER LOSSES 
Marginal prices of real and reactive power are composed of similar marginal resource 
cost components within the Dispatch Based Pricing framework. Therefore, the reactive 
power marginal prices of the spot market described in the previous section are based on 
the definition of the real power marginal (spot) price in Section 2.3. Thus, the marginal 
price of reactive power at any node is defined to consist of the marginal costs of: 
• the next unit of reactive power (defined by the generation cost functions); 
• ·real power losses resulting from an incremental change in reactive power demand; 
3.3 REACTIVE POWER LOSSES 29 
• reactive power losses resulting from an incremental change in reactive power 
demand; 
• any constraints on the power system. 
Defining the structure of reactive power marginal prices in this way implies that react-
ive power flows from the generator nodes (the producers) to the demand nodes (the 
consumers) when it is sold, just as real power does. 
The 'reactive power loss' term is used to describe the cost to the system of 'trans-
porting' reactive power from generator to demand. Physically, reactive power is de-· 
scribed as the continual interchange of power between the generators and energy storage 
devices such as capacitors and inductors [Meadows 1972). Furthermore, reactive power 
is never 'lost' from the power system in the form of 'work done', the case for real 
power. Therefore, to calculate the 'reactive power loss' term, the reactive power losses 
are defined for a pi-modelled branch (k) (see Figure 3.1) as being: 
(3.1) 
The total reactive power loss in the power system is therefore: 
(3.2) 
K is the set of all branches in the network [Read and Ring 1995c). 
The pi-model is used in Dispatch Based Pricing to model all transformers, trans-
mission lines and shunt devices. Note that Read and Ring formulated the pi-model 
using shunt impedances instead of shunt admittances. 
Figure 3.1 Pi-model representation of power system branches in the Dispatch Based Pricing 
model. 
If Branch k is inductive, reactive power is drawn out of the network and LQk is 
positive, indicating that reactive power is 'lost'. If Branch k is capacitive, reactive 
power is injected into the network and LQk is negative, indicating that reaGtive power 
is being generated. 
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The average reactive power flow in a branch, k, is given by: 
(3.3) 
3.4 OPTIMAL POWER FLOW TECHNOLOGY 
In this thesis, the optimal power flow (OPF) has been divided into two parts for the 
purpose of discussion: 
1. The OPF formulation, which is composed of an objective function and a set of 
constraints. 
2. The OPF algorithm. This is the optimisation algorithm that finds optimal values 
for the power system resource variables. In doing this, the algorithm minimises 
(or maximises) the objective function within the feasible region defined by the 
power system constraints (see Figure 4.1). 
These two parts are co-dependent. 
3.5 POWER SYSTEM VARIABLES 
Four power system resources are the prime focus of power system dispatches within this 
thesis: real power injection (P); reactive power injection (Q); voltage magnitude (V); 
voltage angle ( B). The four variables representing these four resources apply to every 
node within the power system. Each node is usually classified by its two independent 
variables. The algorithm used determines which variables are independent, and hence 
used to classify nodes. 
3.5.1 The Power-Flow Atgorithm 
Power-flow algorithms are generally used for planning purposes. Consequently, cer-
tain information is known prior to running the algorithm. All generator nodes (supply 
nodes) are classed as PV nodes because the real power generation and voltage mag-
nitude are known. Hence, P and V are fixed at known levels, making these the inde-
pendent variables. At load nodes (or demand nodes) the demand for real and reactive 
power is known. Hence, load nodes are classed as PQ nodes because P and Q are the 
fixed and independent variables. 
The power-flow calculates the values of the remaining two power system variables 
at each node, with respect to the data describing the physical network and the valu~s 
of the independent variables. These are the dependent power system variables. 
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PY 
(a) Power-flow (b) Optimal Power Flow 
Figure 3.2 The classification of nodes is determined by the algorithm used. 
There is a third type of node. This is the swing bus, also known as the slack bus. 
At this node the voltage magnitude and angle are fixed to provide a reference for all 
other nodes within the power system. Hence, this bus is classed as a VB node. 
The primary task of the generator at the swing bus is to modify its real and reactive 
power generation so that total generation matches total demand plus losses. Doing so 
maintains the frequency of the power system and ensures the conservation of real and 
reactive power in the system [Read and Ring 1995d, p.19]. Figure 3.2(a) Ulustrates the 
different power-flow, node classifications. 
3.5.2 Optimal Pmver Flow Algorithm 
Two node types exist in an OPF: generator nodes and load (demand) nodes. Often, 
power-flow classifications (PV and PQ) are used to describe these node types. However, 
this can create confusion, as the power system variables in an OPF algorithm behave 
differently to the independent variables in a power-flow algorithm. 
Consider for example, an OPF generator node where the voltage (V) is fixed. At 
this node, the real power generation (Pa) is controlled by the OPF algorithm as it 
minimises the value of the objective function. Thus, V is fixed but the value of Pa 
changes from the _start of the optimisation process to the finish of the process. By 
contrast, Pa and Vat a power-flow PV node remain fixed throughout the power-flow 
solution process. Hence, this OPF generator node does not behave in the same way as 
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a power-flow PV node. Therefore, to class this generator node as a PV node would be 
misleading. Below, an alternative node classification system is proposed to correctly 
describe the characteristics of OPF nodes in this thesis. 
The power system resource variables are separated into three vectors in an optimal 
power flow algorithm [Wood and Wollenberg 1996]: 
• state, or unknown, variables (x); 
• control variables (u); 
• fixed parameters (f5). 
Given these vectors, OPF nodes can be classified according to their known variables: 
upper case letters to indicate control variables; lower case letters to indicate fixed 
parameters. To identify generator nodes and demand nodes respectively, the letters 
'G' and 'D' are used. 
Two types of OPF algorithm are used in this thesis. The difference between the 
-two types is the variables contained within each vector. In one OPF type, the vectors 
are: 
[ e ] } Demand nodes e Reference node x= 
; Generator nodes; no ref. p } Demand nodes (3.4) f5= 
Q 
[ 'P ] Generator nodes 
v Generator nodes 
u= 
where P (=Pa-PD) is the real power injection at each. node, and where PD is the real 
power demand (or load) at that node. The reactive power injections at all generator 
nodes ( Q = Q a - Q D) do not ~eature in these vectors. This is because Q at each 
generator node is depend~nt on, and defiµed by, the values of P, V and e at all power 
system nodes. 
The vector contents of this type are typical of the commercially available OPFs 
considered during the research of this Master's thesis. Hence, the node classifications 
for this OPF type are: 
e PvG for generator nodes, and 
• pqD for demand nodes. 
See Figure 3.2(b). An OPF with this vector-set (Vector-Set 3.4) is referred to as a 
'PvG~type' OPF. 
3.5 POWER SYSTEM VARIABLES 
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Here, the OPF algorithm directly controls the real and reactive power injections (P 
and Q) at generator nodes. Hence, the OPF algorithm also directly controls P0 and 
Q a, as implied by the definitions of P and Q. Both V and e at generator nodes are 
now dependent on P and Q because they are in x. The contents of these vectors were 
developed to minimise the costs of real and reactive power generation, specifically for 
the research work presented within this thesis. 
The node classifications for this OPF type are: 
• PQG for generator nodes, and 
• pqD for demand nodes. 
When referring to generator and demand nodes together, the term 'pq' is used: 
pq = (PQG U pqD) (3.6) 
Hence, an OPF with Vector-Set 3.5 is referre~ to as a 'pq-type' OPF. 
The OPF node classification system is therefore, capable of describing the charac-
teristics of nodes in different OPF types. 
The term 'swing bus' is not relev?'nt when using an OPF. The dispatch produced 
·- . 
by an OPF applies only to a single instant in time. Hence, it might be necessary to use 
an OPF for every trading period in a spot market to re-optimise the dispatch of real 
and reactive power generation. During this re-optimisation, the swing bus generator is 
dispatched in an identical manner to all other generators. Furthermore, the reference 
voltage magnitude and angle usually associated with the swing bus, can be assigned 
to any generator during optimisation. Consequently, no distinction is made between 
the swing bus and other generators. Therefore, the swing bus is a PQG node during 
the optimisation process (or PvG node depending on the OPF type). However, the 
swing bus operates as a power-flow VB bus (identified with 'S') between each dispatch 
optimisation, absorbing minor fluctuations of real power load in the powei: system to 
maintain the power system frequency. 
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3.5.3 OPF Independent and Dependent Variables 
In a power-flow problem, the known, fixed variables are called the independent vari-
ables, and the other unknown variables are the dependent variables. For the OPF 
formulations in this thesis, the control variables and fixed parameters can be called the 
independent variables. The state variables (and Q0 in a PvG-type OPF) are therefore 
the dependent variables. To solve an OPF problem, the user sets the values of the 
fixed parameters. The OPF algorithm then determines the optimal values of the con-
trol parameters using an objective function. The values of these independent variables 
then determine the values of the dependent variables. 
3.6 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN POWER SYSTEM VARIABLES 
Figure 3.3 depicts the response (or sensitivity) of one power system variable to a change 
in another variable. These relationships only exist in networks where the reactance to 
resistance ratio (X/ R) is high. 




Figure 3.3 Strong responses exist between real power and voltage angle, and between reactive 
power and voltage magnitude. 
3. 7 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, the philosophy behind Dispatch Based Pricing has been presented. That 
is marginal prices can be calculat~d ex post, to provide a rational economic explanation 
for any observed dispatch. of real and reactive power generation. 
By defining the concept of reactive power losses Read and Ring [1995d] enable 
reactive power to be priced and traded within a spot pricing market. 
Optimal power flow technology is used in this thesis to model the primary purpose 
of a spot market, to optimise the dispatch of real and reactive power. PvG-type and 
pq-type OPFs have been defined. These OPF types represent two types of spot market 
that both include a reactive power sub-market. The power system nodes in each spot 
market have therefore been classified to reflect their behaviour in the context of the 
relevant OPF type. 
Chapter 4 
THE PRIMAL OPF FORMULATION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Read and Ring used Linear Programming Duality theory to derive the Dispatch Based 
Pricing model from their proposed non-linear OPF formulation. The stages in this 
derivation process are: 
1. linearising the non-linear OPF formulation; 
2. obtaining the dual formulation from this linearised OPF; 
3. simplifying the dual formulation to obtain the Dispatch Based Pricing model. 
This chapter is concerned with Stage 1. 
In this chapter, Read and Ring's non-linear OPF formulation is reclassified to 
conform with the OPF nomenclature proposed in the previous chapter. This reclassified 
OPF formulation is then linearised. 
The concept 'of linear programming is introduced using an example within this 
chapter. This example demonstrates how the linearised OPF formulation is a linear 
programming problem. Finally, a discussion on how the linearised OPF can be used to 
calculate marginal prices for real and reactive power is presented. 
4.2 A NON-LINEAR OPF FORMULATION 
Equations 4.1 to 4.13 describe the non-linear OPF formulation used to derive the 
pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing model used in this thesis. This OPF is a modified 
version of Read and Ring's OPF formulation (see Appendix C) and is referred to as the 
pq/PvG OPF formulation. The name indicates that the formulation is the combination 
of a pq-type OPF formulation and a PvG-type OPF formulation. This is discussed 
further in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
The modifications consisted of reclassifying Read and Ring's formulation equations 
with respect to the pq and PvG node classifications defined in the previous chapter. 
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subject to: 
THE NON-LINEAR pq/PvG OPF FORMULATION 
Minimise 
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Vn E PvG ( 4.4) 
Vn E pq (4.5) 
Vk EK (4.6) 
Vk EK (4.7) 
Vi E PX (4.8) 
Vi E PX (4.9) 
Vi E PX (4.10) 
Vi E PX (4.11) 
Vi E PX (4.12) 
VkEK (4.13) 
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Further, the swing bus in Read and Ring's OFF formulation was omitted from the 
pq/PvG OFF formulation since there is no swing bus in OFF technology. 
The objective function of the pq/PvG OFF formulation (Equation 4.1) includes 
non-zero generation cost function for reactive power, as well as for real power. Accord-
ingly, this pq/PvG OPF models a spot market where both real and reactive power are 
economically dispatched. 
The goal of the pq/PvG OFF formulation is to optimise the usage of 'energy 
resources' within the power system, so as to minimise the objective function. Each re-
source is represented by a variable in this formulation. The behaviour of these resources . 
are described by the equality constraints (Equations 4.2 to 4. 7) and the availabil-
ity of these resources are described by the inequality constraints (Equations 4.8 to 4.13). 
4.2:1 The Equality Constraints 
The equality constraints represent the physical characteristics of the power system 
variables. Hence, these constraints ensure that the OFF will calculate optimal values 
for the variables which represent an actual power system dispatch [Ring 1995, pp. 
49-50]. 
4.2.1.1 Conservation of Power 
Equations 4.2 and 4.3 are used to conserve real and reactive power within the system. 
For example, Equation 4.3 sums the nett reactive power injection at all nodes (gener-
ation minus demand) and ensures that this is equal to the reactive power losses in the 
syst~m. The total loss of reactive power (LQ, as defined in Section 3.3) is a function of 
, , PX PX pq pq PvG 
the mdependent variables of the power system: Pa , P O , QG , Q0 and .V 
In this thesis, PX is defined as the set of all nodes: 
PX = (PvG U pq) 
Note that Read and Ring use power-flow terminology, and thus use PXS to identify a 
set of all nodes that includes a swing bus: 
PXS = (PVUPQUS) 
= (PX US) 
4.2.1.2 Dependent Reactive Power Injection at PvG-Type Nodes 
This equality constraint (Equation 4.4) is used to reflect the dependent nature of re-
active power at PvG nodes. At a node n, the nett injection of reactive power ~nto the 
network ( Q n) is equal to the difference between the generation and demand for reactive 
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power at that node: 
Qn repres.ents a function, dependent on the independent power system variables. 
4.2.1.3 Dependent Voltage at pq-Type Nodes 
At a pq node n, the dependent nature of voltage magnitude (Vn) is described by 
Equation 4.5. At pq nodes, Vn is a function of the independent power system variables. 
This equation is valid for use with both PQG and pqD nodes (ref. Equation 3.6). 
4.2.1.4 Transmission Line Flows 
Equations 4.6 and 4. 7 describe the dependency of average real and reactive power flow 
in a branch k on the independent power system variables. 
4.2.2. The Inequality Constraints 
Each inequality constraint (Equations 4.8 to 4.13) represents the finite availability of 
an energy resource. The limits that define the availability of each resource are: 
• P;;in: The minimum real power generation limit is defined by the physical cap-
abilitieB of a generator. It need not be zero, and may be influenced by factors 
such as ramp rates [Ring 1995], or increased operating costs at low generation 
levels. 
• p;;ax ,Q:in ,Q:ax: These represent the generating limits for real and reactive 
power at each node. The maximum limits.are usually set to zero for non-generator 
nodes. If Q:m is negative, an inductive power system component is present at 
that node. This may be a generator capable of absorbing reactive power. 
set set • 
• PD ,Q v : These are the demands for real and reactive power at each node, set 
by customers connected to the power system. 
• Vmin, Vmax: These limits restrict the range of the voltage magnitude at each node. 
• Tkmax: This defines the square of the maximum MVA loading of Branch k. This 
is also referred to as the thermal limit, because exceeding the MVA limit causes 
· excessive heating of the branch. 
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4.3 OPF FORMULATION MODIFICATIONS 
Appendix C presents an OPF formulation taken from the work of Ring [1995], and 
Read and Ring [1995d]. In that OPF formulation, power-flow classifications are used 
to indicate whether each equation is to be applied to a generator node or a demand 
node. 
In discussions with Read and Ring, these power-flow classifications caused con-
fusion as to how their Dispatch Based Pricing equations should be interpreted and 
applied. Consequently, their OPF formulation has been modified according-to the 
node classifications defined in Section 3.5.2, resulting in the pq/PvG OPF formulation· 
(Equations 4.1 to 4.13). This has removed any confusion surrounding the interpretation 
and application of the resultant Dispatch Based Pricing equations (5.1 to 5.9), which 
are derived from the pq/PvG OPF formulation. Table 4.1 summarises the changes 
made to Read and Ring's OPF formulation. 
Table 4.1 Summary of modifications made to the OPF formulation proposed by Read and Ring (ref. 
Appendix C). 
Read and Ring pq/PvG 
OPF OPF 
Independent Variables: Q:Q - Q:Q Q:q - Q~q 
VPVS VPvG 
Dependent Voltage Constrafnt: Vi E PQ Vi E pq 
Dependent Reactive Power 
Constraint: Vi E PV Vi E PvG 
Resource Constraint Settings: Vi E PXS Vi E PX 
The changes .indicate that Read and Ring assumed a mixed PvG /pq-type OPF 
formulation. In addition however, they identified a swing bus (i.e. 'S') having assumed 
that the swing bus operates as a VB node during the optimisation of the dispatch. 
Since the swing bus is just a normal generator node during optimisation, 'S' is not 
included in. the n;1odified OPF formulation (i.e. pq/PvG OPF). 
4.4 LINEARISING THE OPF FORMULATION 
4.4.1 An OPF Linear Program - The Primal Problem 
The non-linear pq/PvG OPF optimises the usage of energy resources, to obtain a 
power system dispatch where the total generation cost is minimised. With ex post 
pricing however, a dispatch already exists. Given an observed dispatch therefore, the 
aim of an ex post OPF is to minimise the change in the total generation cost in response 
to any change in the real and/or reactive power demand. This is achieved by optimising 
the changes of all energy resources with respect to marginal increases in each of the 
f~llowing independent resource variables: · 
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Vi E PX 
Vi E pq 
Vi E PvG 
An ex post OPF can be obtained by linearising all variables of the pq/PvG OPF 
equations around an operating point (the observed or existing dispatch). For example, 
the above independent variables become: 
Vi E PX 
Vi E pq 
Vi E PvG 
where + and - indicate the next and last units of each resource. v; remains unchanged 
because it is already linear. Appendix D summarises the process used to linearise 
the pq/PvG OPF formulation. The resultant equations (D.2-D.17) comprise a linear 
program, referred to throughout this thesis as the fundamental or 'primal' (linear pro-
gramming) problem [Ring 1995). A linear program is just a constrained optimisation 
_p:roblem composed of a linear objective function and linear constraints. Different OPF 
formulations result in different primal linear programming problems. 
The variables of this primal problem are 'marginal variables' representing changes 
in the energy resources. The maximum amount by which each resource can change is 
defined by the linearised constraints. For example, Q;i indicates the marginal (incre-
mental) increase in the amount of reactive power generation being injected into the 
power system by the generator at Node i, in response to a marginal increase in another 
power system variable. However, Equation D.11 restricts the amount by which Gen-
erator i can 'increase its generation in response to the other increased power system 
variable. The ex post objective function of Appendix D calculates the change in. the 
total cost of generation, with respect to_ this change in generation. 
With respect to an observed dispatch, solving this linear program determines 
which generators should be used_to supply the next unit of real or reactive power, so 
as to minimise the ex post (i.e. linearised) objective function. 
4.4.2 An Example of Linear Programming 
Linear programming deals with the problem of maximising or minimising a linear func-
tion with respect to a set of linear constraints [Bazaraa and Jarvis 1977). Below is an 
example of a simple, 2-variable, linear program: 
Minimise 
subject to: -x - 2x > -12 1 2 -
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This linear program is represented graphically in Figure 4.1. 
(0,6) 
Figure 4.1 A graphical representation of the 2-variable linear program. 
The set of all points that satisfies the constraints of the linear program is called 
the 'feasible region'. However, the point (2,0) is where the variables are optimised such 
that the objective function f (xi, x 2 ) is minimised. With respect to the linearised OPF 
therefore, each feasible point represents a valid dispatch, since the constraints define 
the physical properties of a power system. But, the vertex (2,0) represents the optimal 
dispatch. The optimal point always resides on a vertex of the feasible region. 
The variables /31 , /32 are the shadow prices ( or LaGrange multipliers as described 
in Appendix B) corresponding to the constraints of this linear programming problem. 
4.4,3 Marginal Prices From The Primal Problem 
The solution to tne primal linear programming problem is a set of optimal values for 
the marginal, power system variables. The goal of ex post pricing however, is to find 
a set of marginal prices for the observed dispatch (which is described by the observed 
values of the marginal power system variables). 
The prhnal problem can be solved using the gradient method. The gradient method 
assigns a LaGrange multiplier to each resource constraint. Economically, these multi-
pliers are known as 'shadow prices'. Read and Ring offer a description of the shadow 
price: 
"Each shadow price represents the change in primal objective 
function value which would be brought about if we could change 
the right hand side of the corresponding primal constraint by one 
unit. As the primal constraints effectively limit resource usage, 
the shadow prices define the value to the system of having one 
more (or less) unit of each resource." 
Read and Ring {1995d, Appendix 1} 
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That is, each shadow price is the marginal cost of a constrained resource. This is 
confirmed in Appendix B, where it is demonstrated that the value of each multiplier is 
equal to the marginal price of the corresponding power system resource. For example, 
the linearised OPF formulation (Equations D.2 to D.17) has 15 associated shadow 
prices. The shadow prices for Equations D.15 and D.16 are the marginal costs of real 
and reactive power demand at all nodes, and are the marginal prices used within a spot 
market to trade real and reactive power. The behaviour of these shadow prices are the 
focus of Chapters 9 and 10. 
Read and Ring [1995d, Section 2.4] note that it is possible to obtain values for 
the shadow prices by perturbing each marginal resource variable in turn and resolving 
the primal problem with ea~h perturbation. The corresponding change in the objective 
function is the value of the shadow price associated with the perturbed variable. In this 
regard, this perturbation method is analogous to the gradient method. Read and Ring 
however, rejected this approach in favour of linear programming duality theory. Duality 
enables the shadow prices to be solved directly, by forming a new linear program where 
the shadow prices become the variables to be optimised. 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter a non-linear OPF formulation (pq/PvG OPF) has been introduced and 
described. The pq/PvG OPF formulation is a modified version of the OPF formulation 
taken from the work of Read and Ring [1995d] and of Ring [1995]. Both the pq/PvG 
OPF formulation and Read and Ring's OPF are a mixture of the pq-type and PvG-
type OPFs described in the previous chapter. Hence, the classes PvG and pq have 
been used in'the pq/PvG OPF formulation to identify power system nodes. Also, the 
swing bus has been omitte.d from the pq/PvG OPF formulation. 
An ex post OPF was created by linearising the pq/PvG OPF formulation; this was 
Stage 1. The resulting equations (D.2 to D.17) form a primal linear program that can 
be solved to determine the most _~conomic source from which to obtain the next unit 
of real or reactive power. .However, Read and Ring only use this linear program as the 
first stage in deriving the Dispatch Based Pricing model. 
In Stage 2, the primal linear program is used to derive a dual linear program, in 
which the shadow prices of the primal problem are solved directly. Stage 3 consists of 
simplifying this dual linear program to obtain the final pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing 
model. Stages 2 and 3 are the subject of the next chapter. 
Chapter 5 
DUALITY AND THE DISPATCH BASED PRICING 
MODEL 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The goal of ex post spot pricing is to obtain a set of shadow prices that provides an 
economic explanation for the observed dispatch. To achieve this goal, Read and Ring 
used Linear Programming Duality theory. They used duality theory to form a dual 
linear program, which was then rearranged to obtain the equations of their Dispatch 
Based Pricing model. 
In this chapter, stages 2 and 3 in the derivation of the pq/PvG Dispatch Based 
Pricing model are presented. First though, the concept of duality is explained through 
a simple example. Duality is also explained in the context of a hypothetical competitive 
electricity market. The equations of the pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing model are 
then described with respect to the economic dispatch of real and reactive power. 
•Read and Ring used certain terms and symbols to describe the application of 
Dispatch Based ~ricing to a real power spot market. These Dispatch Based Pricing 
terms (as presented in Ring [1995]) are redefined in this chapter for application to 
spot markets that include reactive power sub-markets. These markets are presented 
in subsequent chapters. 
5.2 AN EXAMPLE OF A DUAL LINEAR PROGRAMMING 
PROBLEM 
The variables in a dual linear program are the shadow prices ( or LaGrange multipliers, 
or marginal prices) of the primal linear program. Take the linear programming example 
in Section 4.4.2. Given that the shadow prices of the constraints in that primal linear 
program are /31 and /32, the dual linear program is formulated as: 
Maximise 
subject to: 
w(/31, /32) = -12 /31 + 2 /32 
-/31 + /32 ::::; 3 
-2 /31 + /32 ::::; 5 
/31, /32 ~ 0 
44 CHAPTER 5 DUALITY AND THE DISPATCH BASED PRICING MODEL 
This dual linear program demonstrates that the shadow prices (or marginal prices) 
can be solved directly. Shadow prices are sometimes called dual variables because they 
are used to form the dual problem. Note that the shadow prices of these 'dual' con-
straints are the primal variables in the original linear programming example. Standard 
linear programming texts such as Bazaraa and Jarvis [1977] present duality theory in 
detail. 
Read and Ring defined the relationship between a primal linear programming prob-
lem and its dual. For example, if (31 and (32 are actually marginal prices representing 
the value of two energy resources, they stated that: 
"If the primal objective is to minimise the costs ( of any resources 
used), the dual objective is to maximise the value of the resources 
available, as defined by the constraints of the primal problem." 
Read and Ring {1995d, Appendix 1} 
Read and Ring took the dual linear programmming approach, since their goal was 
to obtain a set of ex post marginal prices that represent the maximum value of the 
-resources available to supply the next unit of real or reactive power. They did not 
need to solve the primal ( ex post OPF) problem, which determines how to optimally 
dispatch the next unit of power so as to minimise the costs of resources used. 
5.3 FORMING THE DUAL PRICING PROBLEM 
The procedure used to obtain the example, dual linear program in Section 5.2 was 
applied to the ex post pricing, primal linear program (Equations D.2 to D.17). The 
result is the 'dual linear programming problem described by Equations D.18 to D.28. 
As in the examples above, ·the shadow (i.e. marginal) P!ices of the energy resources in 
the primal problem are now the variables of this dual problem. Hence, the marginal 
prices of the power system resources can be solved directly. 
The marginal prices are optimised in order to maximise the objective function. 
However, each constraint equation in this dual problem prevents the sum of the shadow 
prices in that equation from exceeding the unit cost of the corresponding primal variable 
(resource). Note that the right hand side of a dual constraint defines the unit cost of 
the power system resource (i.e. the dual shadow price or primal variable) associated 
with that constraint. 
5.4 AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF DUALITY 
The competitive nature of participants in a decentralised power system exemplifies 
the concept of duality. In this discussion, the terms 'Demand-side' and 'Supply-sic!_e' 
are used to represent all consumers of electricity and all generators respectively. It · 
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Figure 5.1 The optimal dispatch of real and reactive power using either cost considerations 
or pricing mechanisms. 
is assumed that the primal objective function mmnmses the total cost of real and 
reactive power generation. The discussion utilises an example presented in Bazaraa 
and Jarvis [1977, _PP· 249-250] 
Marginal prices are only valid for a single instant in time, when the dispatch of real 
and reactive power is optimised. In the New Zealand spot market this instant is the 
start of each half-hourly trading period. At this point in time the Demand-side requires 
a certain a:rpount of real and reactive power. Hence, the corresponding marginal prices 
are used to influence the behaviour of all market participants, to obtain the most 
economic way of dispatching the generators in order to supply this requirement. 
5.4.1 The Primal Perspective 
Consider the illustration in Figure 5.1. Each generator has its own unit generation 
costs, cPi and cQi. These apply only to the current trading period, and reflect the offers 
submitted to the real-time physical market by the company owning that generator (see 
Section 2.5.2.2). From a primal perspective, the Demand-side agrees to pay the total 
cost of generation required to meet their load requirement ( as defined b-y ~he unit 
generation costs). However, they request_ the right to optimise the generation profile 
46 CHAPTER 5 DUALITY AND THE DISPATCH BASED PRICING MODEL 
so as to minimise the total. cost. They achieve this by controlling which of the three 
generators are dispatched and quantity of power supplied by each. 
The dispatch decisions made by the Demand-side are however, restricted by the 
physical properties of the power system. These properties are represented by the con-
.straints of the primal problem. The minimum and maximum generation limits each 
company sets for its generating machines are included among these constraints. 
Generation limits indicate the bounds on the amount of power each company is 
willing to let its machines generate at the unit generation cost it sets for that trading 
period. These may represent economic limits rather than the physical limits of the 
generator. For example, if the Supply-side companies are forced to reduce their unit 
generation cost of power, they might also reduce their generating limits for the next 
trading period to prevent the Demand-side taking advantage of the cheap power_. This 
enables the Supply-side to influence the dispatch decisions of the Demand-side. 
5.4.2 The Dual Perspective 
From the dual perspective, the Demand-side agrees to pay the marginal prices /3P 
and /3q for another unit of real or reactive power as set by the Supply-side, rather 
than controlling the generation output of these three generators to obtain an optimal 
dispatch. However, the Demand-side stipulates that these prices do not exceed the 
unit generation costs (cPi and cQJ of the three generators. Such stipulations define the 
constraints in the dual problem. 
The Supply-side will then choose a set of marginal prices to maximise their col-
lective return given these ( dual) price constraints. The constraints represent the limits 
of the marginal price at ~hich the Demand-side is willing to buy power. Hence, the 
customer will refuse to use power from a generator if the marginal price of power at 
that generator node exceeds its unit generation cost (Generator 3, for example was 
not dispatched because either cP~ > /3P3 or Cq3 > /3q3). In this way, the Demand-side 
influences the amou_nt of power supplied by eaGh generator and is able to influence the 
Supply-side regarding the setting of marginal prices. 
5.4.3 The Optimal Solution 
In a spot market, an equilibrium generator profile and an equilibrium set of prices are 
said to be obtained. The equilibrium is where the minimal generation cost is equal to 
the maximal collective return. It is a result of the influence each side has on the other. 
It is the 'constrained relative minimum' introduced in Appendix B. 
Apply the example in Figure 5.1 to the ex post primal and dual problems in Ap-
pendbc D. The dispatch already exists and is assumed to be optimal. The variables · 
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represent marginal (incremental) changes in power system resources (see Section 4.4.1). 
Therefore: 
• the primal problem controls which generator(s) are used to supply the demand 
at each node for another unit of real or reactive power, so as to minimise the 
change in the total generation cost (the primal objective function) for supplying 
that unit. This change in the generation cost is the marginal price of power for 
that node. 
• the dual problem determines the (marginal) prices of the power system rel3°ources 
that are used to charge for the next unit of real or reactive power at each node, 
so as maximise the change in the collective return (the dual objective function) 
for supplying that unit. This change in the collective return is the optimal con-
tribution of power from the generator at that node. 
The objective functions of these two problems are equal at the optimum. Thus, 
marginal prices for real and reactive power that are acceptable to both Supply and 
Demand sides, are delivered to all market participants. Bazaraa and Jarvis note the 
two possible approaches to obtaining these acceptable prices: 
"the primal objective function is delivered by cost considerations 
and the dual objective is arrived at by a pricing mechanism." 
Bazaraa and Jarvis {1977, Section 6.3) 
5.5 ECONOMIC DISPATCH EXAMPLES 
Two examples illustrating the marginal dispatch of reactive power are presented be-
low, to aid the explanation of the pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing equations. These 
examples are based on the real power dispatch example presented in Read and 
Ring [1995b]. However,_Read and Ring's example has been modified to demonstrate 
the dispatch of r.eactive power in a pq-type spot market, as proposed in Chapter 7. 
Thus, both generator nodes in these examples are PQG nodes, but with some local 
reactive power demand. 
5.5.1 An Unconstrained Dispatch 
Consider the power system in Figure 5.2. Generator 1 has a reactive power unit gen-
eration cost of $9 /MVAr and Generator 2 has a unit generation cost of $12/MVAr1 . 
1The 'unit generation cost' is also known as the 'offer price', where the 'offer price' = 'produc-
tion (i.e. fuel) cost' + profit. The offer price is also the 'marginal fuel cost' in Equation 2.1. From a 
consumer frame of reference, the offer price is seen as a cost; hence the term 'unit generation cost'. 
In this thesis, 'unit generation cost' is used and represents the amount a generating compaRy will be 
paid for producing an extra unit of power. It is represented by the symbol 'c'. The 'marginal price' for 
48 CHAPTER 5 DUALITY AND THE DISPATCH BASED PRICING MODEL 
cQ 2 = $12/MVAr 
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Figure 5.2 An unconstrained, economic dispatch of reactive power in a simple two-node pmver 
system. 
The impedance in Transmission Line 1-2 is such, that the reactive power losses 
will increase by 0.2 MVAr for a 1 MVAr increase in the average flow of power along 
the line (Q1_ 2 ). Also, Generator 1 is fully dispatched. It is supplying the reactive 
power demand at Node 1 (Qm) and part of the demand at Node 2 (Qm)· Gene1;ator 2 
supplies the remainder of Q D 2 • 
The next incremental increase in the demand for reactive power at Node 2 (QD2) 
will be supplied by Generator 2, since it is partially loaded. The marginal price (i.e. the 
-market price2) of reactive power at Node 2 (f3Q 2) is equal to (i.e. fixed at) the unit 
generation cost of Generator 2 (cQ 2 ). That is, f3Q 2 = cq2 = $12/MVAr. If this were not 
so, the market would not have used Generator 2 to supply the incremental increase. 
This is physically consistent in that supplying a change in Q D 2 from Generator 2 does 
not change the real or reactive power losses, resulting in a zero cost for marginal losses. 
If the losses changed, the cost of marginal losses would be non-zero, making f3Q 2 =/= cq2. 
This marginal price can be used to find the marginal price of reactive power at 
Node 1 (f3qi). If the customer at Node 1 decreases its reactive power demand (Qm) by 
1 MVAr, Gex'i_erator 2 will decrease its reactive power output by (1- L~) = 0.8 MVAr. 
Therefore, the marginal price that a customer at Node~ will pay for reactive power is: 
f3q1 = (1 - L~)f3q2 
= 0.8 x 12 
= $9.6/MVAr 
This marginal price is greater than the unit generation cost of Generator 1 
(i.e. f3Q 1 > cQ1 ). This indicates that, at Node 1, the market is willing to pay $0.6/MVAr 
to relax the upper generation limit on Generator 1 in order to gain another 1 MVAr of 
reactive power from this cheaper generator. Note that Generator 1 is making a profit 
of $0.6/MVAr. 
If instead, the reactive power unit generation cost was cQ1 = $11/MVAr, then 
supplying an incremental demand for power at a node, equals the unit generation cost plus the other 
components of Equation 2.1. 
-
2 The marginal price is the price the market is willing to pay for another unit of power. 
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Figure 5.3 An economic dispatch of reactive power in a simple two-node power system. A 
binding reactive power, flow limit exists on this transmission line. 
Generator 1 would not have been dispatched. This is because /3Q 1 is now less that cQ1 , 
and Generator 1 "'.ould be losing $1.4/MVAr if it dispatched. 
5.5.2 A Constrained Dispatch 
Consider again the case where cQ 1 = $9/MVAr. However, the average flow of reactive 
power in Transmission Line 1-2 (Q1 _ 2 ) is now equal to the maximum capacity of the 
line (Q~:;). Figure 5.3 shows that Generator 1 is only partially loaded. This is because 
the flow limit is preventing the demand at Node 2 from utilising the full reactive power 
capacity of Generator 1. 
The marginal price of reactive power at Node 1 is now /3Q 1 = $9/MVAr, because 
Generator 1 can still generate more reactive power to meet the local demand, Q DI. 
However, /3Q 1 was previously calculated at $9.6/MVAr. This apparent price inconsist-
ency of $0.6/MVAr is the cost to the system of relieving the flow constraint, in order 
to allow an extra unit of reactive power to be transmitted through the transmission 
line.' This cost on the power flow constraint is calculated thus: 
• Increasing the flow by 1 MVAr decreases the total generation cost 'to the power 
system by $12/MVAr, but 
• the total generation. cost simultaneously increases by $9/MVAr. Also, 
.. 
• the cost of inarginal losses (supplied by Generator 2) is $12 x 0.2 = $2.4/MVAr. 
• Hence, the cost of the flow constraint is 9 + 2.4 - 12 = -$0.6/MVAr, or 
77Q 1_ 2 = $0.6/MVAr. 
That is: 
f3Q1 = (1 - L~)f3Q2 - 77Q1-2 
= f3Q2 - L~f3Q2 - 77Q1-2 
= 12 - 2.4 - 0.6 
= $9/MVAr 
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The marginal prices at Nodes 1 and 2 are therefore economically consistent with 
each other in both the unconstrained dispatch example and this constrained dispatch 
example. 
5.6 DISPATCH BASED PRICING DEFINITIONS 
From the above examples, definitions can be created for certain Dispatch Based Pricing 
terms used throughout this thesis. 
DBP 5.1 Price Consistency: The set of marginal prices corresponding 
to all nodes in a power system is defined to be consistent, when the dif-
ferences between the marginal prices of connected nodes are explained by 
the cost components of the marginal prices. The marginal cost components 
include the marginal costs of generation, total marginal losses and binding 
constraints (see Figure 5.4). 
In the 'Constrained Dispatch' example, /3q 1 and /3q 2 are consistent with each other 
through the cost of total reactive power marginal losses ( 
8:/j ) and the marginal cost 
of the flow constraint· ( f/q 1_ 2 ). Marginal prices are inconsistent with each other when 
there is no feasible solution to the dual pricing problem. 
DBP 5.2 Marginal Generator: A generator whose upper and lower gen-
eration limits are not binding and whose marginal price is equal to its unit 
generation cost is defined to be marginal for the current time period (e.g. 1/2 
hour).' Only this generator adjusts it output for each marginal change in 
demand for power during that time period. A rry,arginal generator can be 
marginal for either real or reactive power, or both. 
The marginal generator is different to the swing bus generator defined in Sec-
tion 3.5.2. A genetator can be identified as b.eing marginal when the marginal price 
( or market price) at that node is equal to ( or fixed at) the generation cost of the next 
unit of power to be produced by that generator (see Figure 5.4). If this were not so, 
the market would not call on this generator to supply any marginal change in demand. 
Each generator can be associated with up to two marginal prices. One for real power, 
and one for reactive power. The two generators in the 'Constrained Dispatch' example 
are both marginal. 
DBP 5.3 Non-marginal Generator: A generator forced against a gen-
eration limit is non-marginal. Such a generator cannot respond to an in-
. cremental demand for power that requires it to violate this limit. 
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A non-marginal generator is either fully loaded or not dispatched (Generator 1 in 
Figure 5.2 for example, is non-marginal). The marginal price at the node of a non-
marginal generator is always different to the generator's unit generation cost. This 
deters the market from using this generator to supply any marginal change in demand. 
The generation limits can be either physical or economic as stated in Section 5.4. 
DBP 5.4 Merit Order Dispatch: An OPF dispatches the set of gener-
ators in a power system with respect to a merit order. This merit order 
is defined by the unit generation costs of the generators. The dispatch of 
generators starts with the cheapest and ends with the most expensive. In an 
unconstrain~d power system the next cheapest generator in the merit order 
will be dispatched only when the current marginal generator becomes fully 
loaded. 
A merit order minimises the change in the value of the primal objective function 
where there is an incremental change in demand. 
DBP 5.5 Out of Merit Order Dispatch: When a power system is con-
strained, generators are dispatched out of merit order to work around the 
constraints, so as to minimise the marginal change in the objective function, 
for an incremental change in demand: 
There are always at least two fixed marginal prices when an 'Out of Merit Order 
Dispatch' occurs. The relationship between the number of fixed prices and binding 
primal constraints is defined by DBP 5.6. 
DBP 5.6 Marginal Price Criterion: The number of binding' primal 
constraints equals the number of fixed dual marginal prices minus 1: 
( # constra:ints = # prices - 1 ) 
The '-1' in DBP 5.6 indicates there is only one fixed marginal price when the 
power system is totally unconstrained. This is the unit generation cost at the marginal 
generator. This fixed marginal price can be for either real or reactive power because this 
generator can be marginal for either real or reactive power. Each binding constraint 
necessitates that a generator become marginal for either real or reactive power, so as 
to fix another marginal price. 
The dual pricing problem has a unique solution when DBP 5.6 holds. Too many 
fixed dual prices result in an over-defined dual problem and an infeasible solution. 
Too many primal constraints results in an under-defined dual problem a11.d multiple 
solutions. 
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3R l:sJ Unconstrained Component 
~ Constrained Component 
Marginal Node Non-Marginal Non-Marginal 
(Reference Node) or Demand Node or Demand Node 
Figure 5.4 Cost components comprising the marginal price at each power system node. This 
_applies to marginal prices for both real and reactive power. 
5.6.1 Price Inconsistencies 
DBP 5.6 implies that a constraint cost component can be added to the marginal price 
at each node to explain the inconsistencies between the unit generation costs at the 
marginal generator nodes. Thus, invoking primal constraints ( economic or actual) to 
explain multiple marginal generators is equivalent to making another generator mar-
ginal to transmit power round the constraint. 
5.6.2 A Reference Node 
Supplying the demand for real ,or reactive power at a demand Node i (or a non-
marginal generator -Node .i) directly from the ·marginal generator is economically the 
same as exporting that demand from the marginal generator to a reference node, and 
then supplying the demand from there [Ring 1995]. The 'Constrained Dispatch' ex-
ample however, demonstrates that multiple marginal generators can be collectively 
used to supply any marginal change in demand in a constrained power system. In this 
scenario, the generation contributions from all the marginal generators are conceptually 
accumulated at the reference node, and then exported to Node i as a single block. 
The unit generation cost component at demand Node i is therefore the unit gen-
eration cost of the reference generator (see Figure 5.4). However, this unit generation 
cost is the same as the sum of the unit generation costs of every marginal generatQr, 
multiplied by the contribution of those generators. 
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The reference generator has no special status over other generators. It is dispatched 
by the OPF according to the merit order. Hence, this reference node is only a concept, 
used to simplify the mathematics 
5.7 DISPATCHING REACTIVE POWER GENERATION 
Reactive power generation can be dispatched as either an independent or dependent 
resource. The examples in Section 5.5 represent a pq-type spot market where reactive 
power generation is independently dispatched. To illustrate, consider the demand for 
an extra unit of reactive power ( e.g. 1 MVAr) in a pq-type spot market. Physically, the · 
system operator o~ this market would independently dispatch reactive power to meet 
that demand by instructing the marginal power station to generate an extra 1 MVAr 
(assuming no losses). In response, the control system of the station would adjust the 
voltage set-points of the station AVR's until the desired 1 MVAr output is obtained. 
Consider the alternative, a demand for an extra 1 MVAr in a PvG-type spot mar-
ket. In this market every power station is operated by voltage set-point. Consequently, 
the system operator will need to estimate the voltage set-point of the marginal station 
( as well as the levels of all other independent power system resources) necessary to 
obtain the required 1 MVAr output. In this way, reactive power is dependently dis-
patched. If however, the voltage profile must remain constant, then the 1 MVAr can 
only be dispatched by changing the independent resources, such as P0 . 
5.8 SOME RULES GOVERNING DUALITY THEORY 
In Dispatch Based Pricing there are five main rules that govern the relationship between 
the primal and dual pricing problems. 
Duality 5.1 For every binding primal constraint there is a free dual vari-
able. 
Duality 5 .. 2 For every free primal variable there is a binding dual con-
straint. 
Duality 5.3 For every non-binding primal constraint there is a fixed dual 
variable. 
Duality 5.4 For every fixed primal variable there is a non-binding dual 
constraint. 
Duality 5.5 Complimentary Slackness: For a non-binding constraint, 
the corresponding dual variable is zero. 
These rules are explained below in the context of the pq/PvG Dispatch Based 
Pricing equations. 
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5.9 THE pq/PvG DISPATCH BASED PRICING MODEL 
The final formulation of the pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing model is obtained by 
simplifyi1~g and rearranging the dual linear programming problem presented in Ap-
pendix D. This process is described in detail by Read and Ring [1995d]. This Dis-
.patch Based Pricing model is described by Equations 5.1 to 5.9. The changes made 
in Chapter 4 to Read and Ring's OPF are evident in these equations. An explana-
tion of these equations in the context of Dispatch Based Pricing and duality theory is 
presented in the remainder of this chapter. 
5.9.1 A Description of Nomenclature 
The following list describes the main symbolic conventions used in the pq/PvG Di~patch 
Based Pricing formulation (Equations 5.1 to 5.9): 
. ~~~ All partial derivatives perform similar functions. Such derivatives are 
called 'linear sensitivity coefficients' [\i\Tood and Wollenberg 1996]. For 
example, this coefficient describes the sensitivity ( or change) in voltage 
magnitude at Node n, due to an incremental increase in reactive power 
injection at Node i. 
Each derivative is multiplied by a shadow price. Therefore, these de-
rivatives can also been seen as conversion factors, converting the units of 
the shadow price into the units ofthe variable on the left-hand side of 
the corresponding Dispatch Based Pricing equation . 
. Pi and Q; These represent real and reactive power injection at Node i. For example, 
Qi = Q0i - QDi' Hence, the partial derivative described above will 
be positive if. Q; is incrementally increased, assuming a correspond~ng 
positive change in Vn. An incremental increase in demand for power is 
equivalent to a negative increase in power injection. 
. (z) This notation says that the term represented by z only appears in the 
Dispatch Based Pricing equations if the corresponding primal constraint 
is binding (see Duality 5.5). 
These are used to simplify the Dispatch Based Pricing notation, because 
the generation costs of the next ( c;, c;) and last ( c;, c;) units of real 
and reactive power are assumed to be equal in this thesis. For example, 
the unit generation cost of reactive power at Node i is Cq; ( = c;i = c;i). 
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MAXIMISE 
K +PX _PX +PX _PX +PX _PX 
X ,vp ,vp ;vQ ,vQ ,vv , ,vv 2: 0 
PX PX PvG pq 
Ap,AQ,(3p ,(3Q ,µQ ,µv 
subject to: 
Marginal Price Equations 
µ -/3 ->. Qn - Qn Q 
µVn = f3vn 
Price Bound Equations 
c;i - \ v;i) :S /3Pi :S c;i + \ v;) 
Y~; - \ v~i) :S /3Qi :Sc:;+\ v;;) 
The pq/PvG, Dual Linear Program Objective Function 
(Equation D.18) 
(5.1) 
Vi E PX (5.2) 
Vi E pq (5.3) 
Vi E PvG (5.4) 
Vn E PvG (5.5) 
Vn E pq (5.6) 
Vi E PX (5.7) 
Vi E PX (5.8) 
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5.9.2 A Description of the pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing Equations 
This section is based on Section 4.3 of Ring [1995). However, the emphasis is on 
describing the equations of the pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing model, with respect 
to the previously stated definitions and rules stated in previous sections. 
Three marginal prices are associated with each node, one for real power, one for 
reactive power and one for voltage. Accordingly, each node is represented by three 
marginal price equations when using the pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing model. The 
node's type determines the three equations used for that node. 
5.9.2.1 Real Power Prices at PX Nodes 
Equation 5.2 is used to calculate the marginal price of real power at every node within 
the power system. That is, real power prices are calculated for the PX set of nodes. 
(3Pi is the marginal price of real power demand at Node i because it is th~ shadow price 
of Equation D.15. 
The first term of this equation can be rewritten as: 
The marginal generator generates sufficient power to supply the required marginal 
demand, plus marginal real power losses, so as to conserve real power. AP is the 
shadow price of the energy conservation equation constraint equation for real power 
(D.3). Therefore, AP is also the marginal price of real power at the marginal generator. 
Ring [19'95) stated that Ap is the cost of supplying the marginal demand from 
the swing bus generator. This is technically incorrect, as there is no swing bus i:µ an 
OPF algorithm. However, it is feasible for AP to be the marginal price of real power 
at some arbitrary reference node that has a fixed location. This is convenient, since 
the marginal generator node can.be different from one trading period to the next (see 
Section 5.6.2). Hence, tl1ce pq/PvG Dispatch 'Based Pricing model assumes that the 
generator at the reference node supplies every demand for power. Thus, >..P (and >..q) 
is known as the marginal price for real (and reactive) power at the reference node. >..P 
(and Aq) is depicted by the 'Reference Unit Generation Cost of Power' in Figure 5.4. 
The second part of the term ( ->-. P ~~ ) is the cost of the total marginal real power 
losses (supplied by the marginal generator via the reference generator) resulting from 
an incremental increase in real power injection. If the reference generator is marginal, 
it supplies any demand at its own node without changing LP. Therefore, this term is 
zero for the marginal reference node. Physically, not changing LP when supplying local 
demand is true also of all other marginal generators. Mathematically though, this ter!ll 
is 11ori-zero since the local demand is still supplied by these generators via the reference 
5.9 THE pq/PvG DISPATCH BASED PRICING MODEL 57 
generator. Despite the difference between reality and the pricing model, the customer 
at a marginal generator node will still only get charged the unit cost of generation of 
that local marginal generator, and not the costs of transporting that power via the 
rnference generator. 
Rewriting this term with respect to demand produces: 
(5.10) 
Note that an injection is just a negative demand. 
8L 
• The second term of Equation 5.2, ->.Q ~' is the cost of the change in total 
• 
marginal reactive power losses resulting· from an increment in real power injection 
at PX Node i. These losses are supplied by the marginal generator(s) via the 
reference generator. 
• The third term, - L µQn ~~~ , describes the cost of the change in reactive 
nEPvG ' 
power generation at each PvG node, as a result of an increment in real power 
injection at PX Node i. 
• The fourth term, - L (µvn) \ ~~ ), appears for any pq nodes where there is 
nEpq 
a binding primal voltage constraint. It is the dual cost of the change in pressure 
on (i.e. tightening or relieving) each constraint due to an increment in real power 
injection at PX Node i. 
. ~( (J-.aPk) /-.BQk)) • The final term, -2  xk) \ Pk BP; + \ Qk BP; , is only non-zero for 
thermally constrained branches. It is the dual cost of the chang13 in pressure 
on any binding primal thermal limits, as a result of an increment in real power 
injection at PX Node i. 
Equati_on 5.7 sets bounds on the marginal price of real power demand at every 
node. When a generator at Node i is marginal for real power, Pa; is a free variable 
and the upper and lower primal generation constraint equations (D.9 and D.10) are 
not binding. By complimentary slackness (see Duality 5.5), the corresponding shadow 
prices, v;i and v;;, equal zero. As a result, Equation 5.7 fixes the marginal price of 
real power at Node i between the generation costs of the next and last units of real 
power: 
- + 
c.<{3.<c. Pi - Pi - Pi where (5.11) 
That is, {3Pi = cPi. Hence, the marginal price (or market price) for real power at Node i 
is equal to the unit generation cost of Generator i, as discussed in Section 5.6. 
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A generator is non-marginal if Pa is forced against a generation limit so that 
either Equation D.9 or Equation D.10 becomes binding. For example, if a generator 
is fully loaded the upper generation constraint (D.9) is binding and v;i 2 0. Thus, 
Equation.5.7 becomes: 
(5.12) 
The shadow price (v;J is equal to the change in the total generation cost when 
the primal upper generation limit is relaxed by one unit. v ;i acts as a dual slack 
variable, allowing the marginal price ((3Pi) to move outside the range defined by c;; 
and c;i. If (3Pi moves outside this range, this indicates that Generator i is no longer 
marginal for real power. The slack variable assumes the difference between the upper 
unit generation cost ( c;i) and the marginal price ((3Pi). The value of this marginal price 
is set by the terms on the right hand side of Equation 5.2. Thus, the marginal price of 
real power varies freely at generator nodes that are non-marginal for real power. The 
Dualty 5.1 and Duality 5.4 rules apply here. If instead, a lower generation limit was to 
_b_~come binding (that is, Pa = P;;in), complimentary slackness requires that v;i = 0 
and v;; 2 0. 
This discussion on non-marginal generator nodes also applies to pqD nodes where 
the real power injection is fixed. For these nodes, either v;; or v;i becomes non-zero 
depending on whether the market attempts to force PDi up or down when searching 
for an optimal dispatch. 
5.9.2.2 Reactive Power Prices at pq Nodes 
f 
The function of Equation 5.3 is the same as Equation 5.2, except that it calculates the 
marginal price for reactive power demand (f3q;) at pq )lodes. Read and Ring allowed 
for reactive power generation at pq nodes through the definition of reactive power 
injection: Q; = Qa; - QDi' However, they generally treated pq nodes as pqD nodes by 
assuming no generation at these nodes ( Q a; = 0). 
>.Q is the marginal price of reactive power at the marginal generator node. Altern-
atively, it is the marginal price at the reference node, especially when there are multiple 
marginal generators. 
• The first term, ->. P ~~P , is the cost of the change in total real power losses caused 
• 
by an incremental increase in reactive power injection (decrease in demand) at pq 
Node i. These losses are supplied by th 11 generator(s) via the reference 
generator. 
• >.Q ( 1 - ~J;) is the cost of using the marginal generator(s) to supply the mar-
ginal reactive power injection at pq Node i and the resultant losses, via the 
· reference generator. 
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• The term - I: µQ 88QQn is the cost of the change in reactive power generation nEPvG n i 
at PvG nodes as Qi is incremented at pq Node i. 
• The fourth term, - I::nEpq (µvn) \ ~~~ ) , is the dual cost of the change in pressure 
on the binding primal voltage limits at pq nodes (n) as Qi is incremented at pq 
Node i. 
• The final term, -2 I:.,K (x,) ( ( P: ~~:) + ( c:J; ~~: )} is only non--zcro for 
thermally constrained branches. It is the dual cost of the change in preS$Ure on 
any binding primal thermal limits, incurred by incrementing Qi at pq Node i. 
Equation 5.8 works to constrain the marginal price of reactive power (f3qi) in the 
same way that Equation 5. 7 constrains the marginal price of real power. Consider 
a pq Node i where Qi is fixed, because either QGi = O, or because QGi = Q;;"' or 
QGi = Q;;n. By complimentary slackness, {3Qi is allowed to vary at Node i because 
+ -
either vQi ~ 0 or vQi ~ 0. 
Q Gi is an unrestricted variable if reactive power generation is freely available at a 
pq node. Consequently, v ;i = v ;i = 0 and the dual marginal price of reactive power 
demand is fixed to cqi (as required by DBP 5.2). That is: 
(5.13) 
5.9.2.3 Reactive Power Prices at PvG Nodes 
Reactive power generation is a dependent variable at PvG nodes. Rearranging the 
corresponding Di~patch Based Pricing equation (5.5) gives: 
\fn E PvG (5.14) 
µQn is the cost, reflecting the depend.ent nature of reactive power generation at PvG 
nodes. 
Qc is free to vary when a generator at a PvG node is marginal for reactive power. 
By complimentary slackness, Equation 5.8 fixes the marginal price of reactive power at 
Node n to the unit cost of generation, cQn: 
- + 
c <{3 <c 
Qn - Qn - Qn 
Vn E PvG (5.15) 
Either Equation D.11 or Equation D.12 becomes binding when the generator at 
PvG Node n reaches a reactive power generation limit . Accordingly, Generator n is 
non-marginal for reactive power. Intuitively, it appears that either v ;n or-v ;n allows 
the dual marginal price ({3Qn) to vary. However, Section 8.4.2 shows that when a PvG 
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Node n becomes non-marginal for reactive power generation, a PvG-type OPF actually 
treats Node n as a PqG node. Therefore, Equations 5.3 and 5.6 must be used. 
5.9.2.4 -Voltage Prices at PvG Nodes 
The voltage magnitude at every PvG node Cv;) is an independent variable. Ring [1995) 
stated that voltage magnitude is a resource that can be optimised to minimise the total 
generation cost, as calculated by the primal objective function. Hence, Equation 5.4 
calculates the marginal price of this resource. 
• f3v; is the price of demanding another unit of voltage. 
• There is no '1' in this equation since there is no unit generation cost associated 
with voltage. 
• The first term, ->.P ~t~, is the cost of the change in total real power losses for 
I 
an incremental increase in voltage magnitude at PvG Node i. The real power 
associated with the change in losses are supplied by the marginal generator(s) via 
the reference generator. 
• The second term, ->.Q ~~~ , is the cost of the change in the total reactive power 
' losses for an incremental increase in voltage magnitude at PvG Node i. The 
reactive power for this change in losses is supplied by the marginal generator(s), 
via the reference generator. 
• The third term, - I: µQ 889,n , is the cost of the change in reactive power nEPvG n l i 
supplied by generators at PvG nodes, for an incremental increase in voltage mag-
nitude at PvG Node i. 
• The fourth term, - LnEpq (µvn) \ ~~ ), is only n~n-zero for pq nodes where the 
voltage is constrained. Hence, it is the dual cost of the change in pressure on each 
primal voltage constraint due to an incremental increase in voltage magnitude at 
PvG Node i. ·· 
• The final term, -2 ~"" (x,) ( ( P; ~~) + ( Q; ~9,:)), is only non-,ero for 
thermally constrained branches. It is the dual cost of the change in pressure on 
I 
each binding primal thermal constraint resulting from an incremental increase in 
voltage magnitude at PvG Node i. 
Equation 5.9 defines the bounds on the marginal price of voltage magnitude at 
every node. v; is an independent variable at PvG nodes. Therefore, it is possible for 
an OPF to optimise the value of v; in the same way as Pi at PX nodes or Qi at pq 
nodes. Thus, when v; is unconstrained, the shadow prices of primal Equations D.13 -
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and D.14 are zero: v~i = v;i = 0. Accordingly, Equation 5.9 forces the marginal cost 
of voltage to equal zero: 
f3v; = 0 
However, v; is constrained at every PvG node because it is held to a voltage set-point, 
as the definition of 'PvG' implies. This is equivalent to: 
V = vmin = vmax 
i i i 
Vi E PvG (5.16) 
So, by Equations D.13 and D.14, an OPF (i.e. the market) will force v; against the -
upper limit: 
-V = -Vmax 
' ' 
(5.17) 
Or, the OPF will force v; against the lower limit: 
v = vmin 
• i 
(5.18) 
As a result, Equation 5.9 allows marginal voltage price (f3vJ to vary freely because 
either v~i ;::: O, or v;i ;::: 0, depending on whether Equation 5.17 or Equation 5.18 is 
binding. Therefore, f3v; is only non-zero at a PvG Node i when a voltage set-point 
(voltage constraint) is enforced. f3v; is the cost the market is willing to pay in order to 
relieve this constraint by 'one per-unit voltage'. 
5.9.2.5 Voltage Prices at pq Nodes 
The marginal price of voltage magnitude at pq nodes is described by Equation 5.6, 
reproduced here: 
f3vn is subject to the price bounds defined by Equation 5.9: 
Vn E pq (5.19) 
This means that the voltage price at a pq Node n will only be non-zero if the voltage 
magnitude is constrained at that node, by either Equation D.13 or D.14. Therefore, the 
shadow price µQn only appears in Equations 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 when there i~ a binding 
voltage constraint at Node n. 
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5.9.3 The Marginal );rice Criterion 
The need to satisfy the Marginal Price Criterion (DBP 5.6) when using the equations 
of the pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing model, is explained here with an illustration. 
\iVhen a generator is marginal for reactive power at Node n, the marginal price {3Qn 
is fixed with Equation 5.13. Thus, a degree of freedom is removed from the Dispatch 
Based Pricing problem. This degree of freedom must be reintroduced to be able to 
solve the problem. That is, the problem is infeasible without that freedom. This might 
be achieved by assuming that the voltage magnitude at pq Node i has reached an upper 
limit, v;max. To reflect this limit in the pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing model, f3v; is 
allowed to vary. f3v; varies when the corresponding shadow price is no longer fixed to 
zero (i.e. v~i ~ 0). This shadow price provides the required degree of freedom. Hence, 
DBP 5.6 ensures that there are sufficient degrees of freedom so that a feasible solution 
can be found. 
5.9.4 Simultaneous Equations 
-The Dispatch Based Pricing model is a set of simultaneous equations. Therefore, each 
price must be consistent with all other prices if a feasible solution is to be found. 
For example, the following marginal cost variables are present in every marginal price 
equation: Ap, )..Q, µQn, µvn and Xk. Hence, the values of these variables are the same 
for every node (each node is represented by three marginal price equations). However, 
the values of the corresponding partial derivatives are node specific. 
Consider therefore, a Node i and a Node n. When a feasible solution is obtained, 
{3Pi and {3Pn of Equation 5.2 are consistent with each other through the marginal cost 
variables. Furthermore, {3Pi is consistent with f3q; and {3Qn of Equation 5.3 through the 
same marginal cost variables. 
5.10 CONCLUSIONS 
The primal and dual problems have been compared to the operation of two competitive 
markets. The primal market is optimised through cost considerations, the dual by a 
pricing mechanism. Both markets however, arrive at the same optimal result. 
The comparison has been used to explain the derivation of the pq/PvG Dispatch 
Based Pricing model equations. The model is the simplified dual equivalent of the 
primal linear OPF formulation (composed of Equations D.2 to D.17). This pq/PvG 
Dispatch Based Pricing model can be used to find a consistent set of ex post marginal 
prices for any observed dispatch from a spot market, as long as the user adheres to 
DBP 5.6. 
Chapter 6 
DEVELOPMENT OF SOFTWARE PRICING TOOLS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Two new Dispatch Based Pricing models are presented in Chapters 7 and 8 respectively. 
This chapter describes the 'nodal pricing' software used to implement these two pricing 
models. The software programs used as benchmarks to validate this nodal pricing 
software are also described. A pq-type OPF is developed as part of this benchmark 
software. It is capable of accepting non-zero unit generation costs for reactive power. 
6.2 TWO NEW DISPATCH BASED PRICING MODELS 
Two OPF types were defined when the OPF node classification system was proposed 
in Chapter 3. These were the pq-type OPF in which reactive power is dispatched as an 
independent variable, and the PvG-type OPF ·in which reactive power is dispatched as 
a dependent variable. The pq-type OPF is named thus, because only PQG and pqD 
nodes are used in its fonpulation. Similarly, the PvG-type OPF is named because only 
PvG and pqD nqdes are used in its formulation. 
The pq/PvG OPF formulation presented in Chapter 4 contains primal constraint 
equations for PvG nodes, PQG nodes and pqD nodes. Therefore, this pq/PvG OPF is 
the combination of a pq-type OPF and a PvG-type OPF (hence the name 'pq/PvG 
OPF'). These two constituent OPFs are referred to as 'pq-OPF' and 'PvG-OPF' re-
spectively. It follows therefore, that the pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing model presen-
ted in Chapter 5 is the combination of a pq-type pricing model and a PvG-type pricing 
model. Respectively, these two Dispatch Based Pricing models are referred to as the 
'pq pricing model'. and the 'PvG pricing model'. The pq-OPF formulation and the pq 
pricing model are presented in Chapter 7, whereas the PvG-OPF formulation and the 
PvG pricing model are presented in Chapter 8. 
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6.3 NODAL PRICING SOFTWARE 
Prior to the start of the research for this thesis, software was developed to implement 
the Dispa_tch Based Pricing equations in Read and Ring [1995d]. These equations are 
repeated in Appendix C for clarity. This software was developed by the Energy Model-
ling Research Group at Canterbury University in collaboration with Core Management 
Services Ltd, and funded by Transpower New Zealand Ltd1. Two software programs 
were the result. 
The first program is NODALl, which implements a simplified Dispatch Based Pri-
cing model. N ODALl calculates marginal prices for real power at all nodes and reactive 
power prices at pqD nodes. It does not calculate reactive power marginal prices PvG 
nodes, and cannot accept non-zero reactive power unit generation costs. 
The second is N ODAL2. This program implements the pq/PvG Dispatch Based 
Pricing model described by Equations 5.1 to 5.9. These equations are the only equations 
needed when constructing the pq and PvG pricing models proposed in Chapters 7 and 8 
respectively. By default therefore, N ODAL2 implements these two pricing models. 
Bus Data I (BUSDATA.DAT) 
I 
Impedance Data I (IMPEDANCE.DAT) 










Figure 6.1 Software components comprising the nodal pricing software, which is used to 
implement the Dispatch Based Pricing equations. 
N ODALl and N'cmAL2 have five main software components. These components are 
depicted in Figure 6.1, and are as follows: 
• Bus Data - This contains the following data for every node: real and reactive power 
generation, voltage magnitudes and voltage angles, and real and reactive power 
demand. This data describes the observed dispatch for which ex post marginal 
prices are to be calculated. 
• Impedance Data - The impedance of every network component is described in this 
software component using pi-models [Read and Ring 1995c]. See Figure 3.1. 
1This software is known within Transpower New Zealand Ltd. as 'nodal pricing software', since 
ma.rgiiial prices are calculated for all nodes in a power system. 
6.4 BENCHMARK SOFTWARE 65 
• Marginal and Constraint Data - This component contains marginal data iden-
tifing the generators that are marginal for real power, and the generators that 
are marginal for reactive power. The unit generation cost for each of these mar-
ginal generators is also stated. Any binding constraints are also identified herein. 
According to Dispatch Based Pricing philosophy, the constraint data are reflec-
tions of what the Clearing Manager perceived to be the reason for dispatching 
the marginal generators, identified by the marginal data. 
• Software Parameters - This component contains miscellaneous parameters con-
trolling the operation of the nodal pricing software. Some parameters control the . 
terms that are to appear in the objective function. 
• Marginal Prices - The output of both N ODALl and N ODAL2 is the set of ex post 
marginal prices for real and reactive power for the observed dispatch. This com-
ponent also contains other relevant information. See Appendix F for an example. 
6.4 BENCHMARK SOFTWARE 
6.4.1 A Reactive Power Optimal Power Flow 
Mathematically, the equations of the pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing model are cor-
rect. However, the real and reactive power marginal prices from N ODAL2 had to be 
validated to: 
• determine how to correctly apply the pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing equations 
, (i.e. correctly operate N ODAL2) in order to form the exact dual of the OPF used 
to optimise any dispatch from a spot market. If incorrectly applied, the set 
of prices caiculated is not the correct price-set for the optimised clispatch and 
therefore meaningless. For example, the prices will not correctly identify the most 
economic generators from which to obtain the next unit of real or reactive power; 
• ensure that. the N ODAL2 source code correctly implements the pq/PvG Dispatch 
Based Pricing equations. 
Benchmark prices are required to validate the N ODAL2 prices. OPF software can 
be used to generate the required benchmark prices by exploiting the primal-dual rela-
tionship. These benchmark prices are the, easily accessible, LaGrange multipliers used 
by the OPF to obtain an optimal dispatch. 
6.4.1.1 The Primal-Dual Relationship 
An ideal spot market can be operated using cost considerations (the primal perspective) 
















Figure 6.2 An OPF and N ODAL2 will produce identical marginal prices under certain condi-
tions. 
result in the same optimal ~ispatch, and hence the same set of real and reactive power 
marginal prices. Figure 6.2 portrays this relationship from a software perspective. 
The OPF models the optimising influence of a spot market on the dispatch of real 
and reactive power. NODAL2 is used by the Clearing Manager to calculate ex post 
marginal prices for the observed optimal dispatch, while accounting for any binding 
constraints and marginal generators. Once an OPF has found an optimal dispatch, 
-the OPF's marginal real and reactive power prices for this dispatch identify the most 
economic generator(s) from which to supply the next unit of real or reactive power. 
N ODAL2 produces a set of ex post marginal prices identifying the most economic gen-
erator(s) that will supply the next unit of power for the observed dispatch. 
The OPF marginal prices will be identical to the N ODAL2 marginal prices given 
the following assumptions: 
• N ODAL2 is told by the Clearing Manager, of all binding constraints that QOPF 
had to 'work around (i.e. constraint data), and the resultant marginal generators 
(i.e. marginal data),· 
• the market (i.e. the OPF) optimises the dispatch with a formulation identical 
to the non-linear pq/PvG ?PF formulation. That is, the linearised OPF formu-
lation is the d.ual of the pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing model (i.e. NODAL2), 
and 
• the optimal dispatch from the OPF is used as the observed dispatch given to 
NODAL2. 
The optimal dispatch from the OPF represents an operating point, to which the 
next unit of power and the OPF marginal prices are referenced. The observed dispatch 
is the operating point used by NODAL2. NODAL2 is a simplified version of the dual 
problem in Appendix D, which is linearised around the observed dispatch. The OPF 
and NODAL2 will produce identical prices if the two operating points are the same. 
The assumptions ensure identical operating points (i.e. that the optimal dispatch is -
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the observed dispatch). They also ensure the N ODAL2 formulation is the dual of the 
OPF formulation. 
6.4.1.2 A Developmental Overview 
The discussions in the previous sections identify the need for pq-type OPF software 
and PvG-type OPF software to validate the pq and PvG pricing models in Chapters 7 
and 8 respectively. The formulations of these two OPFs must implement Equations 7.1 
to 7.12 and Equations 8.1 to 8.13, if their marginal prices are to serve as benchmarks . 
for the two pricing models. 
Equations 7.1 and 8.1 show that these two OPFs must be capable of minimising the 
total cost of real and reactive power generation. However, commerciar OPF software 
that will accept cost functions for reactive power generation ( as well as cost functions 
for real power generation) could not be found. It is evident from the publications 
surveyed in Chapter 2 that this absence is a result of a common opinion: 'the cost of 
reactive power generation cannot be minimised because reactive power generation has 
a zero unit generation cost'. Thus, OPF software capable of accommodating reactive 
power generation cost functions has been developed for this thesis. 
An OPF, known in this thesis as Matpower, was used as the starting point from 
which to develop the required reactive power OPF software. Matpower was written by 
PSERC at Cornell University, for use in the Matlab environment with the Optimisation 
Toolbox (by Mathworks Inc.) 2 . Matpower only accepts real power cost functions, and 
is therefore only capable of minimising the cost of real power generation. 
Time restrictions have meant that only the pq-type reactive power OPF software 
has been developed. The development of PvG-type reactive power OPF software is 
the subject of future work. 
6.4.1.3 Develc:ipment of the. Reactive Power. OPF 
The objective function of Matpower is: 
(6.1) 
iEGen 
Gen is the set of all generator nodes. Mp (P0 ). is a polynomial describing the cost of • 
real power generation at Node i: 
(6.2) 
2PSERC is an acronym for the Power System Engineering Research Center. 
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Matpower is a PvG-type OPF, optimising the power system variables in Vector-
Set 3.4 so as to minimise the objective function. To ensure that the final values of these 
variables describe a valid dispatch, the power system is described within Matpower as 
the set of.power injections at all nodes: 
(p +j Q) p + J0 Q- = VV*Y* - ~--~ 
mismatch mismatch S 
base 
(6.3) 
Y* is the conjugate of the admittance matrix. Equation 6.3 appears in the Matpower 
formulation as three equality constraints: 
pmismatchi =0 Vi E Gen (6.4) 
p -o mismatchn - Vn E Dem (6.5) 
Q -o mismatchn - Vn E Dem (6.6) 
Dem is the set of all non-generator nodes. The mismatch equation for reactive power 
_ir~j_ection is not required at any generator node ( i), as the value of 'Q' is defined by the 
values of the variables in vectors ii and j5. To use this fourth reactive power mismatch 
equation is to over-define the optimisation problem and make the problem infeasible. 
A gradient vector is formed by Matpower when composing the LaGrange equation 
used to find the optimal dispatch (ref. Appendix B). It is obtained by taking partial 
derivatives of the objective function (Equation 6.1) with respect to the elements in the 
x and u vectors: 
[ 
8f 8f 8f 8f] 
VJ (cost)p = 8().' ae '8V '8P 
t n n t 
Vi E Gen 
Vn E Dem 
(6.7) 
Equations 6.1 to 6.7. were modified to obtain the required pq-type reactive power 
OPF. First, to minimise the cost of reactive power generation, the objective function 
(Equation 6.1) becomes: 
(6.8) 
iEGen iEGen 
That is, the objective function now includes cost functions for reactive power genera-
tion: 
(6.9) 
Second, to convert Matpower into a pq-type algorithm, Vector-Set 3.4 was re-
placed with Vector-Set 3.5: This means that Q is now an element of u. V has shift~d 
frondhe fixed parameter vector (j5) to the state vector (x). This only shows that the -
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modified Matpower is capable of dispatching a power system with either fixed or vari-
able generator voltages. V is now a dependent variable, dependent on the P and Q 
injections at generator nodes. 
Q is now an independent variable, able to assume any value. Thus, an extra 
equality (mismatch) constraint is required in Matpower's formulation to ensure that 
Q takes on values consistent with a power system dispatch. It ensures that the power 




Q -o mismatchi -
Q -0 mismatchn -
The gradient vector for Matpower was modified accordingly: 
[ 
8f 8f 8f 8f 8f 8f ] 
'y'j (cost)P,Q = 8().' av' ae 'av' 8P.' 8Q. 
1 t n n t i 
Vi E Gen -(6.10) 
Vn E Dem (6.11) 
Vi E Gen (6.12) 
Vn E Dem (6.13) 
Vi E Gen 
Vn E Dem 
(6.14) 
These modifications converted Matpower (a PvG-type OPF) into a pq-type reactive 
power OPF. To avoid confusion, this new pq-type OPF is called Matpower. 
The development of Matpower was paralleled by the development of a similar 
pq-type reactive power OPF by PSERC. Collaboration with PSERC was undertaken 
to ensure that Matpower and this PSERC OPF produced identical di:,patches and 
marginal prices. 
The PSERC OPF has been used instead of Matpower because its professional 
design and __ additional features make it easier to use than Matpower. In this thesis, 
the PSERC OPF is called QOPF where 'Q' indicates the ability to accept reactive 
power generation cost functions. 
6.4.2 The PSERC Power-Flow 
Power-flow software was used as benchmark software for the Matpower, Matpower 
and QOPF software. It is also used as part of the perturbation process that generates 
sub-optimal dispatches (see Section 10.2). This power-flow was developed by PSERC 
and accompanied the Matpower OPF. 












Figure 6.3 Software components that comprise the OPF and power-flow software. 
6.4.3 Structure of tlw Power System Software 
Matpower, QOPF and the PSERC power-flow have similar software structures. These 
structures are illustrated in Figure 6.3. 
The main components are: 
• Input Data - This component contains bus data including: voltages; real and re-
active power demand; generator data; impedance data; operating limits on power 
system resources; real and reactive power generation cost function data. 
• Output Results - The output of each OPF and the power-flow describes a dispatch 
based on the input data. In the case of the OPFs, the output also includes mar-
ginal prices for real and reactive power (Appendix F contains an example of the 
QOPF output). The two OPFs and the power-flow were modified to enable the 
f 
dispatch output to be passed directly to N ODAL2 for calculation of ex post prices. 
That is, the dispatch information is saved to file in the N ODAL2 BUSDATA:DAT 
and LINKDATA.DAT formats. All shunt susceptances and tap information are con-
verted to resistance and reactance, so as to conform to the standard pi-model 
depicted in Figure 3 .1. 
6.5 SOFTWARE TESTING METHODOLGY 
6.5.1 Stages of Software Testing 
Figure 6.4 depicts the stages in the software testing process. The real power prices gen-
erated by N ODALl were verified prior to this Masters degree, using a commercial OPF 
called PSS/E. PSS/E is developed by Power Technologies Inc. The PSERC power-
flow was verified with a power-flow package called LFH, developed by the Electri~al 
Erigiiieering Department, University of Canterbury. 
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Figure 6.4 Successive stages in the software testing process. 
6.5.2 Validating Matpower and Matpower 
71 
During the development of Matpower (and QOPF), the PSERC power-flow and 
N ODALl were used as validation tools. The PSERC power-flow was used to ensure 
that Matpower generates valid dispatches. A Matpower dispatch was deemed to be 
valid once it could be passed through the power-flow without the swing bus generator 
changing its real 3<nd reactive output ( to 10 decimal places, in units of M~ and MVAr). 
N ODALl was used to verify the real power marginal prices calculated by Matpower, 
Matpower and QOPF. The bus, marginal and binding constraint data describing the 
optimal dispatches generated by each OPF were passed through N ODALl. The OPF 
prices were-then compared with the re'sultant N ODALl prices. This comparison utilises 
the primal-dual relationship. OPF prices could only be verified to an accuracy of 4 d.p. 
because the nodal pricing software only reports marginal prices to 4 d.p. 
Unconstrained, voltage constrained, MVA constrained and reactive power genera-
tion constrained dispatches were used to verify marginal prices. However, the objective 
functions used for these dispatches had the form of Equation 6.1, in which the unit 
generation cost of reactive power is zero. This was because N ODALl and Matpower do 
not allow the use' of reactive power cost functions, having been developed under the 
assumption that reactive power generation has no cost. Note that QOPF and Mat-
power were configured to optimise dispatches using only real power cost functions by 
setting 111Q (Q 0 ). = 0 in Equation 6.8 for all generators. l . 
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Some reverse checking. occurred, using N ODAL2 as a benchmark for Matpower 
(and QOPF). This was done to check the integrity ofreactive power prices generated by 
Matpower and QOPF. This revealed a problem with the "Constrained Optimisation" 
algorithm from the Matlab Optimisation Toolbox, which Mathworks duly corrected. 
6.5.3 Validating NODAL2 
Black box testing was used to find errors in the operation of N ODAL2, because the 
source code was unavailable for reasons of commercial sensitivity. Transpower New 
Zealand Ltd corrected errors when advised of these. 
At the beginning of this work, N ODAL2 had not been fully tested because an OPF 
capable of accepting reactive power cost functions was not available. However, once 
Matpower, QOPF and the PSERC power-flow became available, NoDAL2 was tested 
in two parts: by testing the equations of the pq pricing model, and then by testing 
the equations of the PvG pricing model. The test experiments for the two parts are 
discussed in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 respectively. 
- --- The set of marginal real and reactive power prices from each validated OPF was 
used as a benchmark for the set of marginal prices from N ODAL2. It was reasoned that, 
when the N ODAL2 prices matched the OPF prices, N ODAL2 would be free of source 
code errors. This price match was also used to demonstrate that the Dispatch Based 
Pricing equations were being correctly applied, so as to obtain the dual formulation of 
the OPF used to optimise the dispatch. 
The validation process at this stage was similar to that in the Matpower-N ODALl 
stage, with optimal dispatches from each OPF being passed through N ODAL2. However, 
non-zero re~ctive power generation cost functions were used when using the price 
set from QOPF. NODAL2· were deemed to be validat~d when the real and r~active 
power prices reported by N ODAL2 were identical to the marginal prices from each OPF 
(accurate to 4d.p.). An example of identical marginal price sets from QOPF and 
NODAL2 is presented in Appendix F. 
6.6 TEST POWER SYSTEMS 
Three test power systems were used to generate all software-validating dispatches. 
They are: 
• the 9-bus power system from Cornell University; this accompanied the Matpower 
software; 
• the IEEE 14-bus power system representing the American electric power system; 
• the IEEE 30-bus power system representing the American electric power system. -
6.7 CONCLUSIONS 73 
The schematics and raw data for each power system are presented in Appendix E. The 
IEEE power systems were used because of their wide availability. 
6.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Two OPFs have been reliably tested during the stages of software testing: 
• Matpower: a PvG-type OPF, only capable of minimising the total cost of real 
power generation. Matpower models a traditional spot market composed only 
of a real power sub-market. It is similar in formulation to most of the OPFs . 
discussed in Chapter 2; 
• QOPF: a pq-type OPF, capable of minimising the total cost of real and reactive 
power generation. QOPF models one form of reactive power spot market, com-
posed of real and reactive power sub-markets. 
The validation process of N ODAL2 has been outlined in this chapter. However, the 
results of this validation process are detailed in Chapters 7 and 8. In those chapters, 
two new Dispatch Based Pricing models are validated using Matpower and QOPF. 
Each new model describes a form of spot pricing market having both real and reactive 
power sub-markets. Both models are implemented in software by N ODAL2. 
Chapter 7 
A pq-TYPE DISPATCH BASED PRICING MODEL 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter established that the pq/PvG OPF (Equations 4.1 to 4.13) is the 
combination of two other OPFs, and that the pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing model 
(Equations 5.1 to 5.9) is the combination of two other Dispatch Based Pricing models. 
Furthermore, it was argued that the software which implementes the pq/PvG pricing 
model (i.e. N ODAL2), also implements these two constituent pricing models. 
This chapter is concerned with the first of the constituent Dispatch Based Pricing 
models. This model can be used to calculate ex post marginal prices for a pq-type spot 
market. Accordingly, it is referred to as the 'pq pricing model'. 
The equations of this pq pricing model are presented in this chapter, together with 
the non-linear OPF formulation from which the pricing model is derived. Initially, the 
model is validated. Then examples are provided, demonstrating the use the validated 
pq pricing equations in order to calculate ex post marginal prices for different observed 
dispatches. 
A pq-type spot market is assumed for the examples. In this type of spot market, 
reactive power is optimally dispatched as an independent resource, just as real power 
is dispatched as an independent resource. It is also assumed that this spot market 
accommod0.tes cost functions for both real and reactive power, to facilitate real and 
reactive power sub-markets. 
7.2 THE pq PRICING MODEL 
7.2.1 The Formulations 
All generator nodes are modelled as PQG nodes because reactive power generation is 
an independent resource in a pq-type spot market. This PQG classification indicates 
that a pq-type OPF must be used to model the optimisation process of this pq-type 
spot market. The pq/PvG OPF of Chapter 4 can be converted into a pq-:type OPF 
by removing all terms used for PvG nodes. The result is Equations 7.1 to 7.12. 
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THE NON-LINEAR pq-OPF FORMULATION 
subject to: 
CONSERVATION OF POWER 
'°' (P . - P . ) - L (Ppq - Ppq Qpq - Qpq) = 0 
L-t Gi Di P G D ' G D 
iEpq· 
'°' (Q . - Q . ) - L (Ppq - Ppq Qpq - Qpq) = 0 
L-t Gi Di Q G D ' G D 
iEpq 
DEPENDENT VOLTAGE AT pq NODES 
-V (Ppq -Ppq Qpq_ Qpq) + V = O 
n G D' G D n 
TRANSMISSION LINE FLOWS 
- P (Ppq - Ppq Qpq - Qpq) + P = 0 
k G D' G D k 
-Q- (Ppq - Ppq Qpq - Qpq) + Q- = 0 
k G D' G D k 
REAL AND REACTIVE GENERATION AND VOLTAGE SETTINGS 
• pmin < p . < pmax 
Gi - Gi - Gi 
REAL AND REACTIVE POWER LOAD SETTINGS 








Vn E pq (7.4) 
Vk EK (7.5) 
Vk EK (7.6) 
Vi E pq (7. 7) 
Vi E pq '(7.8) 
Vi E pq (7.9) 
Vi E pq (7.10) 
Vi E pq (7.11) 
Vk EK (7.12) 
THE pq PRICING MODEL 
·MAXIMISE. 
K +pq _pq +pq _pq +pq _pq 
x ,vp ,vp ,vQ ,vQ ,vv ,vv 2: 0 
pq pq pq 
>..P,>..Q,/3p ,/3Q ,µv 
subject to: 
Marginal Price Equations 
Price Bound Equations 
c;; - \ v;) ~ f3Pi ~ c;i + \ v;i) 
c~i - \ v~i) ~ f3Qi ~ c:i + \ v;) 
' f3v; = \ v~) - \ v;) 
The pq1 Dual Linear Program Objective Function 
{A modified version of Equation D.18} 
Vi E pq 
Vi E pq 
VnE pq 
Vi E pq 
Vi E pq 
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The pq pricing model .(Equations 7.13 to 7.19) can be derived from the pq-OPF 
formulation by following the derivation process outlined in Chapters 4 and 5. Deriving 
the pq pricing model in this way is equivalent to removing all PvG terms from the 
pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing model of Chapter 5. This pq pricing model must be 
used to calculate ex post marginal prices only for pq-type spot markets. This is because 
all terms apply only to pqD and PQG nodes. 
In Equations 7.1 to 7.19, 'pq' is used to indicate those equations that apply to 
both PQG nodes and pqD nodes. For example, Equations 7.15 and 7.18 are used 
together to calculate a reactive power marginal price for every PQG (i.e. generator) 
node and every pqD (i.e. demand) node. It can be seen these two equations correspond 
to Equations 5.3 and 5.8. 
The dual objective function (7.13) is the same as the objective function of the dual 
problem (D._18), notwithstanding the following changes: 
• PX has been changed to pq; 
• all v• terms have been removed; 
• all 7/p and 7/q terms have been substituted out; 
• the following term has been removed. 
" ( Q* "8Qn P* . "8Qn Q* " 8Qn V*) L.J µQn - Dn + L.J 8P. Di+ L.J 8Q. Di - L.J av i 
nEPvG iEPX t iEpq t iEPvG t 
7.2.2 Int~rpretation Experiments 
In Section 6.4 it was stated that pq-type OPF softwar: can be used as benchmark to 
validate this pq pricing model (which is implemented by NoDAL2). In that section, the 
development of QOPF (a pq-type OPF) was presented. Hence, QOPF has been used 
to generate the required optimaLbenchmark dispatches. 
Dispatches we1;e generated for the following power system conditions: uncon-
strained; voltage constrained; thermally constrained; reactive power generation con-
strained. These benchmark dispatches were passed through N ODAL2 and the resultant 
prices compared with the QOPF benchmark marginal prices (see Section 6.5.3). The 
comparisons revealed that the N ODAL2 marginal prices matched the QOPF benchmark 
marginal prices to 4 d.p., in all but the thermally constrained dispatches. From the suc-
cessful experiments, it can be concluded that ' is the software implementation of 
Equations 7.1 to 7.12 and is therefore the primal equivalent of the 'pq' part of N ODAL2 
(as depicted in Figure 6.2). Therefore, the experiments demonstrate the pq pricing 
model can calculate correct marginal prices for a pq-type spot market. Also, the e_?C-
peririients imply that the N ODAL2 source code correctly implements the pq pricing -
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model equations in all but the thermal case. The unsuccessful thermal case indicates 
a possible error in the code used to implement the xk terms. 
The voltage constrained dispatch of the IEEE 14 bus power system, given in Ap-
pendix F, is a typical example of the successful validation experiments. 
7.3 APPLICATION: AN UNCONSTRAINED DISPATCH 
Examples of how the Clearing Manager (introduced in Section 2.5.2) should use the 
pq pricing model to calculate ex post real and reactive power prices for an observed 
dispatch are presented in this section. The observed dispatch is assumed to have been. 
optimal. That is, .an ideal pq-type spot market (modelled by QOPF) is assumed to 
have produced this dispatch. It is also assumed the dispatch is unconstrained. 
jQD2 
I\, t PGl +jQGl 
(JP2,(J 2 i 2 (JP1, (3 1 1 (Reference Node) 
/3P3,/3Q3 3 
f\., t PG3 +jQG3 
Figure 7.1 A 3-node power system. 
7.3:1 The Dispatch and the Equations 
The 3-node power system, illustrated in Figure 7.1, is used to demonstrate the ap-
plication of the ex post pq pricing model. The power system is assumed to have been 
dispatched with variable generator voltages. The resultant unconstrained optimal dis-
patch is assumed to have· the following characteristics: 
• Generator 1 was marginal for real and reactive power; 
• Generator 3 was not dispatched (i.e. not marginal) for either real or reactive 
P 
min min 
power: 03 = P03 = 0 and Q03 = Q03 = O; 
• Node 1 is the Dispatch Based Pricing reference node; 
• Nodes 1 and 3 are PQG nodes; 
• Node 2 is a pqD node; 
• The voltage magnitude at Node 1 was fixed, providing a reference volt-ag~ for the 
rest of the power system. 
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The resultant pq pricing equations for this observed dispatch are: 
Real power marginal price equations 
Reactive power marginal price equations 
Voltage marginal price equations 
µv1 = f3v1 











Price bound equations (which determine the range of values for each marginal price): 
c;1 ~ f3Pl ~ c;1 
c;2 - \ v;2) ~ f3P2 ~ c;2 + \ v;2) 
- - + 
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7.3.2 A Merit Order Dispatch of Reactive Power 
Generator nodes are classed as PQG nodes in the pq-OPF formulation. This implies 
t_hat Q
0 
is an independent primal variable in the pq-OPF formulation, and is an 
element in the OPF control vector (ii.). The independent nature of Q0 implies that 
reactive power generation is dispatched in a manner identical to that of real power 
generation. This means that pq-OPF (i.e QOPF or any other pq-type OPF) will 
dispatch reactive power according to a merit order. This is verified in Appendix G. 
The merit order dispatch of reactive power is also evident in the structure_ of the 
pq pricing model equations. The reactive power price equations that correspond to the· 
PQG nodes (i.e. Equations 7.23 and 7.25) are identical in form to the real power price 
equations (7.20 and 7.22). Since real power is always dispatched according to a merit 
order in an unconstrained power system, the identical form of the equations implies 
reactive power will also be dispatched according to a merit order. 
7.3.3 Marginal Generators 
Generator 1 was marginal for both real and reactive power. Therefore, Equations 7.29 
and 7.32 are used to fix the real and reactive power marginal prices at Node 1 (in 
Equations 7.20 and 7.23). These equations make the marginal prices equal to the unit 
generation costs of Generator 1: 
and (7.38) 
The. corresponding dual slack variables are set to zero because the primal, Equations 7. 7 
and 7.8 are not binding (see Duality 5.5): 
7.3.4 N_on-Marginal Generators 
In this 3-node dispatch, Generator 3 was non-marginal for real and reactive power be-
cause it had not been dispatched. Accordingly, the primal real and reactive power lower 
generation limits (Equations 7.7 and 7.8 or Equations D.10 and D.12) were binding: 
and 
By complimentary slackness, the corresponding dual slack variables are non-zero and 
appear in Equations 7.31 and 7.34 (ref. Duality 5.5). That is: 
and 
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These slack variables allow the marginal price variables of real and reactive power 
(/3P3 and /3q3 in Equations 7.22 and 7.25) to drop to values below the unit generation 
costs (cP3 and cq3). The fact that /3P3 and /3q3 drop below cP3 and cQ3 implies the 
market was not willing to pay for power at the unit generation costs of Generator 3 . 
. v;3 and v ; 3 allow the Node 3 prices (/3P3 and /3q3) to be consistent with the unit 
generation costs ( cP3 and cQ3). 





not feature in Equations 7.31 and 7.34 respectively. 
A pqD demand node is mathematically equivalent to a PQG generator node that 
is non-marginal for both real and reactive power. At such a non-marginal PQG node, 
the real and reactive power injections are fixed due to binding generation limits. At 
every pqD Node i, the real and reactive power injections are similarly fixed. Consider 
reactive power as an example. Reactive power generation is equal to zero ( Q Gi = 0). 
Reactive power demand is defined by a set-point. This set-point is set by the customer 
who is external to the pricing model (ref. Equation 7.11). That is: 
Qmin = Qmax = Qset 
Di Di Di 
Thus, the injection of reactive power at pqD nodes (Q;) is fixed because: 
Qmin Q Qmax i :::; i:::; i 
Qmin Qmin < Q . < Qmax Qmax ==? Gi + Di - Di - Gi + Di 
min max 
==? Q Di :::; Q Di :::; Q Di 
Since the real and reactive power injections are fixed at pqD nodes, the corres-
ponding real and reactive power marginal prices must be allowed to vary, just as with 
non-marginal PQG nodes. This is why the pric~ equations of demand Node 2 (i.e. Equa-
tions 7.21, 7.24, 7.27, 7.30, 7.33 and 7.36) have the same form as the price equations of 
the non-marginal, generator Node 3 (i.e. Equations 7.22, 7.25, 7.28, 7.31, 7.34 and 7.37). 
The only difference is, the pqD marginal prices (/3P3 and /3qJ can vary freely in both 
directions, since either the upper or lower slack variable ( v; or v;, and v; or v;) can 
be non-zero. The slack variable that becomes non-zero is determined by whether the 
OPF attempts to force the P; and Q; injections against the upper or lower limits. 
Note that there is no generation at pqD nodes, and hence, no unit generation costs. 
For pqD Node 2 therefore: 
and 
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7.3.5 Marginal Voltage Prices 
In a power-flow problem, the voltage is fixed at every generator node. In the New 
~ealand power system however, the terminal voltage of each generator is usually allowed 
to vary between upper and lower operating limits. So, for OPF runs in this thesis where 
the generator terminal voltages are allowed to vary, the voltage at one bus is fixed. This 
fixed voltage serves as a reference voltage, preventing the drift of the voltages at all 
other power system nodes. 
The voltage at any node can be used as a reference. In this 3-node example the 
Node 1 voltage is used. A reference voltage implies that constraint Equation 7.9 is 
binding: 
vmin = v = vmax 
l(ref) l(ref) l(ref) 
Since v;_ was constrained as the reference voltage, complimentary slackness (i.e. Dual-
ity 5.5) requires the marginal voltage price (/3vJ to be unrestricted in value. This is 
achieved by including slack variables in Equation 7.35. 
f3v 1 is the cost imposed by this reference voltage constraint on the system. Equa-
tion 7.16 is used to make it appear as a cost component in every real power and reactive 
power marginal price. The resultant cost components are the µv 1 terms present in 
Equations 7.20 to 7.25. 
The reference voltage is the only constraint. Therefore, DBP 5.6 is satisfied by 
fixing two marginal prices at marginal generator nodes. Hence, the prices of marginal 
Generator 1, /3Pl and /3q 1, have been fixed (see Equation 7.38). In an 'unconstrained' 
pow~r system therefore, the reference voltage ensures there is always a minimum of two 
constraints. 
The voltages at Nodes 2 and 3 were unconstrained for this dispatch. Hence, the 
marginal voltage prices, /3v 2 and f3v 3 , are fixed to zero (ref. Equations 7.36 and 7.37). 
This is because complimentary slackness requires the slack variables to be zero: 
7.3.6 The Reference Node 
In this example, the marginal Node 1 has been designated as the Dispatch Based Pricing 
reference node (see Section 5.9.2.1). Read and Ring [1995d] note that, for a marginal 
reference node, all partial derivatives in the relevant Dispatch Based Pricing equations 
are zero. Therefore, Equations 7.20 and 7.23 can be simplified to: 
and 
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This simplification is made within the source code of NoDAL2, and is validated by 
the fact that QOPF and N ODAL2 produce identical marginal prices. These simplified 
equations say that when the reference generator is marginal for real and reactive power, 
the reference prices are equal to the unit generation costs of the reference generator. 
7.4 APPLICATION: MULTIPLE MARGINAL GENERATORS 
Multiple marginal generators indicate an out-of-merit-order-dispatch. Binding con-
straints or marginal losses are the causes of these deviations from the merit order if 
the dispatch was optimal. The following discussions show how the pq pricing model 
should be used to calculate ex post marginal prices for observed out-of-merit-order-
dispatches. 
Only voltage constraints are considered in this section. However, the Dispatch 
Based Pricing framework allows for other constraints to be added to the pq pricing 
model. These constraints are formulated and implemented using terms similar to the 
_voltage constraint terms in Equations 7.14 and 7.15 (the thermal constraint terms for 
example). Hence, the methods described herein can be applied to other constraint 
types. 
In this section, Generator 3 is assumed to be marginal for reactive power 
(i.e. Q:t < QG3 < Q::'"). 
7.4.1 Voltage Constraints 
For every binding voltage constraint, a term will appear in Equation 7.14 and Equa-
tion 7.15. These terms take the form: 
z is used to represent Pi .and Qi. The appearance of this cost term is not dependent 
on whether the binding voltage constraint is at a PQG node or at a pqD node. This 
because the voltage pricing equations (7.16 and 7.19) are used for both PQG and pqD 
nodes. 
One example of binding voltage constraints is where all generators in a pq-type 
spot market operate to a voltage set-point. Consider the generator voltages in the 
3-node power system. They are fixed as follows: 
~ = ~min = ~max and v'; = ~min = v3max 
To reflect these fixed generator voltages, Equations 7.20 to 7.25 need to include -
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two µv; terms. For example, Equation 7.24 would become: 
(7.39) 
For each fixed generator voltage, an extra marginal price must be fixed to satisfy 
DBP 5.6. Therefore, three fixed marginal prices are required. There are only three 
marginal generators: Generator 1 and 3 for reactive power and Generator 1 for real 
power. Hence, the only option is to fix the marginal prices for these generators: 
In this example, Node 3 was marginal for reactive power and non-marginal for real 
power. If this dispatch was reversed so that Node 3 was instead marginal for real power 
and non-marginal for reactive power, the fixed marginal prices will be: 
It should be noted that fixed marginal prices have been used here to economic-
ally explain the presence of the binding voltage constraints. However, when calculating 
ex post prices for an observed dispatch, a dual perspective is often encountered. That is, 
binding constraints can be used to economically explain the presence of multiple mar-
ginal generators. As with the original perspective, this is achieved by adding constraint 
terms to the marginal price equations (7.14 and 7.15). 
As another example, if the voltage at Node 2 was constrained µv 2 :~~ would need 
to be added to Equation 7.39. 
7.4.2 Implicit Loss Constraints 
It is demonstrated in Appendix G that marginal losses for real and/or reactive power 
can act as _implicit conshaints when finding an optimal dispatch. These implicit con-
straints cause multiple generators to be marginal for real and/or reactive power in an 
unconstrained optimal dispatch1•2 . When losses act as implicit constraints, the cost of 
these marginal losses ensures that the prices of the multiple marginal generators are 
consistent with each other. Marginal losses are described as implicit constraints be-
cause all other types of binding constraints must be explicitly identified by the Clearing 
Manager when using the pq pricing model to calculate marginal prices. 
Consider the constrained dispatch example in Section 5.5. If the MVAr limit is 
removed, Generator 1 and Generator 2 can both still be marginal. This will occur if 
1Definition DBP 5.2 states that a generator is marginal if the marginal price at that generator's 
node is equal to the unit generation cost of the generator. . 
2Ring [1995] mentioned that losses can cause multiple marginal generators for real power. 
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the cost of marginal reactiye power losses is equal to the difference in reactive power 
unit generation costs of the two generators. That is: 
L~/Jq2 = /Jq2 - /Jq1 
= $12/MVAr - $9/MVAr 
= $3/MVAr 
Therefore, when the marginal losses (L~) equal 0.25 MVAr, the price of supplying the 
demand at Node 2 using Generator 2 is the same as the price of supplying the demand _ 
at Node 2 using Generator 1. Hence, /3q 1 and /3q2 are consistent with each other, and 
/3q 1 is the 'loss-adjusted' e9-uivalent of /3q2. 
The pq pricing model can cope with multiple marginal generators that result from 
implicit marginal loss constraints. However, the number of fixed marginal prices must 
always be one more than the number of binding explicit constraints (DBP 5.6). There-
fore, all generators that became marginal due to the losses must be formulated as 
non-marginal. This is achieved by using slack variables to allow their prices to vary. 
-ff-the dispatch was optimal, these loss-adjusted marginal prices will equal the unit 
generation cost, forcing the slack variables to equal zero. 
Consider the 'unconstrained' dispatch of the 3-node power system (ref. Sec-
tion 7.3.1). Assume however, that the marginal losses acted as constraints, causing 
Generator 3 to be marginal for both real and reactive power ( as well as Generator 1). 
That is: 
and 
The real and reactive. power marginal prices of the marginal, Generator 1 ~ave 
already fixed to account for the voltage constraint at Node 1 (i.e. f]Pl = cPl and 
/3q 1 = cQi). Since there are no other binding explicit constraints, Generator 3 must be 
formulated as non-marginal for ~oth real and reactive power, so as to satisfy DBP 5.6. 




into Equations 7.31 and 7.34 respectively, 
thus allowing /3P3 and /3q3 to be unrestricted. For example, Equation 7.34 becomes: 
This can be simplified to: 
(7.40) 
where either vQ3 = v;3 or vQ3 = -v;3 • Thus, Equation 7.25 becomes: 
(7.41) 
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The real and reactive power marginal prices however, must be equal to the real 
and reactive power unit generation costs, because Generator 3 is marginal for real and 
reactive power. This only occurs when the slack variables are equal to zero. That is: 
(3P3 = Cp3 + Q and 
because: 
The slack variables will only be zero when the cost of using the reference generator 
(Generator 1) to supply a demand for reactive power at Node 3 is equal to the unit 
generation cost of the marginal, Generator 3. That is, when the marginal losses are 
acting as implicit constraints. 
In summary, all marginal prices are consistent and DBP 5.6 is satisfied. The 
marginal losses have acted as implicit constraints to justify (3p3 = cp3 and {3Q3 = cq3 , 
in the same way that the voltage constraint was used to justify (3Pl = cp 1 and f3q 1 = cq 1 • 
The example in Appendix F verifies this discussion. The loss-adjusted marginal 
prices of every marginal generator node ((3Pn and (3Qn) are equal to the unit generation 
costs (cPln and cqJ, in the marginal price set generated by the pq pricing model. 
These prices indicate that all generators were marginal for real and reactive power, 
even though only six generators were formulated as marginal. 
7.5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, a pq pricing model has been prpposed that allows non-zero reactive 
power unit generation costs to be specified. This pricing model can therefore calculate 
ex post marginal prices for a spot market where real and reactive power are independ-
ently controlled, and where reactive power is optimally dispatched using generator cost 
functions. 
Examples have been given, describing how the pq pricing model can be used to 
calculate ex post prices for dispatches resulting from different power system conditions. 
These examples exemplify the way in which the pq pricing model is used in Chapters 9 
to 10 to investigate the behaviour of reactive power prices. 
Chapter 8 
A PvG DISPATCH BASED PRICING MODEL 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is concerned with a PvG-type Dispatch Based Pricing model. It is the 
second of the two constituent Dispatch Based Pricing models that combine to form the 
pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing model presented in Chapter 5. It is also the other 
pricing model that is implemented by the nodal pricing software, called N ODAL2. 
This pricing model is referred to as the 'PvG pricing model' because it is used 
to calculate ex post marginal prices for PvG-type spot markets. In this spot mar-
ket only real power generation is optimally dispatched as an independent resource. 
Reactive power is optimally dispatched as a dependent resource, by optimising the in-
dependent resources of real power generation and voltage magnitude ( as described in 
Section 5. 7). This spot market is assumed to accommodate generation cost functions 
for both real and reactive power, to facilitate real and reactive power sub-markets. 
In this respect, this PvG-type spot market is identical to the pq-type spot market 
f 
proposed in Chapter 7. 
The equations of this PvG pricing model- are presented in this chapter, . together 
with the non-linear OPF formulation from which it is derived (referred to as PvG-
OPF). The pricing model is validated first. Then examples are provided to demonstrate 
how to use the validated PvG pricing equations when calculating ex post marginal prices 
for different observed dispatches. 
8.2 THE PvG PRICING MODEL 
8.2.1 The Formulations 
In a PvG-type spot market, generation nodes are modelled as PvG nodes because 
reactive power generation is a dependent resource. Thus a PvG-type OPF is used to 
model the optimisation process of this spot market. The pq/PvG OPF of Chapter 4 
can be converted into a PvG-type OPF by restricting the usage of all terms used 
for pq nodes to usage only with pqD nodes (Note that pq=PQG U pqD). The result 
is Equations 8.1 to 8.13. By following the derivation of Chapters 4 and 5, the PvG 
pricing 
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THE NON-LINEAR PvG-OPF FORMULATION 
Minimise 
PY PY PvG PY PY 
PD ,QD ,PG ,QG ,V 
(8.1) 
subject to: 
CONSERVATION OF POWER 




DEPENDENT REACTIVE POWER INJECTION AT PVG NODES 
-Q (PPvG - PPvG -PpqD -QpqD VPvG) + (Q - Q ) = 0 Vn E PvG (8.4) 
n G D ' D ' D ' Gn Dn 
DEPENDENT VOLTAGE AT pq NODES 
-V (PPvG _ pPvG -PpqD _ QpqD VPvG) V = Q n G D' D' D' +n 
TRANSMISSION LINE FLOWS 
-F (PPvG _ pPvG -PpqD _ QpqD VPvG) p = Q 
k G D' D' D' +k 
-Q- (PPvG _ pPvG -PpqD _ QpqD VPvG) Q- = Q 
k G D' D' D' +k 
' 
Vn E pqD (8.5) 
Vk EK (8.6) 
VkEK (8.7) 
REAL AND REACTIVE GENERATION AND VOLTAGE SETTINGS 
Pmin < P . < Pmax Vi E PvG (8.8) 
Gi - G, - Gi 
min max 
QGi :::; QGi :::; QGi 
V
min v vmax 
i :::; i:::; .i 
REAL AND REACTIVE POWER LOAD SETTINGS 




TRANSMISSION LINE THERMAL LIMITS 
Vi E PvG (8.9) 
Vi E PY (8.10) 
Vi E PY (8.11) 
Vi E PY (8.12) 
Vk EK (8.13) 
THE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION OF THE PvG PRICING MODEL 
MAXIMISE 
K +PvG PvG ·+PvG PvG +P,Y 
x ,vp ,vp ,vQ ,vQ ,vv ,vv 
PY 
2: 0 
PY PY PvG pqD 
Ap,AQ,/3p ,/3Q ,µQ ,µy 
- L Q:.) 
iEPvG 
~ ( • ~ aQ n . ~ aQ n • ~ aQ n • ) + 0 µQn -QDn + 0 aP. PD,+ 0 aQ. QD, - 0 av v; 
nEPvG iEPY 1. iEpqD ' iEPvG 1. 
~ ( • ~ av • ~ av • ~ av ·) + 0 µVn vn + 0 ap:PD,+ 0 aQ~QD,- 0 av.V. 
nEpqD iEPY iEpqD 1. iEPvG 1. 
(8.14) + L (v;, (- P';az + P;,) + v;, (P';'n - P;i )) 
iEPvG 
+ L (v:.( -Q:,az +Q:.) +v~;(Q:/-Q:.)) 
iEPvG 
+ L ( _ v!, v;"'az + V~i v;"''n) 
iEPY 
iEPY iEPY 




Marginal Price Equations 
µVn = f3vn 
Price Bound Equations 
c~i -(v~) ~ f3Pi ~ c;i + (v;) 
c~i - ( v~) ~ f3Qi ~ c:; + ( v;i) 
THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE PvG PRICING MODEL 
Vi E PY (8.15) 
Vi E pqD (8.16) 
Vi E PvG (8.17) 
Vn E PvG (8.18) 
Vn E pqD (8.19) 
Vi E PvG (8.20) 
Vi E PvG (8.21) 
Vi E PY (8.22) 
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model (Equations ·8.14 to 8.22) can be obtained. The derivation process is equivalent 
to restricting the use of all pq terms to pqD nodes. Hence, this PvG pricing model can 
be used to calculate ex post marginal prices for this PvG-type spot market. 
P
0 
is independently controlled and Vis fixed at all PvG nodes in the formulations 
of this PvG-OPF and the PvG pricing model. It follows that Q O is a dependent 
variable at PvG nodes and is optimised by optimising the independent variables: 
pPvG PvG ppqD QpqD VPvG 
G ,PD ' D ' D ' 
(8.23) 
Equation 8.4 describes the dependence of Q0 on these variables. 
The main diff~rence between the PvG pricing model and the pq/PvG Dispatch 
Based Pricing model in Chapter 5 comes from the PvG-OPF formulation. PvG-OPF is 
formulated so that there is no real or reactive power generation at non-generator nodes: 
Vi E non-generator nodes (8.24) 
The real and reactive power injections therefore, are fixed at non-generator nodes be-
cause there is no generation and any power demand is fixed by Equations 8.11 and 8.12. 
Therefore, all non-generator nodes are classed as pqD nodes. 
Equation 8.24 implies that the generation limits described by Equations 8.8 and 8.9 
apply only to PvG nodes. Whereas, _in the pq/PvG OPF the equivalent equations 
(i.e Equations 4.8 and 4.9) apply to all nodes. By duality theory, the absence of 
generation limits at pqD nodes in the OPF formulation means there are no 'Price 
Bound Equation' constraints in the PvG pricing model for pqD nodes. This means the 
mar'ginal prices of real and reactive power at pqD nodes are unrestricted. That is, (3Pi 
and f3q; are unrestricted variables at pqD nodes because the Price Bound E9-uations 8.20 
and 8.21 only apply to PvG nodes. 
In PvG-OPF and the PvG pricing model, the set of all nodes is defined as: 
_PY= (PvG U pqD) 
8.2.2 Reactive Power Generation at Non-Generator Nodes 
The PvG pricing model is a limiting case of a model where it is possible to have reactive 
power generation at non-generator nodes. That is 
Vi E non-generator nodes 
Using the node classification system in Section 3.5.2, these nodes are classed as pQG 
nodes. The uppercase 'Q' indicates that Q; is an independent variable for thes~ nodes, 
and must therefore be included as an element in control vector u. 
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Including pQG nodes in the PvG formulation results in changes to: 
• the objective function, 
C (P PvG QPvG QpQG) osts a , a , a 
• the independent variables, 
(
pPvG _ pPvG -PpQGUpqD QpQG _ QpQG -QpqD VPvG) 
G n' D 'GD' n' 
• Equation 8.9, 
Vi E (PvG U pQG) 
• and the set of all nodes. 
PY= (PvG U pQG U pqD) 
A Dispatch Based Pricing model can be derived from this modified OFF, which 
- incorporates unit generation costs for devices providing reactive power support at non-
generator nodes. Examples of such devices are static VAr compensators and capacitor 
banks. An investigation of this pricing model is outside the scope of this thesis and 
has been left as future work. 
8.2.3 Validation of the PvG Pricing Model 
8.2.3.1 B&ckground 
The validation of the PvG pricing model was not straightforward. A software imple-
mentation does not exist for PvG-OPF, unlike QOPF which implements pq-OPF of 
Chapter 7. However, it is possible to use Matpower and QOPF to establish a certain 
amount of confidence in the marginal price output of N ODAL2. Thus, most terms of 
the PvG pricing model a,re validated, indicating that these Dispatch Based Pricing 
equations are being applied correctly to describe the optimisation process of this PvG-
type spot market. The confidence also implies that, possibly, the N ODAL2 source code 
correctly implements the PvG pricing model. 
An early assumption was that the PvG pricing model and pq pricing model were 
equivalent, and would produce identical sets of real and reactive power marginal prices. 
This is because the PvG-type and pq-type OPFs from which these pricing models are 
derived were assumed to be equivalent, and assumed to produce identical optimal 
dispatches. However, this assumption is incorrect. 
The assumption was founded on the apparent similarities between the formulatiovs 
of the two OFF types. Their similarities are described below. One point of clarification, 
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this assumption requires that all generator voltages are fixed using voltage constraints 
when considering the pq-type OPF. 
Consider the formulations of the pq-type and PvG-type OPFs. Both have the 
s·ame objective function: 
(8.25) 
iEGen iEGen 
For both OPF types, Mp (Pa); and Mq (Qa\ are functions only of Pa and 9a re-
spectively. This is illustrated by Equations 6.2 and 6.9. 
Both OPF types are assumed to use mismatch Equation 6.3 to describe the power 
system. This equation is incorporated into the formulation of the pq-type OPF using 
Equations 6.10 to 6.13, which are repeated here for clarity: 
p. h = 0 mismatc i Vi E Gen (8.26) 
p. h = 0 mismatc n \In E Dem (8.27) 
Q mismatch; = Q Vi E Gen (8.28) 
Q mismatchn = Q \In E Dem (8.29) 
For reasons discussed in Section 6.4.1.3, only constraint Equations 8.26, 8.27 and 8.29 
(ref. Equations 6.4 to 6.6) are used in the formulation of a PvG-type OPF. 
In the pq-type OPF algorithm, Vector-Set 3.5 applies, except that v; (for all 
generator nodes) has been tra.,nsferred from x to p. This indicates that all generator 
volt~ges are fixed. The gradient vector used by this pq-type OPF algorithm to minimise 
the objective function is: 
"vf (cost) = [8Mp + 8Mp 8Mp + 8MQ 8Mp + 8MQ 8Mp + 8Mp 8Mp + 8Mp] Vi E Gen 
P,Q 80; 80; ' 811; 8V, ' 80" 80" ' 8P; BP; ' 8Q; 8Q; Vn E Dem 
,. 
=0 =O =0 c,=O =O =0 :f:O =0 =0 :f:O 
(8.30) 
The gradient vector used by a PvG-type OPF algorithm is: 
V f (cost) = 
P,Q [
8Mp 8Mp 8Mp 8MQ 8Mp 8MQ 8Mp 8Mp] 
Eii:"+ Eii:"' av. + av ' ao+aiJ, aP. + BP. 
, 1 , , n n t 1 
Vi E Gen 
Vn E Dem 
=0 :f:O =0 :f:O =0 :f:O :f:O :f:O 
(8.31) 
QGi is an independent variable in a pq-type OPF, so its value is known at all times. 
Note that Qi = CJa; - Qv;, and that QDi is fixed. Thus, g~1;; of Equa:.tion 6.9 is 
actually 88%~ expressed only in terms of the variable QGi. This is also true for Pa; and 
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i1;; . Hence, only these two partial derivatives are not equal zero in Equation 8.30. 
For a PvG-type OPF however, Q0 is only calculated by the algorithm at the end of 
each iteration. Consequently, all partial derivatives of Equation 6.9 (i.e. 8~:Q) must be 
expressed-in terms of all other variables. For example: 
As a result, all partial derivatives of Mq do not equal zero in gradient vector 8.31. 
The reasoning behind the early assumption is that the same OPF formulation is --
being solved using different algorithms. That is, the PvG-type OPF formulation and 
the pq-type OPF formulation describe the same problem. The only difference is, for 
the pq-type OPF reactive power conservation at generator nodes is included in the 
form of Equality Constraint 8.29. Whereas, reactive power conservation is included in 
the definition of the variable Q 0 for the PvG-type OPF. 
8.2.3.2 Dispatch Experiments 
Experiments were used to validate the PvG pricing model, and to test the assumption. 
The results of the experiments indicate that: the PvG pricing model is mathematically 
correct; that N ODAL2 correctly implements the model; and that the initial assumption 
was incorrect. 
The validation experiments summarised in Section 7.2.2 minimise objective func-
tion 8.25. Since these experiments validated the pq pricing model and the 'pq' part of 
N ODAL2, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
f 
• L µvn ~:~ has beeff correctly implemented in so~tware, and 
I 
• Equation 8.17 (i.e. Equation 5.4) has been correctly implemented. 
Further, Equation 8;18 (i..e. Equation 5.5) has been checked and found to be correctly 
implemented. Therefore, it can be concluded (with some caution) that the term unique 
to the PvG pricing model, L µQn 8
8
~; , has also been correctly implemented. This 
nEPvG 
implies that the marginal prices from the PvG pricing model are correct. 
Matpower and QOPF were used to compare the PvG pricing model to the pq 
pricing model. Three dispatches of the IEEE 14 bus power system were considered, the 
data of which is in Appendix E. The three dispatches were optimised using Objective 
Function 6.1 where the unit generation cost of reactive power is zero. Hence, the 
real power generator cost data in the appendix is unmodified, but the reactive power 
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generator cost data is set to zero: MQ; = 0 for every generator Node i. The three 
dispatches were: 
1. Unconstrained. The data is unchanged. 
2. Q constrained. Generator 8 is forced to be non-marginal for reactive power by 
setting: Q;;"' = 15.85 MVAr. 
3. V constrained. A voltage constraint is made binding at Node 13 by setting: 
~:ax = 1.049 pu. 
Table 8.1 summarises the results. 
Table 8.1 A comparison of marginal price profiles between Matpower and the PvG and pq models, 
and between QOPF and the PvG and pq models. Reactive power has a zero unit generation cost. 
Matpower I QOPF 
Dispatch PvG pq Generation PvG pq 
Profile 
Unconstrained ./ ./ Similar ./ ./ 
Q ./ ./ Different ./ ./ 
v ./ ./ Different ./ ./ 
Matpower and QOPF produced different generation profiles for the three dis-
patches. The difference in the generatJ.on profiles was most noticeable in the voltage 
constrained dispatch. Hence, the marginal price profiles from Matpower and QOPF 
are different for each dispatch. 
ll'he marginal price profile from Matpower matched the price profile from the PvG 
pricing model whe_n the Matpower generation profile (and other bus data) for each of the 
three dispatches was passed through the PvG 'pricing model. Without modifying the 
equations of the PvG pricing model, the QOPF dispatches were also passed through the 
pricing model and the price profiles from QOPF and the PvG pricing model agreed to 
4 d.p. Whep. the pq pricing model is used instead, the marginal prices from this model 
are identical to the Matpower and QOPF marginal prices. Hence, the pq pricing model 
prices are identical to the prices of the PvG pricing model. Therefore, the PvG and pq 
pricing models are equivalent when the unit generation cost of reactive power is zero. 
That is: 
Vi E Gen (8.32) 
Matpower (a PvG-type OPF) and QOPF (a pq-type OPF) however, are not equi-
valent. This is be_cause Matpower and QOPF have each produced a different set of 
marginal prices for each dispatch. The Matpower price sets are valid because the pq 
pricing model and the PvG pricing model have produced matching price sets. Likewise, 
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the pq and PvG pricing models have produced price sets matching those from QOPF, 
thus validating the QOPF prices. 
The example in Appendix F further demonstrates that PvG-type OPFs and pq-
type OPFs are not equivalent when Mqi -=/:- 0. In Section 10. 7 this example is used to 
.demonstrate that an optimal dispatch produced by a pq-type OPF is sub-optimal with 
respect to a PvG-type OPF and vice versa. This implies the optimal dispatch from 
one OPF type is different to the optimal dispatch from the other OPF type: different 
dispatches only occur if the pq-OPF and the PvG-OPF are not equivalent. Note that 
this reasoning process assumes the formulations of the pq-OPF and PvG-OPF have 
been correctly validated. 
8.2.3.3 Conclusions 
The software implementation of the PvG pricing model (i.e. NODAL2) has been valid-
ated as far as possible, without the use of a software implementation of PvG-OPF. This 
suggests that the Dispatch Based Pricing equations used in the PvG pricing model are 
be~ng correctly applied for the purpose of calculating marginal prices for a PvG-type 
- -~ spot market. Moreover, it has been completely demonstrated that the PvG pricing 
model and pq pricing model (and their corresponding OPFs) are not equivalent when 
the unit generation costs of reactive power are non-zero. 
8.3 APPLICATION: AN UNCONSTRAINED DISPATCH 
Examples of how to use the PvG pricing model to calculate ex post prices for observed 
dispatches ar.e presented in this section. The 3-node power system in Figure 7.1 is used 
for these examples, and it is assumed that it was optimally dispatched by a PvG-type 
OPF (for example, PvG-OPF). The observed dispatch was unconstrained and had' the 
following characteristics: 
• Generator 1 was marginal for real and reactive power; 
• Generator 3 was marginal for Qa3 , but not dispatched (non-marginal) for real 
min 
power, Pa3 = Pa3 = O; 
• Node 1 is the Dispatch Based Pricing reference node (i.e. cP1 = )..P and cQ 1 = 
>..q); 
o Nodes 1 and 3 are PvG nodes; 
• Node 2 is a pqD node. 
8.3 APPLICATION: AN UNCONSTRAINED DISPATCH 
The resultant PvG pricing equations for this observed dispatch are: 
Real power marginal price equations 
Reactive power marginal price equations 
µQl = f3Ql - )..Q 
BLP ( BLQ) 8Ql 8Q3 
/3q2 = ->-.P 8Q2 + >-.Q 1 - 8Q2 - µQ1 8Q2 - µQ3 8Q2 
µQ3 = f3Q3 - )..Q 











Price bound equations (which determine the range of values for each marginal price): 
- + 
c </3 <c-Q1 - Ql - Ql 
c ---'' < 13· < c + 
Q3 - Q3 - Q3 








11; was unrestricted at Node 2. So, the corresponding marginal voltage price ii: Equa-
tion 8.40 (f3v 2 ) is fixed through Equation 8A7. In a PvG-type spot market all generator 
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voltages are fixed. Hence, v.;_ and Vi were fixed because Nodes 1 and 3 are PvG nodes. 
The fixed voltages are demonstrated by Equations 5.16 to 5.18. Hence, the slack vari-






and v~J allow the marginal voltage 
prices in Equations 8.39 and 8.41 (f3v 1 and f3v 3 ) to be unrestricted in value. 
8.3.2 Marginal Generators 
Generator 1 was marginal for real power because Pa1 was still free to vary after the 
dispatch had been optimised. That is, Equation 8.8 was not binding. This requires -




equal zero. Consequently, the marginal price in 
Equation 8.33 must be forced to equal its unit generation cost by using Equation 8.42. 
That is: 
In Section G.4 it is observed that constraining all generator voltages in a pq-
1:yJ>e spot market generally results in all generators being marginal for reactive power. 
This is also true for generators in a PvG-type spot market where generator voltages 
are always fixed (power system losses have a small influence on multiple marginal 
generators). Multiple generators were observed to be marginal for reactive power in 
the (zero reactive power unit generation cost) Matpower experiments of Table 8.1. 
Therefore, the results of these experiments can be extrapolated to say that multiple 
marginal generators for reactive power occur in PvG-type dispatches where reactive 
power generation has a non-zero unit generation cost. 
Fixed generator voltages are assumed to be the reason for both Generator 1 and 
Generator 3 having been marginal for reactive power in this dispatch of the 3-rrode 
system. Hence, DBP 5.6 is satisfied because the marginal prices for reactive power at 
Nodes 1 and 3 (in Equations 8.36 and 8.38) are fixed by Equations 8.44 and 8.45: 
and 
Note that: 
8.3.3 Non-Marginal Nodes 
Generator 3 was not dispatched for real power, such that Equation 8.8 was binding: 
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This enables v ;
3 
to be used in Equation 8.43 to allow {3P3 (in Equation 8.35) to vary. 
It follows that the marginal (market) price of real power at Node 3 will be less than 
the unit generation cost. That is: 
This equation indicates that the market is not willing to pay the unit cost of real power 
generation from the generator at Node 3. As a consequence, Generator 3 was not 
dispatched because its owner was not willing to sell real power for anything less than 
Node 2 is a p9-D node, indicating that the real and reactive power injections (P2 
and Q2 ) were fixed. Section 8.2.1 showed that price bound equations are not required 
for pqD nodes. For Node 2 therefore, (3P2 and (3Q2 in Equations 8.34 and 8.37 are 
unrestricted. 
8.3.4 The Reference Node 
Node 1 is the reference node for this example. Hence, Equations 8.33 and 8.36 can be 
simplified, as in Section 7.3.6. That is: 
and 
The marginal voltage price equation (8.39) cannot be simplified, as all of the partial 
derivatives in this equation are not equal to zero. 
8.4 APPLICATION: A CONSTRAINED DISPATCH 
This section illustrates how the PvG pricing model is to be used when calculating 
ex post marginal prices,for constrained observed dispatches from a PvG-type spot 
market. Only voltage constraints, reactive power generation constraints and implicit 
loss constraints are considered herein. However, other constraint types are implemented 
in a similar manner within the Dispatch Based Pricing framework. 
8.4.1 Voltage Constraints 
In a PvG-type spot market, voltage constraints can only occur at pqD nodes, because 
all generator voltages are already fixed. For every voltage constraint, the term in 
Equations 8.15 to 8.17 will be non-zero: 
Vn E pqD 
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For example, if the observed dispatch had a voltage constraint at Node 2, Equations 8.33 
to 8.35 and 8.37 will include µv 2 ;~~. For example, Equation 8.37 becomes: 
To satisfy DBP 5.6, another marginal price must be fixed. f3P 3 is the only available 
marginal price, as (]Pl, f3q 1 and f3Q3 are already fixed. Fortunately, a constraint usually 
forces another generator to be marginal. Therefore, it can be assumed that Generator 3 
had also become marginal for real power. Hence, the required fixed marginal prices for ·-
this voltage constrained dispatch of the 3-node power system are: 
8.4.2 Non-Marginal Generators for Reactive Power 
A generator that is non-marginal for reactive power has been forced against an upper or 
lower reactive power generation limit (ref. Equation 8.9). The 'Q' dispatch in Table 8.1 
is a dispatch for the 14-bus power system where Generator 8 has reached its upper 
reactive power generation limit. 
For this 14-bus dispatch, the marginal prices from the PvG pricing model only 
matched the marginal prices from Matpower when Node 8 was modelled using Equa-
tions 8.16 and 8.19 instead of Equations 8.17 and 8.18. Furthermore, the marginal 
prices from the PvG pricing model only matched the marginal prices from QOPF when 
Equations 8.16 and 8.19 were used instead of Equations 8.17 and 8.18. Therefore, a 
generator no'cie is transformed from a PvG node to a PqG node with a voltage con-
straint when Equation 8.9 -becomes binding. This is because Q0 has been transfoqned 
from a dependent variable to an independent fixed parameter. 
For the 3-node example, assume that Generator 3 has become non-marginal for 
reactive power, such that: 
(8.49) 
The required changes to Equations 8.33 to 8.48 for the transformation from 
PvG node to PqG node are as follows. Equation 8.38 is replaced with: 
(8.50) 
and Equation 8.41 is replaced with µv 3 = f3v 2 
Equation 8.50 illustrat~s that all -µQ 3 
8
~ 3 terms must be removed, and that ter~s 
describing the new voltage constraint at this PqG node must be added to Equations 8.33 
8.4 APPLICATION: A CONSTRAINED DISPATCH 103 
to 8.35, and 8.37 to 8.39: 
Experience has shown that often another generator will become marginal if an OPF 
constraint becomes binding, even if that generator had not previously been dispatched. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that Generator 3 was dispatched and became marginal 
for real power when it became non-marginal for reactive power. That is: 
min min 
P03 > P03 where P03 = OMW 
The marginal price of reactive power at Node 3 must be allowed to vary because 
Generator 3 is non-marginal for reactive power. Therefore, v;
3 
is added to Equa-
tion 8.45 because Generator 3 is non-marginal due to the binding upper generation 
limit (Equation 8.49): 
- <(3 < + + 
CQ3 - Q3 - CQ3 + V Q3 
Making (3Q3 unrestricted means that a different fourth marginal generator price must 
be fixed to satisfy DBP 5.6. Therefore, (3P3 can be fixed because Generator 3 is now 
marginal for real power. Thus, Equation 8.43 becomes: 
- + 
c <(3 <c P3 - P3 - P3 
All other equations remain unchanged. 
8.4.3 Implicit Loss Constraints 
In Section 7.4.2, implicit)oss constraints were shown to be a cause of multiple marginal 
generators in an qptimal dispatch. When using the PvG pricing model however, implicit 
loss constraints are the primary economic explanation of multiple marginal generators 
of real power only. This is because the generator voltage constraints are already used to 
account for the fixed reactive power marginal prices of the multiple marginal generators 
for reactive power (see Section 8.3.2). 
The PvG pricing model allows for implicit loss constraints in exactly the same 
way as the pq pricing model. Consider the original unconstrained PvG dispatch in 
Section 8.3 as an illustration, but assume that Generator 3 was marginal for real power, 
as well as for reactive power. 
Generator 3 however, must remain formulated as non-marginal for real power to 
satisfy DBP 5.6. This means that (3P3 must be totally unrestricted. That is, Equa-
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tion 8.43 must become: 
When marginal losses act as constraints however, this equation will become: 
This is because the slack variables become equal to zero: 
+ -
v =v =0 
P3 P3 
The slack variables equal zero because the cost of the marginal losses makes the mar-
ginal price ((3P3) equal to the real power unit generation cost of Generator 3 (cP3). This 
demonstrates that Generator 3 was indeed marginal for real power. 
8.5 CONCLUSIONS 
A PvG pricing model has been proposed. Validation experiments have been used to 
demonstrate that this PvG pricing model and the pq pricing model of Chapter 7 are 
different. 
The PvG pricing model has been validated as far as possible without the use of 
a software implementation of PvG-OPF. However, the model has not been used to 
investigate the behaviour of marginal prices for reactive power in a PvG-type spot 
market, for two reasons: 
• 
1. a software implementation of PvG-OPF does not exist. Therefore, obse~ved 
optimal dispatches from a PvG-typ~ spot market' cannot be generated. 
2. PvG-OPF is required to produce benchmark marginal prices to validate the 'PvG' 
part of the N ODAL2 source code. It is als~ required to verify that the PvG pricing 
equations calculate marginal prices that correctly describe the cost of dispatching 
real and reactive power generation in a PvG-type spot market. Therefore, an 
element of uncertainty remains in the validity of marginal prices generated by the 
PvG pricing model, because PvG-OPF has not been implemented in software. 
The behaviour of marginal prices of reactive power in a pq-type spot market is 
investigated in Chapters 9 and 10. 
Chapter 9 · 
OPTIMAL DISPATCH PRICE BEHAVIOUR 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates the behaviour that can be expected of reactive power prices 
in a pq-type spot market (introduced in Chapter 7). The pq-OPF (Equations 7.1 
to 7.12) models the optimisation process of this spot market. Both pq-OPF and the 
pq pricing model (Equations 7.13 to 7.19) are capable of calculating marginal prices 
for this spot market. 
For all cases in this chapter, it is assumed that: 
• an optimal (economic) dispatch has been achieved, and 
• the Clearing Manager has correctly identified all constraints that have become 
binding during the optimisation process (as discussed in Section 3.2). 
When these assumptions are valid, duality theory states that pq-OPF (i.e. QOPF, 
' 
the software implementation of pq-OPF) and the pq pricing model (i.e. N ODAL2, its 
software implementation) will produce identical marginal prices. This is depicted in 
Figure 6.2. For convenience therefore, QOPF has been used to generate both the 
optimal dispatches and the corresponding ex post marginal prices for all case studies 
presented within this chapter. However, NoDAL2 was used to verify the ex post prices 
calculated by QOPF. QOPF and N ODAL2 produce identical prices for each and every 
case study. 
Dandachi et al [1996] recognised the impracticalities of re-optimising the react-
ive power dispatch too frequently, citing altering transformer taps and altering shunt 
devices during re-optimisation. In New Zealand's spot market the real power dispatch 
is usually only re-optimised at the start of each trading period 1 . Therefore, the dis-
patches of both real power and reactive power in this pq-type spot market are assumed 
to be optimised only at the beginning of each trading period. 
1If the demand prqfile changes dramatically during a trading period, the real power dispatch may 
be re-optimised once or twice during that trading period, to ensure the generation profile follows the 
pre-dispatch generation schedule. This schedule is just the list of real power unit generation costs of 
all generators. Following this schedule ensures a merit order dispatch. 
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Marginal prices for real .and reactive power are only valid for a single instant in time. 
Therefore, the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices for the optimal dispatches 
described in this chapter only apply to the instant at the beginning of the trading 
period when the dispatch is optimised. Only optimal dispatches are considered in this 
.chapter. 
Reactive power is much less expensive that real power. For illustration purposes 
therefore, the reactive power cost function for each generator is formulated to give a 
unit generation cost that is 10% of the real power unit generation cost for the same 
generator. This applies to all cases. It simplifies reality, where this percentage varies --
due to many factors, such as the use of hydro generation instead of thermal generation. 
The 9-bus and 14-bus .power systems are used for the case studies in this chapter. 
9.2 BEHAVIOURAL CASE STUDIES 
The behaviour of reactive power marginal prices is investigated for the following types 
of dispatches2 : 
e unconstrained; 
• voltage constrained; 
• reactive power generation constrained; 
e sub-optimal. 
The sub-optimal dispatch investigation is presented in Chapter 10 . . 
The focus of the investigations in this chapter is on the behaviour of prices in a 
pq-type spot market where reactive power has a unit_ generation cost (that is, cost 
functions are used to economically dispatch reactive power, as well as real power) 3 . 
Power-flow algorithms assume that a power system operates its generators with 
constant voltage set-points. In reality however, it is physically acceptable to let these 
voltage set-points vary within the rated· voltage limits of the generation equipment. 
Hence, all case studies investigate the behaviour of prices for optimal dispatches from 
both perspectives: 
• dispatches with fixed generator voltages (i.e. every generator node is voltage 
constrained), and 
2 See Ring [1995) or Read and Ring [1995a) for a full description of the behaviour of real power 
marginal prices. 
3 The paper, Vlard et al [1999] has been written as background thesis work. It presents a spot 
market in which reactive power is costless. That is, only real power is economically dispatched. The 
focus is on how reactive power marginal prices change when this market is extended to include reactive 
power cost functions, so that both real and reactive power are economically dispatched. This paper-is 
pr~se~ted in Appendix H. -
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• dispatches wi:th unconstrained generator voltages (except the reference voltage). 
The effects of constraints on prices is difficult to observe in a variable generator voltage 
dispatch. Fixed generator voltages however, magnify any price behaviour resulting 
from binding constraints. This is because they restrict the ability of a power system to 
respond to any demand for reactive (or real) power. Therefore, fixed generator voltages 
are used to illustrate the influence of voltage and reactive power generation constraints, 
on the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices. 
Since the focus is on price behaviour in a pq-type market, all generator nodes are 
modelled as a PQG node in every case study (as proposed in Chapter 7). For the fixed 
generator voltage dispatches, each generator node is modelled as a PQG node with a 
voltage constraint. 
9.3 INFLUENCES ON REACTIVE POWER MARGINAL PRICES 
9.3.1 Non-marginal PQG and pqD Nodes 
The marginal prices of real and reactive power at each PQGnm and pqD node (i.e. (3p; 
and f3QJ are composed of a number of marginal cost components (as described by 
Equation 2.1 and in Section 3.3). In the Dispatch Based Pricing framework, these 
marginal cost components can be identified as: 
1. the unit costs of real and reactive power (AP and AQ); 
. aL aL 
2. the costs of margmal real power losses ( 7i1.- and iif-); 
i I 
3. the costs of ~arginal reactive power losses (~~ and ~~~ ); 
• • 
4. the dual marginal costs of all binding primal constraints (For example, the costs 
av av 
of the fixed reference Voltage: µVref aP.f and µVref ac/.1 ) 
• i I 
The real and reactive power prices at the reference node are the only exceptions to this 
composition (see Section 7.3.6). 
The behaviour of f3p; and (3Qi for a particular power system are dictated by the 
responses of the above cost components to changes in the demand profile. (3Pi and (3Qi 
are a function of the first three components when calculating prices for any observed 
dispatch ( either unconstrained or constrained). 
The cost of each constrained power system resource is reflected in (3Pi and (3Qi, 
through the fourth marginal cost component. Each extra binding primal constraint 
results in an extra fourth dual marginal cost component. These constraint_cost com-
ponents also influence the behaviour of the marginal prices. 
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Consider an example. Assume the 14-bus power system has been dispatched using 
QOPF, with fixed (i.e. constrained) generator voltages. Furthermore, a thermal con-
straint became binding on Branch 5-6 during the dispatch process. This is a total of 
six binding constraints. With respect to Equation 7.15, the equation used to calculate 
the marginal price of reactive power at Node 14 would then be: 
Thus, it can be seen that the marginal loss components and the six constraint compon-
ents influence the behaviour of the reactive power marginal price at Node 14 (i.e. /3Q 14 ). 
The marginal price equations are a set of simultaneous equations. Thus, the values 
of the shadow price (marginal cost) variables within this equation also· influence /3Pi 
and f3Qi at all other nodes within the power system (as discussed in Section 5.9.4). 
9.3.2 Marginal PQG Nodes 
The form of price Equation 9.1 also applies to any node (n) where the generator is 
marginal for reactive (or real) power. However, it has been demonstrated in Sec-
tions 5.5, 7.3.3 and 8.3.2 that /3Qn (or /3Pn) is forced to equal the unit generation cost 
of the generator' CQn ( or c Pn). That is: /3 Qn = CQn . 
Equation 6.9 implies that cQn is constant when the generator cost function is linear. 
(note, cQn =,it~). A constant unit generation cost (cQn) means that /3Qn is fixed at 
marginal generator nodes. Only linear cost functions are considered in this chapter. 
This allows the mechanisms of the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices to be 
clearly identified. Ward et al [1999] describes the effect of non-linear cost functions on 
the behaviour of the reactive power marginal prices (/3Qn). 
9.3.3 Predicted Reactive Power ·Price Behaviour 
Reactive power prices are defined by equations very similar to those used for real power 
prices, in a pq-type spot market (see Chapter 7). Naturally, Read and Ring [1995a, 
Section 7.5] extrapolated their discussion on the behaviour of real power prices, to 
conclude that reactive power prices at pq nodes behave in a similar but not identical 
fashion to real power prices. 
They note that, in the absence of "marginal production costs" (i.e. generation cost 
functions), reactive power marginal prices will only be non-zero when reactive power 
is constrained. These nort-zero prices represent the marginal costs of the bindi~g 
consfraints. This statement is applicable to non-marginal PQG nodes and pqD nodes. -
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Reactive power marginal prices at these nodes will be non-zero because the reactive 
power injection at these nodes is constrained. 
Read and Ring argued that these reactive power marginal prices will be high at 
nodes in the vicinity of a binding upper reactive power generation constraint where 
there is a shortage of reactive power. Furthermore, they predicted that reactive power 
marginal prices will be low at nodes in the vicinity of a binding lower reactive power 
generation constraint where there is a surplus of reactive power. This was also con-
cluded in Chapter 2 of this thesis. Read and Ring also predicted that f3Q would increase 
in the presence of upper voltage constraints. This is disproved in Section 9.5. 
Many points of reactive power price behaviour have been discussed in Read and 
Ring [1995a, Section 7.5]. However, no experimental work confirming these points has 
been published. In this chapter, case studies are presented that verify the predictions 
of Read and Ring. But, the studies go a step further by demonstrating the behaviour of 
reactive power prices when using non-zero marginal production costs (that is, reactive 
power generation cost functions). 
9.4 UNCONSTRAINED DISPATCHES 






These costs generally increase with increased electrical distance between Node i and 
the reference node. This is because the marginal real and reactive power losses increase 
with electrical distance. The marginal price of real power (f3Pi in Equation 5.2) depends 
on these marginal loss cost components. Accordingly, Read and Ring [1995a] showed 
that f3Pi generally. increases from node 'to node in the direction of the flow of real power 
when the cost of reactive power is zero (i.e. ,\Q = 0). They showed this occurs due to 
the increasing electrical distance between each consecutive node and the source of the 
real power generation. The phenomenon of "Real Power Price Inversion" is the rare 
exception to this rule. Here, the marginal price of real power decreases in the direction 
of real power flow, because the total real power marginal losses of the power system 
have decreased for an increase in real power demand [Ward et al 1998]4 . 
This section investigates the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices (f3Q;), 
4The investigation into the phenomena of price inversion was performed as background work for this 
thesis and is discussed in ·ward et al [1998]. The unit generation costs of reactive power ,vere-assumed 
to be zero for this paper. This paper is included in Appendix H 
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resulting from the influence of the marginal loss cost components: 
and (9.2) 
.The effects of these loss components on the behaviour of /3q; can only be observed for 
unconstrained dispatches. The effects of the marginal costs of binding constraints mask 
the effect of the loss components. Hence, only unconstrained dispatches are considered 
in this section. 
9.4.1 Variable Generator Voltages 
Reactive power is optimally dispatched in the same way that real power is optimally 
dispatched, according to a merit order (ref. Section 7.3.2). However, there is all' extra 
dimension iri optimising the reactive power dispatch because capacitive power system 
components can generate reactive power, in addition to generators. This necessitates 
the use of two cases to investigate the behaviour of marginal prices in an unconstrained 
_d_~~patch. 
In Case 1 the power system is composed totally of inductive components. This 
ensures that generators are the only source of reactive power. It enables the effect 
of the marginal loss components on /3q; to be easily identified (ref. Equation 9.2). 
In Case 2, the power system is composed of a mixture of inductive and capacitive 
branches. This represents reality more closely where, for example, transmission lines 
generate reactive power when highly capacitive or lightly loaded. 
The Cornell University 9-bus power system in Appendix Eis used for both cases. 
Its simple lobp-structure enables the relationship between average reactive power flow 
and reactive power marginal price behaviour to be easily identified. 
Case 1 
The shunt susceptances (B) ~fall the loop branches in the 9-bus power system (see 
Figure E.1) were set to a very small valu_e to ensure that all branches were inductive. 
That is: 
The objective function used by QOPF to optimise the dispatch of this inductive 
power system was: 
J (cost) = 10.7 P01 + l0.9P02 + ll.OP03 + l.07Q01 + l.09Q02 + l.lOQ03 (9.3) P,Q 
The voltages of Generators 2 and 3 were allowed to vary. ~ was fixed as t~e 
reference voltage at 1.0 pu. To prevent any other binding voltage constraints, the 
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Figure 9.1 The schematic price-profile of reactive power marginal prices ((JQ.) around the 
Cornell 9-bus power system. All branches are inductive. 
upper voltage limits on PQG Nodes 2 and 3, and all pqD nodes were set to: 
The reactive power marginal prices corresponding to this unconstrained, variable 
generator voltage dispatch are depicted by the 'schematic price-profile' in Figure 9.1. 
In this 'schematic price-profile' the layout of the points in the plane defined by the 
two horizontal axes corresponds to the schematic of the 9-bus power system presented 
in F'igure E.1. The vertical lines represent the nodes of the power system. The height 
of each vertical line represents the value of tl,ie marginal price (in $ /MVAr) at that 
node. The vertical axis has a suppressed zero. The arrows indicate the direction of 
average reactive power flow (which is defined by Equation 3.3). 
Case 2 
The power system data presented in Appendix E was used without change in this 
case. In this unmodified 9-bus power system, the loop branches are capacitive and 
Branches 1-4, 3-6 and 8-2 are inductive. 
The power system was dispatched with respect to the objective function described 
by Equation 9.3. Again, the generator voltages were allowed to vary, except the refer-
ence voltage (Yi = 1.0 pu). The resultant reactive power marginal prices are depicted 
by the schematic price-profile in Figure 9.2, with arrows indicating the direction of 
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Figure 9.2 The schematic price-profile of reactive power marginal prices ((3Q,) around the 
Cornell 9-bus power system. Branches are either inductive or capacitive. 
Observations 
In both cases, the marginal price of reactive power at every node is given by: 
(9.4) 
This equation has been formulated with respect to reactive power demand (ref. Equa-
tion 5.10). 
An inspection of the schematic price-profile in Figure 9 .1 reveals that the direction 
of average reactive power flow is from the generator nodes (1, 2, 3) to the demand nodes 
(5, 7, 9), without exception. Furthermore, marginal prices increase in the direction of 
average reactive power flow, from generator to load. 
N ODAL2 was used to determine how the individual cost components of Equation 9.4 
contributed to the behaviour of f3Qi in this inductive network. From one node to the 
next, the marginal loss components for real power and reactive power were both found 
to increase in the direction of average reactive power flow. This was true of every 
branch. However, the magnitude of this change in the cost of real power marginal 
losses ranged between 88% and 270% of the magnitude change in the cost of reactive 
power marginal losses. Fot example, the change in the cost of real power margin_?,! 
losseidrom Node 5 to Node 6 was 270% of the change in the cost of the reactive power -





- ;~;JI 10.1263 - (-0.0516) I $/MVAr 





) I 11.2684 - 1.20251 $/MVAr 
It must be remembered that :iDi is the change in the total reactive power losses 
for a change in reactive power demand at Node i (see Equation 3.2). It is not the 
change in the losses across a single branch. 
The only othe~ changeable cost component in Equation 9.4 is the cost of the ref-
erence voltage constraint. However, NoDAL2 only reports the value of µv1> not the 
8V · 
value of the whole µv 1 ~ component (note that µv 1 = $2.2079/pu). In the fixed . Di . 
generator voltage experiment (Case 3 in the next section), the change in the µv 2 8~; 
8V . 
and µv 3 ~ components from one node (i) to the next, are no more than 20% of the 
change in the sum of the marginal loss cost components: 
(9.6) 
between the same two nodes. Extrapolating this result back to Case 1, it can be 
assumed that the change in µv 1 8~i · is negligible compared to the changes in the 
marginal loss components. Therefore, it can be concluded that the marginal loss cost 
components are causing /3q to increase in the direction of average reactive power flow 
(as (iepicted in Figure 9.1), and not the voltage constraint cost component. 
The marginal reactive power prices in Case 2 however, do not alwaY.s increase in 
the direction of average reactive power flow. The loop branches are sources of reactive 
power generation because they are capacitive. Furthermore, the schematic price-profile 
in Figure 9.2 indicates th_9't Generator 1 is absorbing reactive power. These factors cause 
/3q to decrease in_ the direction of average reactive power flow, along Branches 1-4, 4-5 
and 9-4. 
Consider Branch 9-4 as an example. The price decrease across this branch demon-
strates that the sum of the total marginal real and total marginal reactive power losses 
(Equation 9.6) at Node 4 is less than at Node 9. An analysis of the individual com-
ponents revealed that the cost of marginal real power losses increases from Node 9 to 
Node 4, in the direction of average reactive power flow: 
t::..c ( ) aLP aLP 
ost LP = Ap~Q - Ap~Q > 0 
D4 D9 
(9.7) 
However, the cost of marginal reactive power losses was found to decrease from Node 9 
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to Node 4: 
(9.8) 
.Since b..Cost(LQ) has decreased, f]Q decreases in the direction of average reactive power 
flow because: 
(9.9) 
To explain the decrease in the cost of marginal reactive power losses, let the cost 
of marginal real and reactive power losses be reformulated in terms of finite differences. 
For example: 
Assume that any change in reactive power demand at Node 9 (b..Qv) is supplied totally 
_by_ Generators 2 and 3. This implies that the cost at Node 4 (i.e. )..P :QLP + )..Q :QLQ ) 
D4 D4 
should be greater that the cost at Node 9 (i.e. )..P :QLP + )..Q :QLQ ). This is because 
D9 D9 
Node 4 is further from Generators 2 and 3 than Node 9. However, the sum of the cost 
of marginal reactive power losses decreases from Node 9 to Node 4 (as Equation 9.8 
illustrates). That is, the total losses (>.Pb.LP +.)..Qb..LQ) have decreased. 
The total losses can only decrease from Node 9 to Node 4 if part of b..Qv is 
generated by the capacitive branches, instead of by Generators 2 and 3. Therefore, 
it is possible for f]Q to decrease in the direction of average reactive power flow, if . 
there are reactive power sources in addition to the generators. It must be noted that 
any decrease in f]Q must be attributed to a decrease i~ the sum of the marginal.loss 
components (Equation 9.6). This is because it is possible for f]Q to decrease when the 
real power cost decreases and the reactive power cost increases, and when the change 
in the real power cost is greater -than the change in the reactive power cost. That is: 
b..Cost(LP) < 0, b..Cost(LQ) > 0 and lb..Cost(LP)I > lb..Cost(LQ)I, 
The capacitive branches raised the voltage profile. This tightened the reference 
voltage constraint and is evident by an increase in the marginal voltage constraint 
shadow price from Case 1 to Case 2 (µv 1 =$5.0213/pu). This increased shadow price 
may have also helped nullify the rule-of-thumb that "prices increase in the direction 
. 811 
of average power flow", 1f the whole term (µv 1 ~) was comparable to the loss terms. 
Summary 
In summary, the average flow of real power is always from generator(s) to the de-
mand node because generators are the only source of real power. Likewise, the average 
flo:..V of reactive power is also from the generator(s) to the demand node if generators 
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are the only source·ofreactive power (that is, all network branches are inductive). In an 
inductive network therefore, /3Q increases in the direction of the average flow of reactive 
power due to the increasing electrical distance from the generators. It is possible that 
rare exceptions may occur, such as a reactive power equivalent to "Real Power Price 
Inversion" [Ward et al 1998]. 
In practise, this rule-of-thumb cannot be applied to actual power systems because 
transmission lines are usually capacitive. In the presence of capacitive network com-
ponents the sum of the total real and reactive power marginal losses (Equation 9.6) do 
not always increase in the direction of average reactive power flow. This occurs because 
some capacitive branches increase their reactive power injection to meet an increase 
in reactive power aemand, and as a consequence cause the total real and/ or reactive 
power losses (LP and/or LQ) to decrease. In an unconstrained, capacitive/inductive 
power system therefore, the trend in /3Q is dependent of the positions of all real and 
reactive power sources, the Xk/ Rk ratio of the network branches and the position of 
the reference voltage. 
9.4.2 Reactive Power Generation Surplus 
The reactive power marginal prices at the pqD nodes in Figure 9.2 are appreciably 
less than the corresponding marginal prices in Figure 9.1. At every pqD node except 
Node 4, the marginal real power losses ( !~) have decreased from Case 1 to Case 2, 
and the marginal reactive power losses ( ~~~) have increased because the loop branches 
' . . . C 2 H {)£ h d h {)LQ are generatmg reactive power m ase . owever, oQ~ as ecrease more t an BQ; has 
increased, thus explaining the drop in reactive.power marginal prices at pqD Nodes 5 
to 9. 
The lower prices indicate a surplus of reactive power in the network, because most 
generators and branches are capable .of generating reactive power. This surplus has 
decreased the real power losses associated with transmitting any extra reactive power 
demand. It can therefore be concluded that any unconstrained dispatch of a highly 
capacitive network will generally have a lower reactive power price profile than its 
inductive counter-part. 
9.4.3 Fixed Generator Voltages 
This section investigates the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices for an uncon-
strained dispatch, when all generator voltages are fixed. That is, Case 1 and Case 2 
are re-dispatched with the voltages of aH three generators fixed to 1.0 pu. The result 
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3 4 5 6 
Node Number 
(a) Real power marginal prices (b) Reactive power marginal prices 
Figure 9.3 Marginal price profiles for variable and fixed generator voltage dispatches of the 
inductive version of the Cornell 9-bus power system. 
_is__.Cases 3 and 4 below. For both cases, Equation 9.4 is modified thus: 
(9.10) 
The extra components are the marginal costs of the fixed generator voltage constraints. 
The real and reactive power price profiles of Case 3 are compared with those of 
Case 1, in Fi,.gure 9.3. The price profiles of Cases 2 and 4 are compared in Figure 9.4. 
Case 3 
As in Case 1, /3q increased in the direction of average reactive power flow, even 
with the two extra .fixed ~enerator marginal costs. This is because the change in the 
sum of the three voltage costs between any to nodes, only ranged between 13% and 
22% of the change in the sum of the loss costs. For example, the percentage change 
between Nodes 5 and 6 is: 
(9.11) 
At all nodes the actual magnitudes of the voltage cost components were small in 
comparison to the magnitudes of the loss components, ranging between 3% and 11 %. 
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Figure 9.4 Marginal price profiles for variable and fixed generator voltage dispatches of the 
Cornell 9-bus power system; capacitive and inductive branches exist. 
At Node 6 for example: 
(9.12) 
Therefore, given the low value of µv 1 in Case 1 and the low percentages (as demon-
strated by Equation 9.12), the increase in the real power and reactive power price 
profiles from Case 1 to Case 3 is primarily due to an increase in the sum of the mar-
ginal loss compon~nts (Equation 9.6). 
Case 4 
Fixing all generator\roltages whe1_1 dispatching the original (capacitive/inductive) 
-. 
9-bus power system resulted in a completely different dispatch to that of Case 2. This 
is reflected in the different marginal price profiles of Figure 9.4. However, it was still 
found that f3q does not always increase in the direction of average reactive power flow, 
as in Case 2. 
With reference to Equation 9.11, the changes in the voltage costs were much more 
extreme in this case than in Case 3. At each node, the percentage change in f3q from 
Case 2 to Case 4 was in the range of 33% to 341 %. For example, the percentage change 
from Node 5 to Node 6 was 197% (compared with 16% in Case 3). 
The magnitudes of the voltage cost components were between 17% and-43% of the 
marginal loss components (ref. Equation 9.12). 
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Figure 9.5 A comparison of the price profiles for three different half-hourly trading periods 
in a pq-type spot market, for the Cornell 9-bus system. 
9.4.4 Conclusions 
The percentages associated with Equation 9.12 demonstrate that the marginal loss com-
ponents set the height of the reactive power price profile in an unconstrained power 
system. This is independent of whether branches are inductive or capacitive, and inde-
pendent of whether the power system was dispatched with fixed or variable generator 
voltages. The loss/voltage percentages (ref. Equation 9.11) identify the marginal cost 
components that determine the shape of the reactive power marginal price profile. In 
Case 3, these percentages show that only the marginal loss components determine the 
shape. In Ca.se 4, these percentages show that the marginal loss cost components and 
the marginal cost components of the fixed generator voltages determine the shape of 
the profile. 
9.4.5 Different Real and Reactive Power Cost Functions 
In New Zealand's Wholesale Electricity market; the price of real power can vary widely 
over time. Generating companies may, for a variety of reasons, use different real power 
generation cost functions for different trading periods during a day, when submitting 
offers to the 'Real-time Physical Market'. In an unconstrained power system, changes 
in cost functions between two consecutive trading periods result in real power price 
variations other than the price variations that occur slowly over time as a function of 
the demand-profile. This is also true of a spot market that economically dispatches 
reactive power. 
Consider for example, a spot market set up on the Cornell University 9-bus power 
system. Here, three generating companies are bidding against each other to suppJy 
real ai1d reactive power. If one company made its generator much more expensive than 
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the other two, the market would ignore this generator in favour of the two cheaper 
generators. That is, if these two could meet the total demand by themselves. Therefore, 
it can be assumed that the real power and reactive power generation cost functions for 
the generators are comparable, since the generating companies are being competitive 
with each other. It is also assumed that the changes in all the cost functions between 
different trading periods are not dramatic. 
Three different optimal dispatches, representing three different half-hourly trading 
periods of the spot market, are presented. The generator voltages are fixed for all 
dispatches. The only differences between the dispatches are the generation cost func-
tions of real and reactive power. The objective function for each dispatch is composed 
of three pairs of real and reactive power generation cost functions ( one pair for each 
generator): 
Case 4 = 10.7 Pa1 + l0.9Pa2 + ll.0Pa3 + l.07Qm + l.09Qa2 + l.l0Qa3 
Function 1 = 10. 7 Pm + 10.8 Pa2 + 10.9 Pa3 + 1.07 Qm + 1.08 QG2 + 1.09 Qa3 
and 
Function 2 = 10.9 Pa1 + 11.1 Pa2 + 10.8 Pa3 + 1.09 Qm + 1.11 Qa2 + 1.08 Qa3 
These objective functions represent the total generation cost to the power system for 
the three trading periods. 
In all three dispatches, all generators were marginal for real and reactive power. 
Hen:e, the unit generation costs of each generator (cP and cq) are equal to the coeffi-
cients of the cost functions. For example, cPl = $10.7 /MW and cQ 1 = $1.07 /MVAr for 
Case 4. 
Table 9.1 summarises the generation from Generators 1, 2 and 3, and the total 
system losses for each of the three dispatches. 
Table 9.1 Optimal power system dispatches for the three objective functions. 
I Total System Losses 
Case 4 165.94 + j 24.11 92.33 + j 6.83 59.69 - j 4.18 2.96 - j 88.24 
Function 1 156.95 + j 23.14 97.17 + j 6.79 63.81 - j 4.55 2.93 - j 89.62 
Function 2 148.89 + j 23.25 61.38 + j 6.21 107.85 - j 3.01 3.11 - j 88.55 
The distribution of real power across the generators is dependent on the unit cost 
of real power at each generator. A higher unit generation cost results in less real power 
from that generato_r. Consequently, the distribution of real power changes with object-
ive function. The reactive power generation distribution changes very little ~etween 
objective functions. 
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For each optimal dispatch, the cost of losses is implicitly minimised when minim-
ising the total cost of real and reactive power generation. Therefore, the costs of the 
total marginal losses for the three dispatches are similar because the objective functions 
are similar (i.e. they calculate similar total generation costs). This occurs even though 
.the real power generation profile changes significantly. Consequently, the reactive power 
price profiles depicted in Figure 9.5 are similar, since reactive power marginal prices are 




~zq ). The similarities in the reactive power price profiles also indicate that the 
pressure on the voltage constraints have not changed significantly (ref. Equation 9.10). 
The real power price profiles have been included for completeness (but without 
comment). 
Reactive power marginal prices therefore, will not change dramatically from. one 
half-hourly period to the next due to changing generation cost functions in a pq-type 
spot market. Large price changes will only occur if system constraints become binding, 
or generators become non-marginal. 
9.5 VOLTAGE CONSTRAINED DISPATCHES 
9.5.1 Introduction 
Fixed generator voltages have been introduced in Section 7.4.1 as binding primal voltage 
constraints. Such constraints are 'acceptable' if it is decided that this is the best way 
for the power system to operate, and if the market is willing to accept the associated 
behaviour of real power prices and reactive power prices. However, the price behaviour 
resulting froin binding voltage constraints at non-generator (pqD) nodes is generally 
unacceptable. This is because these voltage constraints can often be relieved (b~ in-
stalling fixed capacitors for example), thus removing the price behaviour associated 
with the voltage constraint. 
In New Zealand's distributiou system, the limits on the acceptable voltage range 
are 230 V ± 6% [NZ-Regs, 1997]. When the needs of a power system force the voltage 
at a node against the limit of a range such as this, the voltage is constrained. This is 
modelled with a binding voltage constraint. 
A voltage (v
1
;in) can only be considered as constrained if it is constrained at a 
voltage different to the voltage that would occur if the voltage constraint was relaxed 
(i.e. the unconstrained voltage). This unconstrained voltage ('V~:ncnstr) is illustrated in 
. uncnstr min 





This section investigates the effects of lower and upper primal voltage constraints 
on reactive power marginal prices. Figure 9.6 illustrates a binding primal lower voltage 
constraint. In particular, the behaviour of marginal prices is investigated when tl;i.e 
voitage at pqD Node 13 of the IEEE 14-bus power system is constrained. The IEEE 
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Figure 9.6 A primal voltage constraint is tightened when the underlying unconstrained voltage _ 
(vl:ncn,tr) moves further away from the actual constrained voltage (~7,n), from one instant in 
time to the next. 
14-bus power system is used because its mesh structure clearly illustrates the effect 
of a nodal-type constraint ( e.g. a voltage constraint) on the marginal prices of the 
surrounding nodes. 
The effect of tightening primal voltage constraints is also presented. Voltage op-
erating limits are often legally unchangeable (for example, the voltage limits regulated 
in NZ Regs. [1997]). For example, it may not be possible to change ~;in in Figure 9.6. 
Therefore, a binding voltage constraint (i.e. limit) is tightened when the underlying un-
constrained voltage (~:ncnstr) moves further away from the actual constrained voltage 
(~;in) due to changing power system conditions. 
In the following cases, the voltage constraint is tightened by changing the reactive 
pow.er demand at Node 13 (Qv 13 ), which in turn shifts the unconstrained voltage. This 
demand-change might occur in reality when a wholesale customer alters their reactive 
power demand from one trading period to the next, for example when a power company 
makes the transition from a day tariff to night tariff. 
For all cases in this ~ection (9.5), the voltage constrained 14-bus power system was 
dispatched,using_QOPF with respect to the objective function: 
f (cost) = 10.7 P01 + 10.7 P02 + ll.OP03 + l0.9P06 + ll.lP08 P,Q 
+ 1.07 QG! + 1.07 Q02 + l.lQ Q03 + 1.09 Q06 + 1.11 Q08 (9.13) 
The real and reactive power price profiles for an unconstrained dispatch of the 
14-bus power system are presented in Figure 9. 7 for the purpose of comparison with 
the voltage constrained price profiles. This unconstrained dispatch was obtained by 
running the 14-bus power system data of Appendix E, unmodified, through QOPF. 
The coefficients of the objective function (9.13) are described by the 'Generntor Cost' 
data. The voltage at Node 13 for this unconstrained dispatch is v
1
:ncnstr = 1.0502 pu. 
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(b) Reactive power marginal prices 
Figure 9. 7 Real and reactive power marginal price profiles for the unconstrained dispatch of 
the IEEE 14-bus power system. 
9.5.2 Lower Voltage Constraints 
In Cases 5 and 6, the voltage at Node 13 has been forced against a lower voltage limit. 
A bin.ding lower voltage constraint was obtained by setting the value of ~;in in both 




= 1.0510 pu 
The only difference between these two cases is the value of Q ma. 
Case 5 
This case illustrates the change in real and reactive power marginal prices when a 
lower voltage constraint becomes binding in a power system. In this case, the reactive 
power load at Node 13 is the same as the original IEEE 14-bus power system data 
(i.e. Qv13 = 5.80 MY.Ar). 
Figure 9.8 depicts the trends in reactive power prices around this voltage con-
strained 14-bus power system. These reactive power marginal prices are also depicted 
by the 'Case 5' price profile in Figure 9.9(b). The unconstrained profiles of Figure 9.7 
are included in Figure 9.9 for comparison. 
The marginal price of reactive power is high at the constrained, Node 13. But, it 
decreases quickly with increased electrical distance from Node 13. The quick decrease 
of prices indicates that, only reactive power demand close to the constrained Node 13 
strongly influences the constrained voltage. This highlights the localised nature of 
reactive power. 
An increase in demand at Node 13 would draw more reactive power out of the 
9.5 VOLTAGE CONSTRAINED DISPATCHES 123 
... :. 
Figure 9.8 The Case 5 schematic price-profile depicting reactive power marginal prices for 
the voltage constrained dispatch of the IEEE 14-bus power system. Node 13 has a binding 
lower voltage constraint. 
system and cause the unconstrained voltage to drop. This increases the difference 
between the constrained and the unconstrained voltages, and thus puts more stress 
on the lower voltage constraint. Accordingly, the high price at Node 13 discourages 
reactive power consumers from putting stress on the constraint by using reactive power. 
It also reflects the amount the market is willing to pay in order to relax the constraint 
on the voltage at that node. 
f 
Case 6 
Case 6 demonstrates the response of real and reactive power prices when the bind-
ing, lower voltage constraint at Node 13 is tightened. The constraint was tightened by 
increasing the reactive power demand at Node 13 to Qm3 = 6.80 MVAr . 
.. 
Figure 9.9 shows that tightening the voltage constraint causes both real and react-
ive power prices to increase. (3Q 13 (at $17.54/MVAr) is now almost the same magnitude 
as (3P1 3 (at $20.19/MVAr). This is a significant proportional increase from the uncon-
strained case in Figure 9.7, where the unconstrained reactive power prices at all nodes 
were between 9.5% and 11.1 % of the unconstrained real power prices ( these percentages 
were obtained by comparing the prices depicted in Figures 9.7(a) and 9.7(b)). 
9.5.3 Upper Voltage Constraints 
In this section, Cases 7 and 8 are used to demonstrate the behaviour of real and reactive 
power marginal prices, in the presence of a binding upper voltage constraint. This is 
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(a) Real power marginal prices (b) Reactive power marginal prices 
Figure 9.9 Marginal price profiles of Cases 5 and 6 for the IEEE 14-bus power system, with a 
binding lower voltage constraint on Node 13. The unconstrained Figure 9.7 profiles are included 
for reference. 
__ . -achieved by setting the value of ~:
0
"' in both cases, below the original unconstrained 
- voltage value of 1.0502 pu, to: 
~;a:z: = 1.0500 pu 
As with Cases 5 and 6, the only difference between these two cases is the value of 
the reactive power load, Q D 13 • In both cases, all generators are marginal for both real 
power and reactive power generation. 
Case 7 
The reactive power load at Node 13 has been set to the same original power system 
value, as in Case 5. That is, QDl§ = 5.80 MVAr. 
Figure 9.lO(b) shows· that reactive power marginal prices drop rapidly with de-
creasing electrical distance from the constrained node. The low reactive power prices 
encourage an increase in reactive power consumption ( Q Di) in order to relieve the pres-
sure on the voltage constraint; increased consumption reduces the voltage (~3 ). The 
price increase when moving away from Node 13, shows that increasing reactive power 
consumption becomes less effective at relieving the constraint with increased electrical 
distance from the constraint. 
Case 8 
· The binding upper voltage constraint at Node 13 is tightened in this case. This -
was achie".ed by reducing the reactive power load at Node 13 in order to increase the 
unconstrained voltage at the same node. Hence, the reactive power demand for this 
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(b) Reactive power marginal prices 
Figure 9.10 Marginal price profiles of Cases 7 and 8 for the IEEE 14-bus power system, 
constrained by an upper voltage limit on Node 13. The unconstrained Figure 9.7 profiles are 
included for reference. 
case IS: 
QD13 = 4.80 MVAr 
Tightening the upper voltage constraint resulted in lower real and reactive power prices 
than in Case 7 (shown in Figure 9.10). Moreover, Figure 9.lO(b) demonstrates that 
reactive power prices can even go negative. 
From the consumers' perspective, a negative price at a node indicates that the 
power system is willing to pay consumers to increase their reactive power load as a 
means of reducing the voltage at that node, in turn relieving the pressure on the 
constraint. From the perspective of the power system, the negative price acts as an 
incentive for the power system to relax the voltage constraint so that it does not have 
to pay consumers to use reactive power. 
9.5.4 Discussion on Voltage Constraints 
With respect to the pq pricing model (Equations 7.13 to 7.19) the marginal cost of 
reactive power at Node 13 for Cases 5 to 7, is described by: 
The presence of non-zero µv; dual variables for Nodes 1, 2, 3, 6 and 8 in-dic~te that 
the voltages at all generator nodes are fixed. The presence of the (non-zero) voltage 
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shadow price µv
13
, indicates that the voltage at Node 13 has been constrained. All 
µv; shadow prices are the non-zero LaGrange multipliers of binding primal voltage 
constraints. By Equations 7.16 and 7.19, these voltage shadow prices are: 
µVl f3v1 = \ v:1 ) - \ v~1 ) 
µV2 f3v2 = \ v:2 ) - \ v~2 ) 
µV3 f3v3 = \ v:3 ) - \ v~3) 
µV6 f3va = \ v:6) - \ V~6) 
µVB f3vs = \ v:s) - \ V~s) 
µVl3 f3vl3 = \ v:13 ) - \ v~13 ) 
By complimentary slackness (i.e. Duality 5.5), if a lower primal voltage constraint 








becomes non-zero for binding upper primal voltage constraints, as m Cases 7 
and 8. 
µv 13 and its corresponding partial derivative (i.e. sensitivity coefficient) describe the 
marginal cost to the power system of the voltage constraint. Formulating Equation 9.14 
in terms of reactive power demand, rather than reactive power injection results in: 
av;_3 
{JQ13 = ' ' ' + µVl3 ~Q . 
D13 
(9 .. 15) 
If the voltage 11;_ 3 was unconstrained, an incremental increase in reactive power demand 
QD 13 would result in a drop in 11;_3. Hence, the partial derivative is negative. Assuming 
a lower voltage constraint. therefore, the marginal price of reactive power is: 
( - ) 1 av;_3 I {JQ13 = , , , - -VV13 0Q D13 
This suggests that reactive power prices will be higher than in the unconstrained 
case (where µv 13 = 0). This price increase is evident when comparing the unconstrained 
profiles with the Case 5 and 6 profiles ( see Figure 9. 9 (b)). The partial derivative 
becomes larger when the constraint is tightened, indicating an increase in the sensitivity 
of 11;_3 to increases in reactive power demand. This increase in sensitivity is also reflected 
by an increase in µv 13 , and consequently, an increase in reactive power prices frorn 
Case.5 to Case 6. 
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When an upper constraint 1s binding, the marginal price of reactive power at 
Node 13 is: 
This results in a decrease in marginal prices from the unconstrained case, since the 
partial derivative is negative. This constrained price behaviour was observed in Cases 7 
and 8. 
The decline in {JQ with increased electrical distance is best illustrated through a 
brief example. Consider the marginal price of reactive power at Node 5: 
(9.16) 
The value of µv 13 in Equation 9.16 is equal to the value of µv 13 in Equation 9.15, 
because these two equations are part of a set of simultaneous equations. But, the 
voltage "Vi3 is not as sensitive to an increase in reactive power demand at Node 5 (Qv5 ) 
as it is to an increase in reactive power demand at Node 13 (Qm3 ). This is because the 
sensitivity of "Vi3 ( and {JQ 13 ) decreases with increased electrical distance. Consequently, 
the partial derivative in Equation 9.16 will be smaller than the one in Equation 9.15. 
This discussion also applies to the cost components representing the fixed generator 
voltages, since fixed voltages are just voltage constraints. 
The discussion above only apples when the shadow price and partial derivative 
of one primal voltage constraint ( e.g. µv 13 ;Qv13 ) is greater than the summation of all 13 
the other marginal cost components in Equation 9.14. If all cost components are 
comparable, the behaviour of {JQ 13 is dictated by the behaviour of all the components. 
9.5.5 Variable Generator Voltage Magnitudes 
Fixed generator voltages magnify real and reactive power prices when a primal voltage 
constraint is binding at 'a pqD node.. This price magnification was observed by re-
dispatching the voltage constrained power system of Case 8, with variable generator 
voltages. Although, the voltage at Node 1 was constrained to provide a reference 
voltage for the power system: 
'\max = vlmin = 1.06 pu 
No other changes were made to the original IEEE 14-bus power system, aside from 
those implemented for Case 8. 
The resultant _dispatch was only restricted by the binding voltage constraints at 
Nodes 1 and 13. All generators were marginal for real and reactive power generation. 
-
Figure 9.11 presents price profiles for the real and reactive power marginal prices. The 
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(a) Real power marginal prices (b) Reactive power marginal prices 
Figure 9.11 .Marginal price profiles for the IEEE 14-bus power system, with variable generator 
voltages and an upper voltage constraint on Node 13. The Figure 9.7 unconstrained, fixed 
generator voltage profiles are included for reference. 
unconstrained, fixed generator voltage, price profiles of Figure 9.7 have been included 
for comparison. 
T.he magnitudes of the reactive power prices for this dispatch are now very small 
in comparison to Case 8 prices in Figure 9.lO(b). Rather, they are comparable to the 
unconstrained price profiles of Figure 9.7. There are two reasons for the small reactive 
power prices. Firstly, the shadow prices, µv, corresponding to the generator voltages 
are now zero, since the generator voltages are no longer fixed (refer to Table 9.2). The 
only exception to this is µv 1 , which is non-zero because the reference voltage is fixed. 
From Equation 9.14, it can be seen that the marginal price of reactive power at every 
node is reduced, since these shadow prices are now zero. 
Fixed Generator Voltages ($/pu) 
µVl =-2. 7 405 
µv 2 =0.5510 
µv 3 =1.285 
µv 6 =-31.8170· 
µVB =-2.2340 
µVl3 =41.4660 
Variable Generator Voltages ($/pu) 
µVl =0.3497 
µv 2 =0.0000 
µv 3 =0.0000 
µv 6 =0.0000 
µv 8 =0.0000 
µvia=l.1051 
Table 9.2 The shadow prices of voltage constraints in the fixed and variable generator voltage dis-
patches of the IEEE 14-bus power system in Case 8, as calculated by NooAL2. 
The second reason comes from the drop in the cost of the voltage constraint, µ 1113 , 
as a result of allowing generator voltages to vary. The shadow price µv 13 , is defined 
to be the cost (in $/pu) of relaxing the voltage constraint at Node 13 by 1 pu; the 
partial derivative, functions as a conversion factor between $/pu and $/MVAr. ~n 
extreme value of µvia indicates the high importance that the spot market assigns to -
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relieving the stress on the power system incurred by this constraint. The extent to 
which a change in the reactive power demand Q Di will relieve the stress, is indicated 
in the magnitude of the reactive power price (/3q;), through the values of µv 13 and the 
partial derivative (i.e. sensitivity coefficient). Extreme values of /3q were experienced 
in Cases 5 to 8. 
Fixed generator voltages constrain all other voltages in the power system by re-
stricting real and reactive power flows. These flow restrictions may require the use of, 
normally, uneconomical transmission routes and/or reactive power sources when ob-
taining the power necessary for maintaining the constrained voltage level at No~de 13. 
Such abnormal practises place stress on the power system. 
Allowing generator voltages to vary within their rated operating ranges therefore, 
relieves the stress on the power system. This means that the nett levels of real and 
reactive power at Node 13 required to maintain the constrained voltage cv;_3 ) are more 
easily obtained since there are fewer power flow restrictions. This lack of stress is 
reflected by the low value of µv 13 in Table 9.2, and by the low reactive power prices 
depicted in Figure 9.ll(b). 
There was very little change in any of the reactive power prices, and no observable 
change in real power prices when the voltage constraint at Node 13 was tightened 
for this variable generator voltage dispatch. This result is the opposite of the results 
from Cases 7 and 8. Consequently, any_ tightening of the voltage constraint places very 
little extra stress on the power system, and the reactive power prices remain the same 
because the generator voltages are free to vary. However, there is threshold above (or 
below) which the power system has difficulty in maintaining the constrained voltage. 
This results in high stress and thus high prices. The high prices indicate the importance 
to the system, of relieving this constraint. 
9.6 REACTIVE POWER GENERATION CONSTRAINTS 
9.6.1 Introduction 
A generator that is non-marginal for reactive power has been forced against a primal 
reactive power generation constraint. Constraints that limit the reactive power output 
of a generator can be imposed for either physical or economic reasons. This section 
investigates the effects of binding lower and upper primal reactive power generation 
constraints on the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices (/3q;). 
Specifically, the cases presented describe the behaviour of reactive power marginal 
prices for dispatches of the IEEE 14-bus power system with a primal reactive power 
generation constraint imposed on the generator at Node 8. In all cases, this reactive 
power generation-constrained power system is optimally dispatched using objective 
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function 9.13, repeated here for convenience: 
f (cost) = 10.7 P01 + 10.7 P02 + 11.0P03 + 10.9 P06 + 11.1 P08 P,Q 
+ 1.07 Q01 + 1.07 Q02 + 1.lQ Q03 + 1.09 Q06 + 1.11 Q08 (9.17) 
For all cases, the maximum generation limit on Generator 1 in the original IEEE 
14-bus power system data has been increased to Q:;x = 50 MVAr, to ensure that that 
all generators (except Generator 8) are marginal for reactive power. All generators 
are marginal for real power. Unless indicated, all generator voltages have been fixed. 
There are no other constraints on the power system. 
The unconstrained price profiles in Figure 9. 7 are used to contrast the constrained 
price profiles presented in the impending cases. The reactive power generation injected 
by Generator 8, in the unconstrained dispatch used to generate the price profiles of 
Figure 9.7, is Q08 = 16.0797 MVAr. 
-9;6.2 Lower Reactive Power Generation Constraints 
Binding lower reactive power generation constraints are considered in Cases 9 and 10. 
Generator 8 has been forced against a lower generation limit. The value of Q:t is the 
only difference between Case 9 and Case 10. It has been increased in the latter case to 
tighten the lower reactive power generation constraint. 
Case 9 
To obtain a binding lower reactive power generation constraint, the minimum re-





= 16.5 MVAr 
The resultant real and reactive power marginal price profiles are depicted in Fig-
ure 9.12. The unconstrained profiles of Figure 9.7 are included for comparison. A 
schematic price-profile has not been presented, as the negative {3Q values make the 
schematic price-profile confusing rather than informative. 
{3Q 8 at PQG Node 8 has decreased with respect to the unconstrained price and 
become negative. The negative price requires that the owner of Generator 8 pay the 
market the value of {3Q 8 if the owner wants Generator 8 to continue generating this level 
of reactive power. Customers at Nodes 7 and 8 will be paid by the market for their 
reactive power usage. The negative prices encourages either, the customer to use mo:1:e 
reactive power allowing Generator 8 to operate above its present constrained level, or · 
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Figure 9.12 Marginal price profiles of Cases 9 and 10, for the IEEE 14-bus power system, 
where Generator 8 is constrained by a lower reactive power generation limit. The unconstrained 
Figure 9.7 profiles are included for reference. 
Generator 8 to slacken its lower generation limit to meet the unconstrained demand 
for reactive power. Either way, the desired effect is to relieve the constraint. 
Case 10 
In this case, the lower generation constraint is tightened by increasing the minimum 
reactive power generation limit to: 
Q:t = 17.0 MVAr 
Tightening this constraint made the reactive power prices m the r.egion of the 
constraint more negative. Unlike the upper constraint in the next section however, 
the changes in the reactive power marginal prices are small. Tightening the constraint 
further causes the prices ~-o become more negative in a non-linear fashion, indicating the 
increasing impor~ance to the market df relieving the constraint on the power system. 
9.6.3 Upper Reactive Power Generation Constraints 
Generator 8 is forced against an upper generation limit in Cases 11 and 12. Case 12 
differs from Case 11, only in that the upper generation limit on the generator ( Q:;x) 
is reduced, to tighten the upper reactive power constraint. 
Case 11 
To force a binding upper reactive power generation constraint on the power sys-
tem, the maximum reactive power generation limit was set below the unconstrained 
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Figure 9.13 The schematic price-profile of reactive power prices (!3q.) from Case 11, for the 
IEEE 14-bus power system. Generator 8 has been forced against an upper reactive power 
_generation limit. 
generation level of 16.0797 MVAr to: 
Qmax = 16 MVAr 
GB · 
This reactive power generation constraint causes the reactive power marginal prices 
in the vicinity of Generator 8 to increase dramatically (see the schematic price-profile 
in Figure 9.13). The increase in prices shows that the market is willing to pay in order 
to increase the reactive power generating capacity of Generator 8. The high price 
also prevents more stress being applied to the constraint by discouraging customers 
from using more reactive power. That is, the high price prevents the constraint from 
being tightened. The low prices at a distance from the constraint means those distant 
customers can use more reactive power without significantly increasing the amount of 
stress on the reactive power constraint. 
Case 12 
The change in reactive power marginal prices as the binding upper reactive power 
generation limit is tightened, is described in this case. The constraint was tightened 
by decreasing the maximum reactive power generation limit to: 
Qmax = 15.765 MVAr 
GB 
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Figure 9.14 Marginal price profiles of Cases 11 and 12, for the IEEE 14-bus power system, 
constrained by an upper reactive power generation limit on Generator 8. The unconstrained 
Figure 9. 7 profiles are included for reference. 
Tightening the constraint by a small amount causes the reactive power prices to in-
crease dramatically, especially with respect to the unconstrained case from Figure 9. 7 (b) 
(see Figure 9.14(b)). This increase in marginal prices impresses the importance of re-
lieving the generation constraint on the market. At Nodes 1, 2, 3 and 6, {3Qi are small, 
as they are held at the unit reactive power generation costs of the generators marginal 
for reactive power (as described in Section 7.3.3). 
The reactive power marginal prices are more volatile when tightening this up-
per reactive power generation constraint than when the lower generation constraint is . 
tightened in Case 10. 
9.6.4 Discussion on Reactive Power Generation Constraints 
The marginal price equation for-reactive power in a reactive power constrained power 
system is very similar to Equation 9.14 in the section on binding voltage constraints. 
For example, the equation for the marginal price of reactive power at Node 8 is: 
(9.18) 
In this equation however, the only constraint shadow prices (µvJ are for the fixed 
generator voltages. 
Fixed generator voltages are binding primal constraints. By complimentary slack-
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ness therefore, the µVi shadow prices are non-zero: 
µv1 = f3v1 = \ v:1 )- \ v:1 ) 
µv2 = f3v2 = \ v:2 )- \ v:2 ) 
µva = f3va = \ v;3 ) - \ v:3) 
µVB= f3v6 = \ v;5 )- \ v:6) 
µVB= f3vB = \ v;B)- \ v:B) 
In Section 7.3.3, it was shown that the dual reactive power marginal price at 
that node is constrained between the unit generation costs of the last and next units 
of reactive power when a generator is marginal for reactive power. Therefore,. when 
Generator Sis marginal for reactive power, the reactive power marginal price is thus: 
$1.11/MVAr ~ {JQB ~ $1.11/MVAr 
_However, when a primal reactive power generation limit is reached Generator 8 becomes 
non-marginal and this dual price constraint must be relaxed. This is achieved by 
including a slack variable into the equation. In Case 11, Generator 8 is non-marginal for 
reactive power because QGB = Q:;"'. Consequently, the dual price constraint equation 
becomes: 
+ $1.11/MVAr ~ {JQB ~ $1.11/MVAr + vQ2 
for reasons described in Section 7.3.4. 
In Cases 9 to 12, QO~F fixes all generator voltages at pre-specified voltage set-
points and adjusts the real and reactive power generation profiles to maintain these 
set-points. At Node 8 for example, VB = VBset ( = ~min = VBmax). When Generator 8 is 
marginal, reactive power from th!s generator is used to maintain Vg at ~set. Whereas, 
reactive power must..be provided by a different reactive power source when Generator 8 
becomes non-marginal for reactive power. 
Generator 8 is forced against an upper reactive power generation limit in Case 11 
(i.e. QGB = Q:;"'). This reactive power constraint prevents Generator 8 from supplying 
all the reactive power required to boost 11;; to the voltage set-point. Reactive power 
must therefore, be generated by a remote, and possibly more expensive, reactive power 
source to ensure that Vg is equal to ~set. 
The tendency of the power system is therefore to attempt to reduce 11;; so that 
a remote reactive power source does not have to be used to maintain ~set. This is 
because using a remote source puts stress on the power system. Consequently, the lower 
generator voltage constraint is binding (i.e. 11;; = ~set = ~min) and the correspondi~g -
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slack variable (v~
8
~ is non-zero. Thus: 
Reducing the value of Q;;"', as in Case 12, tightens the upper reactive power constraint 
and moreover, the lower generator-voltage constraint. The tighter the upper generation 
constraint, the harder it becomes to maintain the voltage set-point and the greater the 
value of v~
8
• An increase in v;
8 
results in an increase in the marginal price of reactive 
power because: 
f3Qs = · · · - (-v~s) :;: · · · 
An increase in reactive power demand tightens the lower voltage constraint. There-
fore, a high reactive power marginal price occurs to discourage the use of more reactive 
power. High prices were observed in Cases 11 and 12. The partial derivative ( i~!) 
also increases in value as the reactive power constraint is tightened. This reflects the 
increased sensitivity of Vs to an incremental increase in Qa
8 
(i.e. ~uncnstr has moved 
set 
further from ~ ) . 
This price behaviour is the opposite of reactive power price behaviour in the pres-
ence of a voltage constraint at a pqD node (compare Figures 9.lO(b) and 9.14(b)). In 
the vicinity of a binding upper reactive power generation constraint, reactive power 
prices increase because an increase in reactive power demand tightens the upper gen-
eration constraint and consequentially tightens the lower generator voltage constraint. 
In the vicinity of a binding upper voltage constraint however, reactive power prices 
decl'ease because an increase in reactive power demand relieves the voltage constraint 
(see Figure 9. lO(q) ). 
Reactive power prices drop quickly with electrical distance from an upper reactive 
power constrained (i.e. non-marginal) generator node. This is because increasing re-
mote reactive power deiuand has less effect on tightening the lower generator voltage 
constraint than local reactive power demand. A similar argument is also applicable to 
binding lower reactive power generation constraints. 
Table 9.3 presents the values of the voltage shadow prices for Cases 10 and 12. The 
negative sign means that a lower (rather than an upper) primal voltage constraint was 
binding. These shadow prices show that a lower reactive power generation constraint 
at Node 8 results in an upper voltage constraint at the same node (Case 12). In like 
manner, an upper generation constraint results in a lower voltage constraint (Case 10). 
This confirms the discussion above. 
Reactive power marginal prices are more volatile for binding lower voltage con-
straints than for binding upper voltage constraints as a comparison of the marginal 
price profiles in Figure 9.9(b) and Figure 9.lO(b) demonstrates. Consequently, when 
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Lower Q O constraint 
Case 10 ($/pu) 
µVl =-3.4379 
µV 2 =-1. 7202 
µV 3 =-0.1329 
µV 6 =-3.8137 
µvB=l0.5128 
Upper QG constraint 
Case 12 ($/pu) 
µVl =145.3015 
µv 2 =483.5036 
µv 3 =301.7433 
µV 6 =661. 9529 
µVB =-15 28, 0841 
Table 9.3 The shadow prices of fixed generator voltages, in the presence of a reactive power gener-
ation constraint at Node 8. 
a generator becomes non-marginal for reactive power generation, reactive power mar-
ginal prices are much mar~ volatile when the upper generation constraint is binding, 
rather than when the lower generation constraint is binding. 
The above discussion applies only when the marginal cost component of the 
fixed generator voltage at the node with the reactive power generation constraint 
( e.g. µvs ~~~ ) is larger than the other components. If this marginal cost component 
is comparable to the other component, the price behaviour may contradict the above 
_ -discussion. Such a contradiction may occur if the power system has sufficient, cheap, 
carefully located reactive power sources to maintain fixed generator voltages without 
placing undue stress on the power system when generators become non-marginal for 
reactive power. 
9.6.5 Variable Generator Voltage Magnitudes 
In this section, the influence of variable generator voltages on reactive power marginal 
prices is inv;stigated for dispatches bound by a reactive power generation constraint. 
QOPF was used to optimally dispatch the IEEE 14-bus power system with variable 
generator voltages. However, the Node 1 voltage was used as a reference at: 
The objective function was Equation 9.17. 
The following reactive power generation limits were modified to ensure that Gen-
erator 8 is the only non-marginal generator for reactive power: 
Q::n = -200 MVAr 
Qmin(= Qmax) = 9 MVAr 
GB GB 
Q:t is lower here than in the fixed generator voltage section because in this new 
dispatch, the unconstrained reactive power generation is now Q::cnstr = 10.32 MVAr 
instead of 16.0767 MVAr. 
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Figure 9.15 Marginal price profiles for the IEEE 14-bus power system, with variable generator 
voltages and an upper reactive power constraint on Node 8. The Figure 9.7 unconstrained, fixed 
generator voltage profiles are included for reference. 
Equation 9.19 indicates that v;_ and Q::cnstr are the only constrained resources in 
this dispatch: 
(9.19) 
The resultant marginal price profiles are illustrated in Figure 9.15. The unconstrained, 
fixed generator voltage price profiles of Figure 9. 7 are included for comparison. 
The reactive power marginal prices for this dispatch are now very small in com-
pari'son to the prices in Figure 9.14(b), because only the generator voltage at Node 1 is 
still fixed resulting in a non-zero shadow pric~ (µv 1 = $1.6350 /pu). The_ µv terms in 
Equation 9.18 corresponding to the other generator voltages equal zero. Consequently, 
the reactive power constraint has almost no effect on reactive power prices. The react-
ive power constraint only influences /3Qi by increasing the cost of marginal losses. This 
constraint forces .any reactive power demand to be supplied by alternate sources, thus 
altering the marginal losses. 
µv 1 is no longer large enough to significantly affect the behaviour of /3Q. This 
is because the other generator voltages are no longer restricting the flow of real and 
reactive power. The restriction occurs when reactive power is required to maintain any 
fixed generator voltages. With no restrictions, the use of alternative reactive power 
sources place almost no stress on the power system. No restrictions means a small 
value of µv 1 • Therefore, a major cause of high reactive power marginal prices when 
reactive power generation is constrained is the costs of fixed generator voltages (µv), 
not the cost of th~ generation constraint itself ( vQ;). 
The upper reactive power generation limit was tightened using the same procedure 
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as Cases 11 and 12. However, tightening the constraint made almost no change to the 
reactive power prices. 
A PQG node that is non-marginal for reactive power is equivalent to a pqD node 
(Section 7.3.4). Consequently, (3Q at a reactive power constrained generator node be-
.haves in the same manner as (3Q at an unconstrained pqD node. This statement is veri-
fied by the similarities between the 'fixed' and 'variable' price profiles of Figure 9.15(b ). 
In conclusion, reactive power prices for this variable generator voltage dispatch 
will generally behave in the same way as the prices in Cases 9 to 12. But, only if 
the magnitude of the µv 1 ~ term is larger than the combined magnitudes of the real 
and reactive power marginal loss cost components. If this term is smaller, the price 
behaviour may differ to that in Cases 9 to 12. 
9.6.6 Summary 
To summarise, reactive power marginal prices decrease when a lower reactive power 
generation constraint is binding. They increase when an upper reactive power gener-
-ation constraint is binding. In the presence of a reactive power generation constraint, 
the main contributors to the volatile and subdued behaviour of reactive power marginal 
prices· are the marginal cost components of any binding constraints, such as fixed gen-
erator voltages. The exception to this is when the stress caused by binding constraints 
is low. This can cause low constraint costs, aHowing the marginal loss components 
to dominate. When the marginal loss components dominate the unconstrained price 
behaviour described in Section 9.4 applies. 
9.7 CON'cLUSIONS 
In this chapter the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices for optimal dispatches 
from a pq-type spot market has been investigated. This price behaviour is valid only 
at the instant in time in the trq,q.ing period when the dispatch of real and reactive 
power is optimised.,. 
It has been demonstrated that two types of marginal cost components influence 
the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices. These are: 
• the costs of marginal losses, and 
• the marginal costs of binding resource constraints. 
In the absence of binding resource constraints, reactive power marginal prices be-
have in exactly the same way as real power marginal prices in a pq-type spot market. 
This is because real and reactive power marginal losses are formulated in exactly t~e 
same.way (as set out in Section 3.3). Any difference between the behaviour ofreal and -
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reactive power marginal prices (that can be attributed to the cost of marginal losses) 
is due to the presence of reactive power generation sources other than generators, such 
as capacitive transmission lines. 
For constrained dispatches, reactive power marginal prices were shown to be stable 
and comparable to the reactive power prices of unconstrained dispatches, when all 
generator voltages are allowed to vary. When generator voltages are fixed however, 
marginal prices for reactive power can become equal to, or even exceed, the real power 
marginal prices in the vicinity of another binding constraint. This is in spite of the 
fact that the reactive power unit generation costs are set at 10% of the corresponding 
real power unit generation costs. The fixed generator voltages tighten any binding -
constraints by restricting reactive power flows and the power system's ability to work 
round the constraint. This results in a high marginal cost-component on the binding 
constraint and hence high reactive power marginal prices. The high marginal costs on 
binding constraints obscure the reactive power price behaviour resulting from the low 
costs of real and reactive power marginal losses. 
Read and Ring [1995a, Section 7.5] predicted that, in the vicinity of a reactive 
power generation constraint, reactive power marginal prices will be high (or extreme) 
where there is a shortage of reactive power and low (or negligible) when there is a 
surplus of reactive power. These results verified this prediction and demonstrated that 
prices can even go negative. Read and Ring also predicted high reactive power marginal 
prices in the vicinity of a binding upper voltage constraint, implying that using reactive 
power will tighten this constraint. However, reactive power marginal prices have been 
demonstrated to go low and even negative, thus indicating that the use of reactive 
power actually relieves upper voltage constraints. 
f 
The influence of voltage and reactive power generation constraints on reactive 
power price behav1our, can be used to predict the behaviour of reactive power marginal 
prices in the presence of any other type of constraint. Reactive power prices will 
behave according to whether an incremental increase in reactive power demand at 
a node tightens or relaXBs the binding constraint. A respective increase or decrease 
in the partial derivative of the constraint reflects this. The changes in the reactive 
power marginal prices are then dependent on whether that partial derivative and its 
corresponding shadow price are added to or subtracted from the reactive power price 
equation (Equation 7.15). 
Chapter 10 
SUB-OPTIMAL DISPATCH PRICE BEHAVIOUR 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
In an ideal pq-type spot market, competition between market participants results in an 
optimal dispatch of real and reactive power. That is, the social welfare function is max-
imised (see Section 2.3) subject to a set of operating constraints on the power system. 
As in Chapter 9, this optimisation process is assumed to occur only at the start of each 
trading period. Note that the optimal dispatches of real power and reactive power are 
assumed to be coincident. In reality, many factors prevent the optimal dispatches of 
real power and reactive power. Factors may include poor market operation, uncompet-
itive market-participant behaviour, and unknown operating constraints [Ring 1995]. A 
dispatch influenced by factors such as these is defined to be sub-optimal in the Dispatch 
Based Pricing framework. 
Read and Ring [1995a, Section 7.5] predicted that obtaining a feasible solution 
for ~ sub-optimal dispatch will be difficult as real and reactive power marginal prices 
at different nodes will not be consistent with each other. Price inconsistencies arise 
because there are no specific binding primal constraints to economically explain why 
the total cost of generation was not be minimised further to obtain a more optimal 
dispatch. 
Ring [i995] proposed a "'Best Compromise' pricing approach" to remove these 
price inconsistencies, so that ex post marginal prices can be calculated for the sub-
optimal dispatch. This approach exploits the methodology of Dispatch Based Pricing 
(presented in Section 3.2) by using arbitrary primal constraints to explain why a more 
optimal dispatch was not obtained. The sub-optimal dispatch can then be considered 
as optimal with respect to these constraints and ex post marginal prices can then be 
calculated. Arbitrary constraints add extra dual marginal cost components to the f3q; 
equation (7.15). Each cost component can be "viewed as a penalty on those responsible 
for the sub-optimal dispatch". In the previous chapter it was shown that the behaviour 
of reactive power marginal prices for a constrained optimal dispatch is dependent on the 
behaviour of the marginal cost components of the binding constraints. Therefore, any 
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reactive power price behaviour resulting from the behaviour of the arbitrary constraint 
cost components is described by the conclusions of Chapter 9. 
Read and Ring [1995a, Section 7.5] proposed that the problem of price inconsist-
encies cari also be eliminated by treating the sub-optimal dispatch of reactive power 
.(i.e. the reactive power generation profile) as a constraint. This proposal is validated 
in this chapter. Examples are used to show that the pq pricing model (and Dispatch 
Based Pricing in general) is formulated in such a way that it automatically considers 
the real and reactive power generation profiles to be constrained when a dispatch is 
sub-optimal. The behaviour of the ex post reactive power marginal prices from these 
examples is then described. The implications of this price behaviour in a pq-type spot 
market are also highlighted. 
Discussions in this chapter are concerned only with reactive power for the purpose 
of illustration. However, these discussions and the conclusions are equally applicable 
to the behaviour of real power marginal prices, since the form of the real and reactive 
power price equations are identical. Although, the underlying power system operation 
causing this price behaviour, may be different. 
10.2 OBTAINING A SUB-OPTIMAL DISPATCH 
The IEEE 30-bus power system (in Appendix E) is used for all cases in this chapter'. 





~~;..l p &Q 
Winualfy 
Figure 10.1 The perturbation process, used to obtain marginal price profiles for sub-optimal 
dispatches. 
Optimal dispatches were used as the starting point for deriving sub-optimal dis-
patches. This is based on the assumption that dispatches are generally close to optimal 
if not optimal. All optimal dispatches in this chapter were generated using QOPF, -
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with respect to the following objective function: 
f (cost) =cP1 Pm + cP2Pa2 + Cps Pas + cPBPGB + CP11 Pan + Cp13Pa13 P,Q 
+ CQl QGl + CQ2QG2 + CQ5QG5 + CQBQGB + CQll QGll + CQ13QG13 
(10.1) 
=10.8PG1 + 10.6PG2 + ll.OPG5 + 10.9PGB + 11.lPGll + 10.7 PG13 
+ 1.08 Q01 + 1.06 Q02 + l.lQ Q05 + 1.09 QGB + 1.11 QGll + 1.07 Q013 
(10.2) 
The real and .reactive power demand profiles for these optimal dispatches were 
perturbed to obtain sub-optimal dispatches. This was achieved by manually perturbing 
the real and reactive power loads at the following nodes: 
opt 
and QDi Vi E (3, 8, 15, 17, 24, 26) 
Note that 'opt' identifies the demand values for the optimal dispatch. As an example, 
the following demand perturbations were implemented for most cases: 
opt 
QD3 = QD3 +4 MW 
opt 
Q DB = Q DB - 4 MW 
opt 
QD15 = QD15 + 4 MW 
opt 
QD17 = QD17 - 4 MW 
opt 
QD24 = QD24 - 4 MW 
opt 
QD26 = QD26 + 4 MW 
•For continuity, real power and reactive power are always added to the demands at 
Nodes 3, 15 and 26, and always subtracted from the demands at Nodes 8, 17 and 24. 
The demand profiles are perturbed rather than the generation profiles. This reflects 
the fact that the demand profiles change from one trading period to the next ( or within 
a trading period) and t~e generation profiles follow. 
The perturbation process causes the real and reactive power generation profiles 
to be sub-optimal with respect to the perturbed demand profile. This process of 
obtaining a sub-optimal dispatch models the scenario where the generators do not 
respond optimally to changes in the real and reactive power demand profiles. 
The resultant data does not describe a valid dispatch after the demand profile is 
perturbed. For this reason, the invalid dispatch data is passed through the PSERC 
power-flow to obtain a valid, sub-optimal, dispatch. N ODAL2 is then used to gener-
ate ex post marginal prices for all valid sub-optimal dispatches in this chapter. All 
sub-optimal dispatches presented in this chapter have been derived using the process 
depicted in Figure 10.1. 
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10.3 MULTIPLE MARGINAL GENERATORS 
In Section 7.4.2, implicit loss constraints are identified as one reason for the occurrence 
of multiple marginal generators (for either real power or reactive power). For example, 
.it is possible for all generators to be marginal for both real and reactive power with 
no binding explicit constraints, because the marginal losses are acting as constraints. 
For this example, the Marginal Price Criterion (i.e. DBP 5.6) is satisfied when only 
one generator is formulated as marginal because there are no binding explicit con-
straints. All other generators must be formulated as non-marginal (as demonstrated 
in Section 7.4.2). Formulating a generator as marginal follows the process described in 
Section 7.3.3. Formulating a generator as non-marginal follows the process described 
in Section 7.4.2. 
A distin.ction is made between a formulated-non-marginal generator for reactive 
power and a truly non-marginal generator for reactive power. They are mathem-
atically equivalent because Equation 7.18 is used for both of these generator types, 
to let f3Qi vary freely. However, the former generator type is still physically capable 
-of-changing its generation output because the output is within the generation limits 
defined by Equation 7.8 (that is, formulated-non-marginal generators are in fact phys-
ically marginal because Equation 7.8 is not binding). Whereas, the latter type cannot 
change its output because the output has reached the physical generation limit defined 
by Equation 7.8 (that is, this non-marginal generator is truly non-marginal because 
Equation 7.8 is binding). 
In the cases presented in this chapter, Generators 1, 2, 5, 8, and 13 are marginal for 
both real an1 reactive power for every 'valid optimal dispatches' generated by QOPF. 
That is, these generators are physically marginal because the real and reactive power 
outputs of each are within the physical generation limits specified by the data of'the 
30-bus power system. Generator 11 is only marginal for reactive power. QOPF has 
not dispatched Generator 11 for real power because it is too expensive in comparison 
with the other generators. 
10.4 FORMULATED-NON-MARGINAL GENERATORS 
The case studies and examples presented in Sections 7.4.2 and Chapter 9 apply only to 
optimal dispatches. In those dispatches, several generators were marginal for real and 
reactive power due to losses acting as implicit constraints. When calculating ex post 
marginal prices however, these generators were formulated as non-marginal to satisfy 
the marginal price criterion (DBP 5.6). In the price equations for these formulated-
non-marginal generators, the slack variables were equal to zero because the dispatches 
were ·optimal (i.e. vPi = 0 and Vq; = 0 as described in Section 7.4.2). 
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This section i1westigates the role of formulated-non-marginal generators in sub-
optimal dispatches, and the implications of the behaviour of the real and reactive power 
marginal prices associated with these generators. 
10.4.1 Obtaining the Price Profiles 
Four increasingly sub-optimal dispatches are considered herein. With respect to the 
perturbation process presented in Section 10.2, the following perturbations were used 
to obtain these increasingly sub-optimal dispatches: 1 MW, 1 MVAr; 2 MW, 2 MVAr; 
3 MW, 3 MVAr; 4 MW, 4 MVAr. 
The 'valid optimal dispatch' of Figure 10.1 is an optimal unconstrained, variable 
generator voltage dispatch of the 30-bus power system. For this dispatch the following 
changes were made to the original 30-bus power system data, to ensure· that all gener-
ators were marginal for both real and reactive power, and that the reference voltage is 
the only binding constraint: 
• ~m""' = ~min = 1.06 pu. This is the reference voltage. 
max ( ) • V = 2.06 pu for all other nodes 2 ... 30 . 
e Pmax = 400 MW 
G5 
• Qmin = 10 Qmin Vi E PQG 
G Gorigina/..data 
• Qmax = 10 Qmax Vi E PQG 
G Gorigina/..data 
,The ex post marginal price profiles of these sub-optimal dispatches and of the 'valid 
optimal dispatch' are compared in Figure 10.2. Table lCi.1 contains the information 
required by the pq pricing model (i.e. NODAL2.) to generate the marginal ·price profiles 
of Figure 10.2. 
Table 10.1 Information required by NODAL2 to calculate ex post marginal prices for the observed 
unconstrained, variable generator voltage, sub-optimal dispatch of the IEEE 30-bus system. 
Node Description Unit Generation Cost 
1 Ref /3p1 = >..p, f3q1 = >..q 
5 pfm $ 11.0/MW 
1 Qfm $1.08/MVAr 
1 vb n/a 
The contents of the 'Description' column in Table 10.1 are defined as: 
Ref indicates the reference node; 
P fm indicates that the generator at Node 5 is to be formulated as marginal for real 
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(b) Reactive power marginal prices . 
Figure 10.2 Price profiles generated by Nodal2 for optimal and sub-optimal, variable gener-
ator voltage dispatches of the IEEE 30-bus system. Generator 5 is formulated as marginal for 
real power, and Generator 1 for reactive power. 
Q indicates that the generator at Node 1 is to be formulated as marginal for reactive Jm 
power in the pricing model; 
Vb indicates that there is a binding primal voltage constraint at Node 1. 
Hence, the contents of Table 10.1 show that DBP 5.6 is satisfied because there is one 
constraint and two formulated-marginal generators. 
In addition to Generator 5, Generators 1, 2, 8 and 13 are identified in Section 10.3 as 
being marginal for real po:ver in the 'valid optimal dispatch'. Likewise, Generators 2, 
5, 8, 11 and 13 are identified as being marginal for ·reactive power in additio{;_ to 
Generator 1 (as stated in Section 10.3). To satisfy DBP 5.6 however, the generators 
in these two groups are formulated as non-marginal for real power and reactive power 
respectively, when c!eating the pq pricing. model equations to calculate marginal prices 
for these optimal and sub:_optimal dispatches. 
The equation for the reactive power marginal price at every node of all five dis-
patches represented in Figure 10.2, is: 
Vi E PX (10.3) 
10.4.2 Binding Reactive Power Generation Constraints 
30 
Definition DBP 5.2 states that a generator (at a node n) is marginal for reactive pow~r 
only if the marginal price f3Qn is equal to the unit generation cost cQn. This definition -
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applies to both formulated-marginal generators and formulated-non-marginal generat-
ors. An inspection of the price profiles in Figure 10.2(b) shows that only f3q 1 is equal to 
the unit generation cost, cq 1 (see Equation 10.2 for the unit generation costs). For all 
other generators (all of which are formulated as non-marginal for reactive power) (3Qm 
was close to cQm but not equal, even though they are operating within their physical 
generation limits. That is, vQm -=/= 0 in the following price bound equation: 
Vm E (2, 5, 8, 11, 13) 
Equations 7.18 and 7.40 have been applied here. 
The reactive power price profiles in Figure 10.2(b) demonstrate that (3Qm is not 
equal to cQm for the generators formulated as non-marginal for reactive power, even 
though these generators are physically marginal for reactive power. By calculating 
(3Qm as not equal to cQm, the pq pricing model ( and Dispatch Based Pricing in general) 
has indicated that these generators are non-marginal for reactive power and unable to 
respond to any demand for extra reactive power. Therefore, the reactive power output 
of the formulated-non-marginal generators must actually be constrained ( even though 
the outputs are within the physical reactive power generation limits), otherwise a more 
optimal dispatch would have been found. Note that this 'more optimal dispatch' is the 
original 'valid optimal dispatch' depicted in Figure 10.2. 
If the reactive power output of the· formulated-non-marginal generators were not 
constrained then their shadow prices (vqm) will be non-zero and (3Qm will be equal to 
cQm. This will result in marginal prices that are inconsistent with each other ( defin-
itio11 DBP 5.1) and an infeasible problem because DBP 5.6 is not satisfied. Hence, 
these generation constraints satisfy DBP 5.6 so that all prices are consistent with each 
other, and so that' the pq pricing model can find a feasible solution. The marginal cost 
of each of these binding generation constraints is the value of the non-zero shadow 
price, vQm. These prices can be thought of as the penalty for a sub-optimal dispatch, 
thus performing the same function as the marginal costs of the arbitrary constraints in 
Ring's 'Best Compromise' appro"ach. However, further research is required to ensure 
that these non-zero constraint prices produce signals appropriate to penalty costs. 
To conclude therefore, when a power system is sub-optimally dispatched the re-
active power marginal prices generated by any Dispatch Based Pricing model imply 
that: 
1. all formulated-marginal generators are marginal for reactive power, 
2. all formulated-non-marginal generators are non-marginal for reactive power 
(even though they may be operating well within their physical generation limits), 
and that 
148 CHAPTER 10 SUB-OPTIMAL DISPATCH PRICE BEHAVIOUR 
3. the phenomenon of 'i;nultiple marginal generators', resulting from implicit loss 
constraints, cannot occur in sub-optimal dispatches. 
10.4.3 ·verification using QOPF 
10.4.3.1 Sub-Optimal Dispatch Description 
The conclusions of Section 10.4.2 can be verified using QOPF. Consider another sub-
optimal dispatch of the 30-bus power system. The objective function, power system 
data and perturbation data are identical to those used to obtain the sub-optimal dis-
patch from which the '4 MW; 4MVAr' profiles in Figure 10.2 are generated. In this 
new dispatch however, all generator voltages are fixed while obtaining the 'valid op-
timal dispatch'. These generator voltage constraints are used to increase the number 
of marginal generators, making the verification experiments easier to interpret. 
QOPF was used instead of the power-flow software after this optimal fixed-
generator-voltage dispatch had been perturbed, (ref. Figure 10.1). QOPF was used 
_simultaneously to obtain the 'valid sub-optimal dispatch' and to calculate ex post mar-
ginal prices for this sub-optimal dispatch. The upper and lower generation limits of all 
generators were set equal to the actual generation power outputs (to 12 d.p.) to pre-
vent QOPF from finding a more optimal solution. This is illustrated by the following 
excerpt from the QOPF print-out, where 'Pmin'='Pmax': 
============ Generation Constraints -------------
Bus Active Power Limits 
# Pmin mu Pmin p Pmax Pmax mu 
------- -------- -------- -------- -------
1 0.1630 0.23 0.23 0.23 
2 0.0073 109.92 109.92 109.92 
5 0.0105 70.81 70.81 70.81 
8 ,.0. 0257 58.53 5·8.53 58.53 
11 0.0294 0.00 0.00 
13 46.80 46.80 46.80 
This real (active) power generation print-out is analogous to the reactive power 
generation print-out from QOPF. Also, the voltage magnitude and angle values were 
stored back into the QOPF input data fields 'Vm' and 'Va' (see Appendix E) to help 
with convergence. 
'Pmax mu' and 'Pmin mu' are the shadow prices or Lagrange multipliers of the up-
per and lower real power generation limits. They correspond to v;, and v;, of Equ~-
tio'ns·D.9 and D.10, where i is any of the generator nodes: 1, 2, 5, 8, 11 and 13. v;i · 
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and v~; of Equaticms D.11 and D.12 correspond to 'Qmax mu' and 'Qmin mu' (see Ap-
pendix F for an example). Each dash (i.e. '-') represents a shadow price of less than 
1 x 10-8 . Hence, that shadow price equals zero and the corresponding constraint is 
not binding1. 
A generator at Node i is defined to be marginal for real power (reactive power) 
only if both v;i and v;; (v;; and v~) equal zero, when using QOPF to calculate real 
power (or reactive power) ex post marginal prices for a sub-optimal dispatch. Since the 
real power (reactive power) output of each generator, 'P' ('Q') is constrained through 
'Pmax'='Pmin' ('Qmax'='Qmin'), each generator can only be marginal if QOPF has not 
attempted to change 'P' ('Q'). Attempting to change 'P' causes either the upper or lower 
generation limit ('Pmax' or 'Pmin') to become binding, resulting in a non-zero shadow 
price. Hence, the QOPF print-out shows that only Generator 13 is marginal for real 
power. 
Generator 13 is representative of the formulated-marginal generators for real power 
that occur when using the pq pricing model. Therefore, /3p13 = cP13 = $10. 7 /MW for 
this marginal generator. 
'Pmin' and 'Pmin mu' indicate that Generators 1, 2, 5, and 8 are non-marginal for 
real power, even though an inspection of the original power system data in Appendix E 
reveals that these generators are operating within their physical generation limits. 
Hence, these are the formulated-non-marginal, but physically marginal, generators 
described in Section 10.4.2. Generator 11 is truly non-marginal because it has not 
been dispatched for real power (i.e. 'P' 11 =0), just as with Generator 11 in the variable 
generator voltage case described in Section 10.4.1. Hence, Generator 11 represents all 
form.ulated-non-marginal and truly non-marginal generators. 
Table 10.2 Checkmarks represent the marginal (i.e.· formulated-non-marginal) generators for the 
observed sub-optimal, fixed generator voltage dispatch of the IEEE 30-bus power system. Extra real 
power generation limits are relaxed with each case. 
Iylarginal Generators Marginal Generators 
" 
for Real Power for Reactive Power 
1 2 5 8 11 13 1 2 5 8 11 13 
Case 13 ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
Case 14 ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
Case 15 ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
In summary, the full QOPF print-out revealed that seven generators were marginal 
for this 'valid sub-optimal dispatch' 2 • These generators are identifiable as marginal be-
cause either 'Pmin mu'=O and 'Pmax mu'=O, or 'Qmin mu'=O and 'Qmax mu'=O. Thus, 
1Dashes are not used by QOPF to indicate generators with reactive power (or real power) outputs 
of O MVAr. QOPF reports such generators as having an output of 0.0000 MVAr. 
2There are 12 potential generators because each generator is capable of being marginal Tor both real 
and reactive power. 
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Generator 13 was marginal for real power (see the print-out above) and all six gen-
erators were marginal for reactive power, as indicated by the checkmarks for Case 13 
in Table 10.2. These seven generators must be formulated as marginal when using the 
pq pricing model to calculate ex post prices for this sub-optimal dispatch. If different 
generators are formulated as marginal, the marginal prices calculated by the pq pricing 
model will be different to the prices calculated by QOPF. 
The seven formulated-marginal generators satisfy DBP 5.6 because there are six 
voltage constraints, one constraint representing each of the fixed generator voltages. 
Generators 1, 2, 5, 8 and 11 are formulated as non-marginal for real power when using 
the pq pricing model. 
The real power generation limits on Generators 2 and 13 were relaxed to ensure 
that DBP 5.6 was indeed being satisfied, thus producing Case 14. That is: 
'Pmin'2 ,13 = 'P\13 - 1 MW and 'Pmax\13 = 'P\13 + 1 MW 
The limits of Generator 2 were relaxed to make Generator 2 marginal for real power, 
thus giving the power system an extra degree of freedom. The limits of Generator 13 
were relaxed to ensure that Generator 13 remained marginal. The degree of freedom 
for Generator 13 already existed in Case 13. To remove the extra degree of freedom 
introduced by relaxing the limits of Generator 2 so as to satisfy DBP 5.6, QOPF forced 
'Q'i against 'Qmin'i, thus making Generator 1 non-marginal for reactive power. This 
is illustrated by the checkmarks in Case 14 of Table 10.2. Relaxing a third pair of 
constraints ('Pmin's and 'Pmax's) resulted in Generator 5 becoming marginal for real 
power and becoming non-marginal for reactive power (i.e. Case 15). 
The marginal price profiles for each of these three cases are different from the price 
profiles of the other cases. This is because the generators that are marginal for each case 
are different from the marginal generators of the other two cases. This is discussed 'fur-
ther in Section 10.6. For each case, NODAL2 is able to produce real and reactive power 
price profiles that are identical to the QOPF profiles, by formulating as marginal only 
the checkmarked (i.e. marginal) 'generators. 'J;'he uncheckmarked (i.e. non-marginal) 
generators are formulated ·as non-marginal. Thus, conclusions 1 and 2 of Section 10.4.2 
are verified. 
10.4.3.2 Generation Constraints 
The process by which QOPF calculates marginal prices for a sub-optimal dispatch 
is as follows. QOPF attempts to dispatch generators according to a merit order dis-
patch, subject to the generation constraints used to prevent QOPF from finding a 
more optimal dispatch. Initially, sufficient generators are allocated as marginal by 
QOPF to satisfy DBP 5.6; After allocation, QOPF tries to minimise the objective 
fmidion by attempting to change the outputs of the remaining generators, resulting in · 
10.4 FORMULATED-NON-MARGINAL GENERATORS 151 
binding generation limits. Consequently, these remaining unallocated generators are 
non-marginal, as illustrated by the excerpt and the checkmarks in Table 10.2. After 
attempting to minimise the objective function, QOPF then recalculates the marginal 
prices. All real and reactive power marginal prices are dependent on the costs of these 
generation constraints as well as the costs of any other binding constraints. 
The QOPF process of price calculation is the primal equivalent of the process used 
by N ODAL2. N ODAL2 assumes all generators to be marginal with zero slack variables 
v;i, v;i, v;;, v;i (the shadow prices of generation constraint Equations D.9 to D.12). 
N ODAL2 then adjusts the values of these slack variables to explain why a more optimal 
dispatch could not be found. The slack variables that become non-zero during this 
process identify the non-marginal generators for real and/or reactive power. 
N ODAL2 calculates marginal prices for real and reactive power, based on the non-
zero slack variables of the generation constraints for these non-marginal generators, and 
on the non-zero slack variables of any other binding constraints. The final price profiles 
from N ODAL2 are identical to those from QOPF. This is because the sub-optimal 
dispatch is actually optimal with respect to the generation constraints. Figure 6.2 
illustrates that QOPF and NoDAL2 prices are identical for optimal dispatches. 
10.4.3.3 Multiple Marginal Generators 
In an optimal dispatch, the total generation cost (i.e. the objective function) has been 
minimised. When this optimal dispatch is run through QOPF, the generation profile 
does not change. This is because QOPF cannot further minimise the objective function 
by changing the (already optimal) generation profile. Accordingly, the losses do not 
change either. 
A constraint implies a boundary that cannot be moved. In Section 7.4.2, marginal 
losses of an optimal dispatch are classed as implicit constraints if the marginal cost 
of those makes the unit generation costs of any two marginal generators consistent. 
The losses are classed as constraints because they will not change when the optimal 
dispatch is run through QOPF. 
In a sub-optimal dispatch, the total generation cost (i.e. the objective function) 
has not been minimised. Therefore, when this dispatch is run through QOPF, QOPF 
will always attempt to further minimise the total cost of generation. However, gener-
ation constraints are used to prevent QOPF from further optimising the sub-optimal 
dispatch. Therefore, when QOPF attempts to minimise the objective function, gen-
eration constraints will always become binding before losses begin acting as implicit 
constraints. Consequently, the multiple marginal generator phenomenon described in 
Section 7.4.2 cannot occur in sub-optimal dispatches. 
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10.4.3.4 Summary 
In summary, Dispatch Based Pricing automatically treats the real and reactive power 
generation output from all of the formulated-non-marginal generators as constraints 
when calculating ex post marginal prices for any observed sub-optimal dispatch. That 
'is, N ODAL2 considers the generation profiles to be constrained and invokes generation 
constraints to reflect this. Generation constraints are only invoked in the absence of 
the arbitrary constraints from the 'Best Compromise' pricing approach. 
10.4.4 Load-Following Generators 
Definition DBP 5.2 implies that only generators marginal for reactive power can supply 
any demand for more reactive power. Therefore, the conclusions of Section 10.4.2 imply 
that only formulated-marginal generators respond to any change in reactive power 
demand when the dispatch is sub-optimal. The formulated-non-marginal generators 
do not respond, even though they are physically capable of doing so. This is equivalent 
to the formulated-marginal generators behaving as load--following generators. 
Generator 1 is the only formulated-marginal generator for reactive power, in the 
dispatches used to generate the price profiles depicted in Figure 10.2(b). Therefore, 
only this generator will respond to any changes in reactive power demand. Furthermore, 
at each node, the marginal price of using this load-following, Generator 1 to supply 
any change in reactive power demand at that node, is depicted by the price profiles in 
Figure 10.2(b). 
If there are any explicitly-stated constraints, extra generators must be formulated 
as marginal .to satisfy DBP 5.6 (e.g. Cases 13 to 15 in Table 10.2). These multiple 
marginal generators follow_ the load. However, they are not true load-following gener-
ators. This is because the contribution from each generator is optimally determined by 
the OPF, rather than by the impedances of the network as in a power-flow problem. 
The load-following scenario _for reactive power (and real power) therefore, only 
applies to sub-optimal dispatches where there is only one marginal generator for 
reactive power. That is, dispatches where any extra marginal generators are formu-
lated as non-marginal, because there are insufficient explicit and implicit constraints 
(with respect to DBP 5.6) to explain why these generators are operating within their 
physical generation limits. 
10.5 INCREASINGLY SUB-OPTIMAL DISPATCHES 
The discussions and conclusions presented thus far have been based on the assumption 
that this sub-optimal dispatch was the result of a poor optimisation process at the sta!t 
of ·a trading period. However, there is another scenario. Any dispatch that is optimal · 
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at the start of a t-rading period will become increasingly sub-optimal with time due 
to the continually changing demand profile, until the start of the next trading period 
when the dispatch is re-optimised. 
The price profiles in Figure 10.2(b) were obtained by successively moving the real 
and reactive power demands at the six pqD nodes (3, 8, 15, 17, 24 and 26) away 
from their original levels at the point when the dispatch was last re-optimised. Hence, 
these four price profiles demonstrate how reactive power marginal prices change as an 
initially optimal dispatch becomes more sub-optimal with time. 
In Section 10.4.3.2, these four sub-optimal dispatches were concluded to be optimal 
with respect to the binding reactive power generation constraints on the formulated-
non-marginal generators at nodes 2, 5, 8, 11 and 13. It has been demonstrated in 
Section 9.6 that the behaviour of reactive power prices in a reactive power generation 
constrained dispatch is dependent on any binding voltage constraints. It follows there-
fore, that the behaviour of the reactive power marginal prices shown in Figure 10.2(b) 
is dependent on the marginal cost component of the reference voltage in Equation 10.3: 
The price profiles demonstrate that reactive power prices become more extreme 
as the trading period progresses. This is because the changes in the demand profile 
over time are causing this voltage constraint to be tightened. The price at each node 
increases or decreases as the dispatch becomes more sub-optimal, depending on whether 
a marginal change in reactive power demand at that node tightens or relaxes the voltage 
constraint. 
' 
Any price changes due to the changing demand profile are magnified further because 
reactive power must come from the reactive power load-following, Generator 1. Since 
all other generators are non-marginal, the power system's ability to respond to any 
changes in reactive power is severely constrained. This inability is reflected in the high 
marginal prices. 
10.6 DIFFERENT FORMULATED-MARGINAL GENERATORS 
10.6.1 Obtaining the Price Profiles 
The contents of Table 10. 2 demonstrate that the Clearing Manager has a choice as to the 
marginal generators he or she formulates are marginal and as to the marginal generators 
he or she formulates as non-marginal when calculating ex post marginal prices for a 
sub-optimal dispatch. In other words, there are several different but equally valid 
sets of generation· constraints that can be used to explain any observed sub-optimal 
dispatch. 
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12 x Generator 2 
o Generator 5 
• Generator 8 
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Node Number 
(a) Real power marginal prices 
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Node Number 
(b) Reactive power marginal prices . 
Figure 10.3 The price profiles obtained from NoDAL2 by formulating each marginal generator 
as marginal for real power in turn, except Generator 11. The 'valid sub-optimal dispatch' used 
for all of these profiles is the one used to generate the '4MW; 4MVAr' profiles in Figure 10.2. 
These different sets provide the Clearing Manager with a choice as to the two 
generators that will behave as load-following generators to follow any changes in the 
real and reactive power demand profiles during a trading period. At the start of the 
trading period, this choice is only available if the dispatch is sub-optimal, since the 
concept of load-following generators applies only to sub-optimal dispatches. 
The same 'valid sub-optimal dispatch' is used to generate all the real and reactive 
power price ~rofiles in Figure 10.3. It is the same 'valid sub-optimal dispatch' used to 
obtain the '4MW; 4MVAr' price profiles in Figure 10.2. Hence, the '4MW; 4MVAr' 
and 'Generator 5' price profiles are the same. The price profiles of Figure 10.3 were 
obtained by formulating each generator as marginal for real power in turn, and then 
resolving the reformulated pq pricing model of the 'valid sub-optimal dispatch'. 
The price profil~s in Figure 10.3(a) illustrate the cost at each node of obtaining 
another unit of real power from different load-following generators, during a trading 
period. These profiles also demonstrate the different marginal price profiles that can 
be obtained for a sub-optimal dispatch as the start of the trading period, just by 
formulating different generators as marginal. 
It has not been possible to investigate the effect of changing the generator formu-
lated as marginal for reactive power. The N ODAL2 source code has been written in 
such a way, that an error results when the reference node is not formulated as marginal 
for reactive power. Node 1 is identified in Table 10.1 as the Dispatch Based Pricing 
reference node. For this reason, Generator 1 is the formulated-marginal generator 9f 
reactive power for all of the price profiles in Figure 10.2 and Figure 10.3. 
30 
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10.6.2 Discussion 
The following discussion only applies to sub-optimal dispatches. That is, dispatches 
where there are insufficient explicit and implicit constraints to explain why multiple 
generators are physically marginal. 
For the valid sub-optimal dispatch associated with Figure 10.3, only one marginal 
generator can be formulated as marginal for real power because the reference voltage 
forms the only explicit constraint: DBP 5.6 must be satisfied. The marginal price at 
this formulated-marginal generator node (n) is: 
(10.4) 
However, {3Pn must be fixed as equal to the unit generation cost of the formulated-
marginal, Generator n by using Equation 7 .17: 
{3 - c Pn - Pn (10.5) 
Rearranging Equation 10.4 with respect to the reference prices gives: 
(10.6) 
Table 10.1 shows that the reference prices >. P and >.Q are the marginal prices of the 
generator at Node 1 (i.e. >.P = {3Pl and >.Q = f3q1). For the 'Generator 1' price profile, 
Generator 1 is formulated as marginal and Equation 10.5 illustrates that {3Pl is fixed: 
• 
(10. 7) 
Hence, the reference price is equal to the unit generation cost of the reference generator. 
For the other price profiles, the reference node is different to the formulated-marginal 
node (i.e. w=f 1) c_1,nd therefore formulated-non-marginal, resulting in {3Pl and >.P being 
unrestricted. By Equation 10.6 therefore, >.P is dependent on the unit generation cost 
of a different generator for each of these other profiles. 
For each profile, the marginal cost at every pqD node and every formulated-non-
marginal and truly non-marginal generator node is: 
Vi E pqD U PQGnm (10.8) 
PQGnm represents the set of all non-marginal and formulated-non-marginal generator 
nodes. This price equation and Equation 10.6 illustrate that the marginal price at every 
node is dependent on the unit generation cost of the formulated-marginal ge;1erator 
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(i.e. cP) through the refereuce prices (i.e. >.P and >.Q). 
The same valid sub-optimal dispatch is used to generate all the price profiles in 
Figure 10.3(a) (and Figure 10.3(b)). Therefore, the marginal losses (~t7 and ~~~) 
and the voltage constraint partial derivative ( ~) do not change from one price profile 
to the next in Figure 10.3(a). Hence, the only terms that change are >.P, >.Q and µv 1 • 
µv 1 changes so as to be consistent with the other shadow prices in the equation. >.P and 
>.Q change according to the unit generation cost of the formulated-marginal Generator n 
(i.e. cPJ. 
The real power unit generation costs of the generators are defined to all be different, 
by Equations 10.1 and 10.2. Accordingly, the real power price profile experiences a 
translation along the 'Marginal Price' axis each time a different marginal generator 
is formulated as marginal, rather than formulated as non-marginal. If N ODAL2 had 
allowed generators ( other than the reference generator) to be formulated as marginal 
for reactive power, the reactive power price profile would shift up or down for different 
reactive power formulated-marginal generators, in the same way that the real power 
profile does. 
It must be noted that if the dispatch had been optimal the price profile would not 
have moved, regardless of which generator was formulated as marginal. This is because 
all prices are consistent with each other through the costs of explicit constraints and 
the costs of marginal losses (as described in Section 7.4.2). That is, fixing the price at 
the marginal generator node specifies the optimal marginal prices at all other nodes in 
the power system. 
In conclusion, the Clearing Manager must be careful in their choice of formulated-
marginal generator when calculating ex post marginal prices for the start of a trading 
period, if the dispatch was. sub-optimal. For consistency with Dispatch Based Pricing 
then, the most expensive marginal generator should be formulated as marginal when 
using the pq pricing model, unless all market participants agree that another generator 
should be formulated-marginal. Choosing the most expensive generator reflects a merit 
order dispatch. Du:ring a trading period_ however, it is possible to exploit this load-
following characteristic of Dispatch Based Pricing. The characteristic can be used to 
determine the cost of supplying real or reactive power using different load-following 
generators, during a trading period. 
10.7 PvG-TYPE OPTIMAL DISPATCHES 
Thus far it has been shown that, at the node of a formulated-non-marginal generator 
for reactive power the reactive power marginal price (f3Qm) does not equal the unit 
generation cost (cqm) when the dispatch is sub-optimal. This result also applies when 
the Dispatch Based Pricin·g model used to calculate ex post marginal prices for ~n 
observed optimal dispatch, is not the dual equivalent of the OPF used to obtain this -
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observed optimal dispatch. 
In the example presented in Appendix F, the IEEE 14-bus power system has been 
optimally dispatched using the pq-OPF formulation (Equations 7.1 to 7.12). That is, 
QOPF was used. The resultant pq-type optimal dispatch was unconstrained, apart 
from the fixed generator voltages. Section F.2 states that all generators were marginal 
for both real power and reactive power. 
Ex post marginal prices were calculated for this dispatch, using both the pq pricing 
model and the PvG pricing model. These two price sets (both generated by NODAL2) 
are presented in Sections F.5 and F.6 respectively. As discussed in Chapters 7 ·and 8, 
these models calculate prices for pq-type and PvG-type spot markets respectively. 
Tables F.1 and F.2 show that only Generator 8 was formulated as marginal for real 
power when calculating both sets of marginal prices. All other generators (m =1, 2, 3, 
6) were formulated as non-marginal for real power, even though they were physically 
marginal for real power (see the QOPF output). All generators were formulated as 
marginal for reactive power. 
In the pq pricing model price set, /3Pm is equal to cPm for all the formulated-
non-marginal (i.e. physically marginal) generators. This implies that this dispatch is 
optimal for a pq-type spot market, and that QOPF is the primal equivalent of the pq 
pricing model. In the PvG pricing model price set however, /3Pm is not equal to cPm 
for any of the formulated-non-marginal generators. This implies that Generators 1, 
2, 3 and 6 are actually non-marginal· (i.e. constrained) for real power, even though 
the generators are all within their physical generation limits. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that any pq-type optimal dispatch is actually sub-optimal in the context of 
a PvG-type spot market (which is modelled with a PvG-type OPF), and vice versa. 
That is, the PvG-pricing model considers this pq-type optimal dispatch (produced by 
QOPF) to be sub-optimal. This is because the QOPF formulation is not the primal 
equivalent of the PvG pricing model. 
10.8 CONCLUSIONS 
Read and Ring [1995a, Section 7.5] have been cited as proposing that a sub-optimal 
reactive power dispatch (i.e. the reactive power generation profile) can be treated as a 
constraint, so as to eliminate the problem of price inconsistencies that normally prevent 
the calculation of ex post marginal prices for sub-optimal dispatches. In this chapter, 
this proposal has been shown to be inherent within the equations of the Dispatch 
Based Pricing framework. Specifically, it has been demonstrated that the pq pricing 
model automatically treats the real and reactive power outputs of the formulated-non-
marginal generators as constrained when the dispatches of real and reactive power are 
sub-optimal. 
Read and Ring expected that reactive power marginal prices should be "relatively 
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small" (i.e. approaching $0/MVAr) when the dispatch is near optimal, in the absence 
of reactive power generation cost functions. A similar result has been demonstrated 
in Section 10.4 for dispatches where reactive power generation cost functions are em-
ployed. For these dispatches, the sub-optimal price profile approaches the optimal 
price profile as the dispatch becomes more optimal. Accordingly, it has been concluded 
and shown that marginal prices become more extreme throughout each trading period 
as the dispatch becomes more sub-optimal. 
It has also been demonstrated that Dispatch Based Pricing can be used to calculate 
the cost of supplying another unit of real or reactive power from different load-following 
generators. The different marginal price profiles that result are dependent on the unit 
generation costs of the for~ulated-marginal generators. 
All of the above conclusions also apply when the OPF formulation used to obtain 
the optimal .dispatch is not the primal equivalent of the dual pricing model used to 
calculate the ex post marginal prices. 
Chapter 11 
APPLICATION OF DISPATCH BASED PRICING 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
The North Island and South Island of New Zealand geographically divide the country's 
National Grid into two smaller grids. These two grids are connected only by a 1240 MW 
high voltage de link. The geographies of the two islands cause the two power systems 
to have very different physical and operational characteristics. The National Grid is 
the high voltage network operated by Transpower New Zealand Ltd. It excludes the 
networks of the retail power companies. 
The physical process currently used to dispatch reactive power in the South Island 
section of the National Grid is presented in Section 11.2. This section summarises 
discussions held with Transpower New Zealand Ltd employees at the control centre for 
the South Island section of the National Grid. The voltage and reactive power profiles 
presented in this section are generated using SCADA data obtained from the control 
centre. The data were recorded on Thursday, November 19, 1998. 
The reactive ~ower dispatch information along with the conclusions of the previous 
chapters, are used to propose a spot market for real and reactive power for the South 
Island National Grid. Some of the implications concerning how this spot market might 
influence the operation of the South Island National Grid are also discussed. 
11.2 THE SOUTH ISLAND NATIONAL GRID 
11.2.1 Grid Operation Voltage Limits 
In the South Island National Grid reactive power is currently controlled for the 
purpose of maintaining certain voltage levels within the National Grid transmission 
network. The following nominal operating voltage ranges apply to the North and 
South Island Grids [GOSP 1997]: 






± 5% (North Is. only) 
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These voltage ranges indicate extreme limits. Generally, operating voltage ranges 
are much smaller. For example, the usual operating voltage range for the Waitaki 
power scheme is 220 kV to 236 kV. Such operating limits depend on: 
• upper and lower tap limits of transformers; 
• the maximum voltage ratings of generators and power stations: these help define 
the upper voltage limits; 
• supply-point voltage limits. 
11.2.2 Supply-Point Voltage Limits 
The supply-point is defined to be the low voltage (LV) side of the transformer banks 
connecting the power company networks to the South Island National Grid. At the 
supply-points, the following nominal voltage ranges exist [GOSP 1997): 
33kV ± 5% 
22kV ± 2.5% 
llkV ±2.5% 
However, these percentage limits are often redefined within supply contracts between 
Transpower New Zealand Ltd and the individual power companies. 
11.2.3 On-Load Tap Changing 'fransformers 
In the South Island National Grid, On-Load Tap Changing (OLTC) transformers are 
used primari{y in the transformer banks that connect the power company networks to 
the grid. These OLTC's 1:1aintain the supply-point voltages within their contracted 
limits, as stated in the previous section. When OLTC's approach their tap limits, 
reactive power must be redispatched. This redispatch changes the grid voltage profile, 
allowing OLTC's to move away from their tap limits. 
11.2.4 Reactive Power Dispatch 
The South Island control centre dispatches reactive power from the South Island power 
stations using two methods: by 'voltage set-point' and by 'reactive power output'. 
These methods are described below. There are also some stations that are not dis-
patched by the South Island control centre. 
11.2.4.1 By Voltage Set-Point 
The South Island control centre provides certain power stations with a voltage se~-
point: For each power station, the associated automatic voltage regulators (AVR's) -
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hold the required voltage set-point. The reactive power output of the station varies 
with changing load conditions in order to maintain this set-point. In this way reactive 
power is dependently dispatched (see Section 5.7). The Cobb, Coleridge and Manapouri 
power stations are dispatched in this manner. 
There are also six capacitor banks. These are also provided with a voltage set-
point. The control centre switches sufficient capacitors into the network to obtain the 
required voltage set-point, thus nominally dispatching reactive power. After this 'dis-
patch' has occurred, both voltage and reactive power change at the point of connection 
2 
according to the relationship: Q = i- . The Islington site actually consists of switched 
capacitors, a static VAr compensator and synchronous condensers. 
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Figure 11.1 Voltage and reactive power profiles at the Manapouri power station 220 kV bus-
bar, for Thursday, November 19, 1998. 
,Figure 11.1 depicts the voltage and reactive power output at the Manapouri power 
station 220 kV bus bar over a 24 hr period. The voltage and reactive power are heavily 
dictated by the loads of the nearby aluminium smelter and city of Invercargill. It can 
be seen that the reactive power profile changes slowly over the 24 hr period, following 
the demand of the city and smelter. Consequently, the voltage set-point was only 
changed four times duril-ig this period. (points a-d). In general, the voltage set-points 
of the three power stations are changed between 2 and 4 times a day. 
11.2.4.2 By Reactive Power Output 
The South Island control centre issues these power stations ( or blocks of) with a certain 
reactive power output. When a reactive power output is issued to a station, the station's 
control system varies the machine excitation voltages until the required reactive power 
station output is obtained. By varying the excitation voltages the terminal voltage of 
the power station also varies. The station terminal voltage corresponding to the new 
reactive power output is used as the new voltage set-points for the generator_AVR's. In 
this way, reactive power is independently dispatched (see Section 5.7). Once the AVR's 
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begin maintaining this voltage set-point, the reactive power output of the power station 
is allowed to vary with load conditions, in order to maintain this set-point. Holding 
the set-point indicates that, after being dispatched for reactive power, these generators 
operate in exactly the same way as the 'voltage set-point' generators. The following 





Roxburgh, at 110 kV and 220 kV bus bars 
Ohau (A, B and C) 
Tekapo B 
The voltage and reacti:ve power profiles at the Clyde power station No. 1 220 kV 
busbar are depicted in Figure 11.2. Reactive power was redispatched to O MVAr at 
6:19am (point a), and to -20MVAr at 7:34pm (point b). The corresponding new 
voltage set-points required to obtain the O MVAr and -20 MVAr are visible by the 
significant steps in the voltage profile. Once dispatched, the Clyde power station AVR's 
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Figure 11.2 Voltage and reactive power profiles at the Clyde power station No. l, 220kV 
busbar, for Thursday, November 19, 1998. 
The AVR's actually monitor the LV (11 kV) busbar but the SCADA does not record 
data at the LV busbar. Thus, the fluctuations in the voltage profile are likely to be 
the result of changes in the current flowing through the connection transformer. Since 
Clyde uses thyristor control, it is expected that its LV profile remains as constant as the 
Manapouri 220kV voltage depicted in Figure 11.1 (between the points of redispatch 
that is). 
11.2.4.3 Undispatched Power Stations 
The control centre has no 'influence over reactive power generation from the Branch 
River; High Bank, Tekapo A or Waipori power stations. The operators at these minor -
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stations control their own reactive power output or voltage set-point to manage local 
voltage conditions. Waipori uses a power-factor set-point rather than a voltage set-
point. 
11.2.5 Reactive Power Generation Constraints 
Generally, the control centre attempts to minimise the reactive power output of all 
power stations, if possible. The primary reason for this is to minimise rotor winding 
heating and enables generators to respond to voltage contingencies. Minimisation of 
the reactive power output is a form of reactive power generation constraint. 
11.3 A SOUTH ISLAND NATIONAL GRID SPOT MARKET 
In this section, a spot market for real and reactive power is proposed for the South Island 
National Grid. This market proposal is based on the current methods used to dispatch 
reactive power in the South Island National Grid. It is assumed to have 48 half-
hourly trading periods in a day, to match the existing New Zealand Electricity Market 
(NZEM) described in Section 2.5.2. At minimum, real power generation is assumed 
to be economically dispatched (i.e. the output of each generator is re-optimised) once 
every trading period, as it is in the NZEM. 
Regarding the economic dispatch of reactive power, Dandachi et al (1996] noted the 
impracticalities of frequent "system-wide dispatches of quantities like transformer taps 
and shunt capacitors". Their suggestion was to fully re-optimise reactive power only 
at c~rtain points on the load cycle, and every half-hour optimise the reactive power 
dispatch while minimising the number of controls shifted. For simplicity of discussion 
however, reactive power is assumed to experience a full economic (i.e. optimal) dispatch 
every time real power is economically dispatched in this new spot market, that is at 
least once every trading period. It is also assumed this dispatch occurs at the start of 
the trading period. 
11.3.1 The Optimal Reactive Power Dispatch 
Real and reactive power generation are economically dispatched in this notional spot 
market using a pq-type optimisation process. In Section 11.2.4.2, it was stated that 
reactive power can be dispatched as an independent resource (i.e. by 'reactive power 
output') from the majority of South Island power stations. This implies that each 
station terminal voltage is a dependent resource, because it assumes a value consistent 
with the real and reactive power output of that station. Therefore, the terminal bus-
bars of the stations listed in Section 11.2.4.2 should be classified as PQG nodes when 
optimising the reactive power dispatch at the start of the trading period. 
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PQG nodes are only present in the formulations of the pq-OPF (Equations 7.1 
to 7.12) and the pq pricing model (Equations 7.13 to 7.19). Hence, this South Island 
spot market is a pq-type spot market. In this pq-type market, a pq-type OPF (such 
as pq-OPF or QOPF) must be used to optimally dispatch the real and reactive power 
generation. Also, the Clearing Manager must use an equivalent of the pq pricing 
model to calculate ex post marginal prices for each instant in time when the dispatch 
was optimised. 
Generator voltage set-points are defined to be voltage constraints in the context 
of a pq-type spot market (see Section 7.4.1). Therefore, the terminal busbars of Cobb, 
Coleridge and Manapouri can be classed as PQG nodes with a binding voltage con-
straint, where1 : 
{11.1) 
The terminal busbar of each capacitor bank should also be modelled as a PQG 
node with a binding voltage constraint2 . For these nodes however, there is no real 
, Th t , p pmin pma:c Q _p9.wer generat10n. a 18, a; = a; = a; = · 
In this pq-type spot market the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices at the 
instant of optimisation is described in Chapter 9. If however, the dispatch was sub-
optimal (i.e. poorly optimised) then the price behaviour is described in Chapter 10. 
11.3.2 Between Optimal Dispatches 
The PvG pricing model can be used to calculate the actual cost of obtaining another 
unit of power from the load-following generators, after each optimisation of real and 
reactive power generation (see Sections 10.4.4 and 10.6). 
Once the power system has been optimised, demand for power is actually supplied 
in a power-flow type manner. That is, all generators respond to any change in reactive 
power load, where the electrical distance between each generator and the load-change-
node determine the proportion supplied by thctt generator. Furthermore, any demand 
for extra real power (greater than minor fluctuations) is usually supplied by a single 
swing bus generator. 
This power-flow dispatch is identical to an unconstrained, sub-optimal, PvG-type 
dispatch thus making it possible to use the PvG pricing model for calculating marginal 
1This PQG classification actually requires the control centre to dispatch these stations by 'reactive 
power output' instead of by 'voltage set-point' because Q is an independent variable at PQG nodes. 
The voltage set-point would then be used to define very tight operating voltage limits for this PQG 
node (e.g. Equation 11.1). The alternative is to dispatch these stations by voltage set-point and class 
the busbars as PvG nodes. This results in a mixed pq/PvG-type spot market, requiring the pq/PvG 
Dispatch Based Pricing model (Equations 5.1 to 5.9); the price behaviour arising from this permutation 
has not been investigated. 
2 These nodes should actually be modelled as PvG nodes, just like the 'voltage set-point' generat~r 
nodes:· 
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prices. The reasoning for this is as follows. In Section 11.2.4.2 it was shown that once 
a power station has attained the required reactive power output, the terminal busbar 
voltage is fixed and the reactive power output is allowed to vary. Thus, voltage is the 
independent resource and reactive power is the dependent resource. Hence, all PQG 
nodes must be reclassified as PvG nodes after the generators have been optimally dis-
patched for real and reactive power. The nodes of the 'voltage set-point' power stations 
remain as PvG nodes, likewise the Islington node with the static VAr compensator. The 
static capacitors however, would only be switched in or out when the dispatch is optim-
ised. Therefore, it is proposed that they should be treated as fixed shunt impedances 
and their nodes reclassified as pqD nodes (i.e. standard load nodes). Given that all · 
nodes are either PyG of pqD nodes, this is a PvG-type dispatch. Also, this dispatch 
is sub-optimal because it is a PvG-type dispatch in the context of a pq-type spot 
market, and because the demand profile is constantly changing (see Section 10.7) . 
. All generators can be formulated as marginal for reactive power when using the 
PvG pricing model to calculate ex post marginal prices. This is because all gener-
ator voltages are fixed thus satisfying DBP 5.6 (see the examples in Chapter 8 and 
Appendix F). Likewise, to satisfy DBP 5.6 oniy one generator can be formulated as 
marginal for real power when the dispatch is unconstrained. All other generators must 
be formulated as non-marginal for real power, even if they are within their generation 
limits. Applying the conclusions of Section 10.4.2 to this dispatch, all these formulated-
non-marginal generators ( even those operating within their physical generation limits) 
must actually be non-marginal for real power because the dispatch is sub optimal. Note 
that when a dispatch is optimal, formulated-non-marginal generators can actually be 
marginal (ref. Section 7.4.2) . . 
Table 11.1 Fixed PvG and power-flow variables for a power-flow type dispatch. 
Fixed PvG Pricing Variables Fixed Power-Flow Variables 
V and e at the formula_ted-marginal V and e at the swing bus (S) 
node 
P and V at all other PvG nodes P and V at all other generator nodes (PV) 
P and Q at the pqD nodes P and Q at all demand nodes (PQ) 
The fixed variables of the PvG pricing equations for this unconstrained sub-optimal 
PvG-type dispatch are presented in Table 11.1 along with the fixed variables in a 
standard power-flow algorithm. There is only one possible dispatch solution in a power-
flow problem because the problem is fully defined by the fixed variables. Thus, when 
comparing the two sets of fixed variables it is evident that the PvG pricing problem is 
also fully defined. That is, there is only optimal solution: a set of marginal prices that 
describes the cost of supplying any demand for power using a power-flow dispatch. For 
-
example, the prices will indicate that the optimal proportion of reactive power to be 
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supplied by each generator. (as calculated by an OPF in response to a unit change in 
reactive power demand) is exactly the same as the generation proportions calculated 
by a standard power-flow algorithm. 
QOPF was used to verify that an OPF does dispatch the next unit of power in 
.a power-flow manner when the variables (shown in Table 11.1) are fixed. However, 
the marginal prices from QOPF (which is a pq-type OPF) did not match the prices 
from the PvG pricing model (i.e. NODAL2). Until a PvG-type OPF is implemented in 
software, it is not possible to establish whether this price discrepancy stems from the 
difference between the pq-type and PvG-type OPF algorithms, or from a source code 
error in NODAL2. 
Regardless of the validity of the final output of the N ODAL2 software, the PvG 
pricing equations model the power-flow ( or load-following) behaviour of the .South 
Island National Grid, with the following provisos. The dispatch must be unconstrained 
and sub-optimal. Also, the reference voltage angle (i.e. ()ref = 0) must be at the node 
of the generator that is formulated as marginal for real power. If it is not, the next 
unit of power will not be dispatched in a power-flow manner because there must be an 
-el~ment of optimisation if the OPF is to find a feasible dispatch. 
11.4 IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
In this Section some of the many issues relevant to the implementation of this South 
Island spot market are identified. 
11.4.1 Vqriable Generator Voltages 
The terminal voltages oft-he power stations identified in Section 11.2.4.2 are allo_wed 
to vary within certain limits at the time of optimisation ( e.g. 220 kV to 236 kV for 
the Waitaki power scheme). The "Variable Generator Voltages" sections in Chapter 9 
indicated the primary advantage_.of variable generator voltages, stable and moderate 
reactive power marginal prices in the vicinity of a single binding constraint. The 
importance of this becomes evident when looking at the behaviour of a reactive power 
dispatch. 
In Appendix G it is shown that a pq-type OPF will force a merit order dispatch 
for both real and reactive power in the absence of binding constraints such as fixed 
generator voltages. This is because the nature of an OPF is to force the dispatch against 
operating limits (in particular, generation limits when the dispatch is unconstrained). 
However, this appendix demonstrates that if some other network constraints had been 
tight enough, these network constraints would have become binding before the reactive 
power generation limits became binding (i.e. multiple marginal generators for reacti~e 
power occur would have occurred). 
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Assuming that pq-OPF is used to minimise the total cost of real and reactive 
power generation, the main constraints that are likely to become binding in the South 
Island National Grid are: 
1. supply-point voltage limits; 
2. OLTC limits (if included in the pq-OPF formulation); 
3. power station terminal voltage limits; 
4. reactive power generation limits. 
The first three types of constraints are likely to become binding before any reactive 
power generation limits become binding. This is particularly true of the supply-point 
voltage limits, which are considered to be very tight by the control centre ( e.g. the 
nominal voltage ±2.5%). Depending on the line impedance in the South Island National 
Grid, it is also possible that reactive power losses will act as implicit constraints, 
resulting in multiple marginal generators for reactive power. 
It can be <..:onduded therefore, that prices should be moderate for a limited number 
of binding constraints if the power station voltages are allowed to vary within their 
respective operating limits. However, as the OPF forces more constraints to become 
binding, prices are likely to become more volatile and extreme. 
11.4.2 Fixed Generator Voltages 
Marginal prices for an optimal dispatch are much more volatile in the vicinity of a 
binding constraint when all generator voltages are fixed (as concluded in Chapter 9) 3 . 
This is because the power system's ability to work around that binding .constraint is 
restricted by the fixed generator voltages. Therefore, if all South Island power stations 
are operated to voltage set-points, reactive power marginal prices can be expected 
to be volatile if the pq-OPF forces binding constraints when optimising the dispatch 
of real and-reactive power generation: Fixed generator voltages do however, have the 
benefit of restricting the amount by which the pq-OPF can optimise the reactive power 
dispatch, thus reducing the likelihood of binding constraints and volatile prices. 
11.4.3 Neglected Constraints 
It can be concluded from Chapter 10 that a dispatch is sub-optimal if there are in-
sufficient primal constraints to explain why an observed dispatch could not be made 
more optimal. Consider therefore, an optimal dispatch of the South Island National 
3In a pq-type spot' market, generator voltages are fixed by applying Equation 11.1 to all generator 
nodes. Hence, all generator nodes become PQG nodes with voltage constraints, and reactive.power is 
still the independent resource. 
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Grid. It follows that the mc1,rginal prices calculated by the pq pricing model will reflect 
a sub-optimal dispatch if any binding constraints are neglected or overlooked, even 
though the dispatch is optimal. The likelihood of the Clearing Manager overlooking 
binding constraints will be dependent on the final complexity of the model used for 
this South Island spot market. 
These marginal prices include penalties, signalling to the market that the dispatch 
of real and reactive power was sub-optimal. These penalties can take the form of the 
'Best Compromise' pricing proposed by Ring [1995], or the slack variables of gener-
ation constraints (Section 10.4.2). Either way, market participants will be penalised .-
inappropriately if constraints are neglected. 
11.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Certain physical aspects pertaining to the dispatch of reactive power in the South Island 
National Grid have been presented. Specifically, it has been shown that it is physically 
possible to dispatch reactive power from most power station blocks as an independent 
.resource. Consequently, any spot market for the South Island National Grid must be 
a pq-type spot market (or at least a mixed pq/PvG spot market). 
In this market, both real and reactive power are independently and economically 
(i.e. optimally) dispatched. Hence, a pq-type OPF must be used to model this op-
timisation process. Furthermore, a pq pricing model must be used when calculating 
ex post marginal prices for the instant in time when the dispatch was optimised. At 
every other point in time, each extra unit of real or reactive power has been shown 
to be dispatched in an unconstrained, sub-optimal PvG-type manner, under certain 
conditions. Respecting these conditions, the PvG pricing model can therefore be used 
to calculate the marginal prices of supplying another unit of power from different lo.ad-
following generators. 
Fixed and variable generator voltages are shown to have advantages and disad-
vantages by the way they affect the optimal power system dispatch, and ultimately the 
way in which marginal prices behave. 
Chapter 12 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
12.1 INTRODUCTION 
Recent literature indicates that spot pricing of reactive power is beginning to receive 
serious consideration as a method of paying for the ancillary services of system secur-
ity, power quality, and voltage support. Such a method has particular relevance for 
countries where real power spot markets are already operating, such as New Zealand. 
The objective of this thesis has been to increase the understanding of how the reactive 
power marginal prices in a notional spot market behave when both real and reactive 
power have non-zero unit generation costs at the generators. This has involved utilising 
the Dispatch Based Pricing theory derived by Ring [1995]. It has been used to identify 
that the power system marginal costs are the mechanisms influencing the behaviour 
of reactive power marginal prices under unconstrained and constrained power system 
conditions. It has also been used to delineate some of the implications of this marginal 
price behaviour in this notional spot market. 
f 
The research was broadly divided into two stages. Firstly, the Dispatch Based 
Pricing equations ·were applied to different types of spot markets. This 'included the 
validation of the software used to implement the equations (see Section 12.2). Secondly, 
the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices was investigated using the validated 
software (see Section 12:3). 
12.2 DISPATCH BASED PRICING VALIDATION 
Dispatch Based Pricing, as proposed by Read and Ring [1995d], was used to provide the 
framework for describing the behaviour of the reactive power marginal prices of this 
notional spot market. To calculate marginal prices, Dispatch Based Pricing models 
utilise optimal power flow technology. However, Read and Ring used power-flow node 
classifications (i.e. PV and PQ) when identifying the node-type to which each Dispatch 
Based Pricing equation was to be applied. They also used these power-flow classifica-
tions in their non-linear optimal power flow (OPF) formulation. Their Dispatch Based 
Pricing model was derived from this OPF formulation. 
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The use of power-flow nomenclature makes it unclear as to how the power system 
resources behave in an OPF context. For example, P varies at every generator node 
because an OPF optimises the real power injection at these nodes. Therefore, to 
class an OPF generator node as a PV node is misleading because P is not really 
fixed or specified, as implied by the 'PV' classification. Therefore, Read and Ring's 
non-linear OPF formulation and Dispatch Based Pricing model have been redefined 
(see Chapters 4 and 5) with respect to a new OPF classification system ( defined in 
Chapter 3). 
The new OPF nomenclature classifies power system nodes with respect to their 
fixed and control variables, as defined by the OPF algorithm. The result has been 
the definition of two types. of OPF algorithm, identified by the classifications of the 
generator nodes. The OPF node classification system has revealed that the formulations 
of Read and Ring's redefined OPF ( called pq/PvG OPF) is the combination or' these 
two types of OPF. They are: 
• a pq-type OPF (i.e. pq-OPF of Chapter 7) where reactive power generation is 
dispatched as an independent resource at generator nodes, 
• and a PvG-type OPF (i.e. PvG-OPF of Chapter 8) where reactive power gener-
ation is dispatched as a dependent resource at generator nodes. 
The pq-OPF and PvG-OPF formulations have been used to derive two new Dis-
patch Based Pricing models, the 'pq pricing model' in Chapter 7 and the 'PvG pricing 
model' in Chapter 8. When combined, the equations of these two models form the re-
defined version of Read and Ring's Dispatch Based Pricing model ( called the pq/PvG 
Dispatch Based Pricing model). 
A piece of software called N ODAL2 has been introdu~ed in Chapter 6. This software 
was developed by Transpower New Zealand Ltd to implement Read and Ring's Dispatch 
Based Pricing model (and hence the pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing model). It has 
been demonstrated that N ODAL2. also implements the pq pricing model and the PvG 
pricing model. This·is because all the equations· required for these models are contained 
in the pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing model. 
OPF software (called QOPF) has been developed in conjunction with Cornell Uni-
versity to implement the pq-OPF formulation. QOPF is distinct in that it is capable 
of including reactive power generation cost functions in it objective function. The 
pq-type marginal prices generated by QOPF have been used as a benchmark against 
which to compare the N ODAL2 marginal prices. This comparison has demonstrated 
that the N ODAL2 source code correctly implements the pq pricing model equations 
(except when the power system is thermally constrained). It has also been established 
that all terms in the pq pricing equations correctly describe the components of the re~l 
and reactive power marginal prices in a pq-type spot market. It must be noted that · 
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using QOPF as a benchmark program has provided valuable insight into the optimising 
behaviour of the OPF algorithm (see Chapter 10). Also, insight has been gained into 
the use of the OPF as a spot pricing tool for both optimal and sub-optimal dispatches. 
Due to time restrictions, PvG-type OPF software that includes reactive power 
generation cost functions in the objective function has not been developed. This OPF 
would have been the implementation of the PvG-OPF. However, inductive reasoning 
has been employed to establish reasonable confidence that the equation-terms of the 
PvG pricing model correctly describe the marginal prices of real and reactive power 
in a PvG-type spot market. It has been verified that the N ODAL2 source code cor-
rectly implements parts of the PvG pricing model equations. However, the source code · 
implementing the ,remainder of the PvG pricing model can only be validated once a 
PvG-type OPF has been developed . 
. The verification experiments for the PvG pricing model indicated that the pq-OPF 
and the PvG-OPF are different, returning different optimal dispatches for the same 
set of input data. Furthermore, the pq pricing model and the PvG pricing model have 
been demonstrated to calculate different real and reactive power marginal price-sets 
for the same observed dispatch. The conclusion drawn from these results is that the 
optimisation processes of these two OPF's are distinctly different. That is, these OPF's 
model two types of spot market with distinctly different optimisation processes, which 
accordingly produce different real and reactive power marginal prices. The definitions 
of these two OPF types have been used to define two types of spot market: a pq-
type spot market where reactive power is dispatched as an independent resource, and 
a PvG-type spot market where reactive power is dispatched as a dependent resource. 
Consequently, the pq pricing model and the PvG pricing model must only be used 
f 
calculate ex post marginal prices for dispatches from the respective spot markets. 
12.3 REACTIVE POWER PRICE BEHAVIOUR 
To facilitate the investigation into the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices 
in this thesis, a ·generic spot market was assumed. In this spot market, the social 
welfare function was assumed to be the total cost of real and reactive power generation, 
obtained by summing the real and reactive power generation cost functions of all the 
generators. The cost functions were assumed to be submitted by generating companies 
as offers in the 'Real-Time Physical Market' (described in Section 2.5.2.2). Real power 
and reactive power were assumed to be economically (i.e. optimally) and simultaneously 
dispatched by minimising this social welfare function. It has been assumed that this 
optimisation process occurs only at the start of each trading period. This spot market 
definition was used when discussing pq-type spot markets and PvG-type spot markets. 
Section 2.6 in.dicates the prevalent opinion in literature is, that reactive power 
marginal prices represent only a fraction of the costs of supplying ancillary services 
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and are thus unusable as signals for encouraging the efficient and economic dispatch 
of reactive power. Dandachi et al [1996) demonstrated that reactive power generation 
cost functions can be used to cause the magnitudes of reactive power marginal prices to 
be significant. This thesis has confirmed that work. Further, it has demonstrated that 
these significant reactive power marginal prices have the potential to be used to fund 
ancillary services in both pq-type and PvG-type spot markets. It has also been shown 
that reactive power generation cost functions and significant reactive power marginal 
prices enable reactive power to be economically dispatched. 
Reactive power marginal price behaviour has only been investigated for pq-type 
spot markets, since it has not been completely established that N ODAL2 generates 
correct marginal prices for PvG-type spot markets. The behaviour of marginal prices 
was examined under four dispatch conditions: optimal, sub-optimal, unconstrained 
and constrained (see Chapters 9 and 10). The pq pricing model equations were used to 
identify the marginal cost components that are the dominant influence on the behaviour 
of reactive power marginal prices for each condition. 
The locations of reactive power sources within the power system (such as capacitive 
network components) influence the amount QOPF is able to optimise the real and 
reactive power losses. Accordingly, the magnitudes of the costs of marginal losses are 
influenced by the locations of the reactive power sources. It has been shown that the 
costs of real power marginal losses and reactive power marginal losses dominate over 
any other cost components when an optimal dispatch is unconstrained. Hence, the 
magnitudes of the reactive power marginal prices are also influenced by the locations 
of reactive power sources (see Section 9.4). 
The loss, cost components also determine the trends in prices between connected 
nodes when the generator voltages are unrestricted. However, it was proved that if 
generator voltages were fixed, the price trends between nodes were determined instead 
by the marginal cost components of these fixed generator voltages. 
At times, the power system's __ ability to supply another unit of reactive power may 
be severely restricted. Th~se restrictions are the result of numerous binding constraints, 
such as fixed generator voltages. A scenario has been considered, of another constraint 
becoming binding when this already-constrained power system is optimally dispatched. 
It has been shown that if this new constraint results in a further significant restriction 
to the ability of the power system, the cost component of this new constraint will 
dominate over all other marginal cost components (Section 9.5). 
When a dispatch is optimal, every generator whose real power or reactive power 
output is within its physical generation limits is identified as being marginal for real 
or reactive power. These generators are defined as being marginal by the fact that the 
marginal price at the node of each of these generators is equal to the unit generation 
cost of that generator. It has been demonstrated that a generator will be marginal -
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irrespective of whether it is formulated as marginal or formulated as non-marginal 
in the Dispatch Based Pricing model. That is, the marginal price at the node of a 
marginal generator will always equal the unit generation cost of that generator when 
t-he dispatch is optimal. This is regardless of whether the generator is formulated as 
marginal or non-marginal. The implication is there is only one possible set of marginal 
prices when the dispatch is optimal. Note that the marginal generators respond to all 
changes in demand. 
When a dispatch is sub-optimal, the marginal price of real or reactive power at 
a generator node is only equal to the unit generation cost if that generator has been 
formulated as marginal for real or reactive power. This implies that the outputs of all · 
generators formula,,ted as non-marginal must actually be constrained because the mar-
ginal prices do not equal the unit generation costs. This is irrespective .of whether the 
formulated non-marginal generators are within their physical generation limits. Hence, 
only the formulated marginal generators respond to any marginal change in demand. 
This is because the prices for a sub-optimal dispatch infer that these generators are 
the only marginal generators. 
Marginal prices for sub-optimal dispatch also imply a load-following scenario; 
where the formulated marginal generators are the load-following generators. It has 
been demonstrated that formulating different generators as marginal, results in differ-
ent marginal price-sets. These price-sets communicate the costs of supplying real or 
reactive power from different load-following generators. 
If the PvG pricing model is used to calculate ex post marginal prices for an optimal 
pq-type dispatch, these prices purport that the dispatch was sub-optimal. This is 
because pq-type and PvG-type OPF algorithms result in different optimal solutions . 
• 
The pq-type and PvG-type spot markets have been discussed in the context of 
the South Island section of the New Zealand national grid (Chapter 11). In this power 
system, the optimal dispatch of real and reactive power can be modelled using a pq-
type OPF. In addition, the pq pricing model can be used to calculate ex post marginal 
prices for these optimal'dispatches. ~etween each optimal dispatch, the dispatch of 
the next u~it of real or reactive power can be described as an unconstrained sub-
optimal PvG-type dispatch (this description was subject to certain conditions). The 
PvG pricing model can then be used to calculate real and reactive power marginal 
prices for this sub-optimal dispatch. These prices indicate the true cost to the power 
system of satisfying the demand for another unit of real or reactive power. 
12.4 FUTURE WORK 
This thesis has set the foundation for future work into the role of reactive power in a 
deregulated spot market. Initially a PvG-type OPF must be developed tQ finish the 
validation process started in Section 8.2.3. This OPF is required to establish total 
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confidence in the equations .of the PvG pricing model, and to ensure that the N ODAL2 
source code correctly implements these equations. To achieve this, the OPF must be 
able to optimally dispatch reactive power is a dependent resource. This can be achieved 
by taking.the Matpower OPF algorithm (introduced in Chapter 6) and implementing a 
~ew gradient function in which Q0 is expressed in terms of the other system variables. 
This gradient function is represented by Equation 8.31. 
This thesis has investigated the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices in a pq-
type spot market. Once the PvG pricing model has been validated using a PvG-type 
OPF, it will also be possible to investigate the behaviour of reactive power marginal 
prices in a PvG-type spot market. A comparison can then be made of the merits and 
disadvantages of each type .of spot market. 
A more flexible spot market would be a mixed pq/PvG-type spot market, the 
marginal prices of which would be calculated by the pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing 
model of Chapter 5. Such a spot market would accommodate the PQG nodes of power 
stations where reactive power is dispatched as an independent resource. Also, it would 
accommodate voltage-constrained nodes of power stations such as Manapouri that 
-sliould be modelled as PvG nodes where reactive power is dispatched as a dependent 
resource. A pq/PvG-type OPF must be developed to model the optimisation process 
of this spot market. 
The extension of the spot market to allow reactive power cost functions at non-
generator nodes should also be investigated. This will enable market participants own-
ing equipment such as static VAr compensators or capacitor banks to trade solely in 
the reactive power sub-market. 
In this thesis the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices has been described 
for dispatches where reactive power generation cost functions have been used. However, 
it has been left as future work to determine whether these cost functions result in price 
behaviour that generates signals encouraging the efficient and economic use of reactive 
power. 
Reactive power _generation cost functi_ons have been used without definition in this 
thesis. Therefore future work must define the structure of these cost functions, so that 
generating companies can adequately charge for the reactive power ancillary services 
they provide. 
Certain sectors of any power system experience lower power quality and/or more 
extreme voltage levels than other sectors. In these sectors, the needs of each customer 
determine whether such experiences are an issue to that customer. Therefore, real and 
reactive power marginal prices must be structured so that customers only pay for the 
level of power quality ancillary services they require (such as their required level of 
voltage support). 
It has been shown that a pq-type OPF will attempt to force generators against 
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reactive power generation limits when optimally dispatching real and reactive power. 
Work should be performed to determine whether power system security will be com-
promised by this kind of extreme economic dispatch of reactive power. If so, future 
work must determine a structure for reactive power generation cost functions and re-
active power marginal prices that will incorporate charges reflecting the levels of power 
system security required by different customers. 
Appendix A 
SYMBOLS AND SYMBOLIC CONVENTIONS 
A.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Appendix contains all symbols and symbolic conventions used within this thesis. 
A number of the definitions are taken from either Ring [1995] or Read and Ring [1995d]. 















Dollars per megavar. 
Dollars per megavar-hour. 
Dollars per megawatt. 
Dollars per megawatt-hour. 
Dollars per 1 pu voltage. 
Abbreviation. 
Automatic voltage regulator. 
Compare with. 
Decimal places. 
Dispatch Based Pricing. 
Electricity Corporation of New Zealand. 
Electricity 'Market Company. Now called M-co, The Marketplace Com-
pany Ltd. 
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineering. 
A PvG-type OPF developed by PSERC. Incapable of accepting unit 
generation costs for reactive power. 







Multiple marginal generators. 
Not applicable. 
National Grid Company. 
Disp0,tch Based Pricing software. 
New Zealand Electricity Market. 





SYMBOLS AND NOTATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
Optimal power flow. 
Power System Engineering Research Centre. 
A pq-type OPF developed by PSERC, with the ability to accept unit 
generation costs for reactive power. 
ref. Reference or refer to. 
SC-OPF Security-constrained optimal power flow. 
A.3 PRICING SYMBOLS 
Symbols are sorted alphabetically with respect to the Greek alphabet, and then with 
respect to the English alphabet. Where required, symbols are sorted further with 
respect to subscripts, and then with respect to superscripts. 























Arbitrary dual variable (i.e. shadow price or LaGrange multiplier). 
Marginal price of real power demand at Node i. 
Marginal price of reactive power demand at Node i. 
Marginal price of voltage at Node i. 
Shadow price for the average real power flow constraint on Branch k. 
Shadow price for the average reactive power flow constraint on Branch k. 
Algorithm variable for voltage angle. 
An arbitrary LaGrange multiplier. 
Marginal price of real power at the reference node. 
Marginal price of reactive power at the reference node. 
•Shadow price for the constraint defining dependent reactive power injec-
tions at Node n. 
Shadow price for the constraint defining· the dependent voltage mag-
nitude at Node n. 
Shadow prices for the upper and lower real power generation limits at 
Node ( 
Shadow prices for the upper and lower reactive power generation limits 
at Node i. 
Shadow prices for the upper and lower voltage magnitude limits at 
Node i. 
Shadow price for the thermal limit of Branch k. 
A.3.2 English Symbols 
A 
a,. b, .. c Arbitrary polynomial constant coefficients. 











Total shunt susceptance of Branch k. 
Constraint curve. 
Unit generation cost of real power at Node i when c;; = c;;. 
Unit generation cost of reactive power at Node i when c;; = c~;. 
Costs of next and last units of real power at Node i. 
Costs of next and last units of reactive power at Node i. 
Cost of total real power losses. 
Cost of total reactive power losses. 
Indicates a demand for the associated resource (subscript). 
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Dem Set of all non-generator nodes; includes, but not limited to, pqD nodes. 
F 
f ( cost) An objective function for the total cost of real and reactive power gen-
P,Q 
eration. 
f (x, y) An arbitrary primal objective function, which is a function of x and y. 
G 
G Indicates generation of the associated resource (subscript). 
Gen Set of generic generator nodes. Can include both PvG and PQG nodes. 
g(x, y) An arbitrary primal constraint equation, which is a function of x and y. 
I 
I Set of all arbitrary variables (i.e. x;). 












Mp (P0 ). • 
Branch k. 
Set of all branches. 
Total real power losses. 
Total reactive power losses. 
Reactive power losses in Branch k. 
Marginal reactive power loss, equivalent to !~~. 
LaGrange equation. 
A polynomial function describing the real power generation cost at Node i 
(abbr. MPJ 
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MQ (Q 0 )i A polynomial.function describing the reactive power generation cost at 
Node i (abbr. MQJ. 
0 
opt Indicates the value of the variable when the dispatch 1s optimal 
(subscript). 
p 
P Algorithm variable for real power injection. 
j5 Vector of fixed OPF parameters. 
P O Vector of real power demand at the nodes indicated by the superscript. 
PDi Real power demand at Node i. 
P;:t Real power demand set by the customer at Node i. 
P fm Indicates the corresponding generator node is formulated as marginal for 
. real power. 
Real power generation. 
Vector of real power generation at the nodes indicated by the superscript. 
Real power generation at Node i. 
Incremental increase in real power generation at Node i (this variable is 
always positive, i.e. ~ 0). 
Incremental decrease in real power generation at Node i (this variable is 








Real power injection at Node i. 
Real power generation at Node i, as reported by QOPF. 
Average flow of real power in Branch k . 
Real power, flow in Branch k from Node i to Node j. 
P Real power mismatch at Node i. mismatchi 
'Pmax';, 'Pmin';QOPF fields for upper and lower limits on real power generation at 
Node i. 
pq Set of pqD and PQG nodes (OPF). 





Set of reactive power controlled demand nodes; p and q injections are 
fixed (OPF). 
Set of non-generator nodes where reactive power generation can be op-
timally dispatched. 
Set of generator nodes, non-marginal for reactive power. 
Set of reactive power controlled generator nodes; P and Q injections are 
unrestricted (OPF). 
Set of all non-marginal and formulated-non-marginal generator nodes; 
i.e. non-margfnal for either real or reactive power. 
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PV Set of voltage controlled nodes (power-flow). 
PvG Set of generator nodes with fixed generator voltages (OPF). 
PX Set of all nodes ( as defined for this thesis). 
·PX Set of all nodes excluding the swing bus (according to Ring (1995]). 
PXS Set of all nodes including the swing bus (according to Ring (1995]). 
PY Set of all nodes in a PvG-type OPF; i.e. (PvG U pqD). 
Q 
Q Algorithm variable for reactive power injection. 
Q
0 
Vector of reactive power demand at the nodes indicated by the super-
script. 
Q Di Reactive power demand at Node i. 
Q;: Reactive power demand set by the customer at Node i. 
Q fm Indicates the corresponding generator node is formulated as marginal for 
reactive power. 




Gi ' Gi 
+ 
QGi 
Reactive power generation at Node -i. 
Upper and lower reactive power generation limits at Node i. 
Incremental increase in reactive power generation at Node i (this variable 
is always positive, i.e. ~ 0). 
Incremental decrease in reactive power generation at Node i (this variable 
is always positive, i.e. ~ 0). 
Qi Reactive power injection at Node i. 
Qk Average flow of reactive power in Branch k . 
• 
Qki Reactive power, flow in Branch k from Node i to Node j. 
Q-max Maximum average flow of reactiv.e power in Line 1 - 2. 
1-2 
'Qmax';, 'Qmin';QOPF fields for upper and lower limits on reactive power generation 
at Node i. 
R 
Rk Series resistance ofBranch k. 
Rki Shunt resistance of Branch k at Node i. 




The swing bus. 
Tkmax Square of the thermal limit of Branch k. 
u 






. v:iif f 
SYMBOLS AND NOTATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
Algorithm variable for voltage magnitude. 
Vector of voltage magnitudes at the nodes indicated by the superscript. 
Indicates a node with a binding voltage constraint. 
Difference between v;uncnstr and the constrained voltage for the same 
Node i. 
v; Voltage magnitude at Node i. 
V
uncnstr 
Voltage magnitude at Node i when the power system is unconstrained. 
! 
v;max, v;min Upper and lower limits on voltage magnitude at Node i. 
v;.ef Reference voltage, used when generator voltages are not fixed. It does 
not necessarily have to be the voltage at the reference node. 
v•et A fixed voltage set-point at Node i. 
! 























Vector of OPF state (i.e. unknown) variables. 
Arbitrary primal variable. 
Series reactance of Branch k, at Node i. 
Shunt reactive of Branch k, at Node i. 
Reactance to resistance ratio of each power system branch. 
The admittance matrix. 
Arbitrary term used to represent all variables relevant to the context in 
, which z appears. 






Observed value of the associated variable, around which the OPF formu-
lation is linearised, in Chapter 5 (superscript). 
Complex conjugate. Although identical to the 'observed value', they do 
not appear in the same context. 
Partial derivative with respect to ( or gradient of). 
Tilde, denoting a vector. 
Absolute value of z. 
z is only non-zero if the constraint corresponding to term z is binding. 
Appendix B 
LAGRANGE MULTIPLIERS 
The optimal power flow algorithm used in this thesis makes use of LaGrange multipliers 
to aid the search for an optimal dispatch. In this appendix a brief definition of LaGrange 
multipliers is provided. This definition is used to show that LaGrange multipliers are 
the marginal prices used in an electricity market. 
B.1 DEFINITION 
An OPF minimises the value of an objective function, say J(x,y), subject to a set of 
constraint equations such as g(x, y). Assuming only one constraint for simplicity, an 
OPF attempts to minimise the value off (x, y) as (x, y) varies over the constraint curve 
C, where C is the graph of g(x, y) = o·and is shown in Figure B.1 [Anton 1988]. 
y 
g(x,y) = 0 
c 
x 
Figure B.1 Curve C is the graph of g(x, y) = 0, and has a 'constrained relative minimum' at 
(xo, Yo). 
Anton stated that J(x,y) is said to be at a 'constrained relative minimum' at 
(x0 ,y0 ) if there is a circle centred at (x 0 ,y0 ) such that 
f (xo, Yo) ~ f (x, y) 
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for all points (x, y) on C within the circle. 
If g(x, y) = 0 represents the energy conservation equation then, all values of (x, y) 
on C represent valid power system dispatches, and (x 0 , y0 ) represents the optimal 
dispatch where the objective function ( or cost function) has been minimised. Often this 
.constrained relative minimum is also the absolute minimum, especially when f (x, y) is 
a function of generation costs. 
Given an optimal dispatch therefore, , Theorem B.1 holds. 
Theorem B.1 Let f and g be functions of two variables with continuous 
first partial derivatives on some open set containing the constraint curve 
g(x, y) = 0, and assume that V g i= 0 at any point on this curve. If f 
has a constrained relative extremum, then this extremum occurs at a point 
( x 0 , Yo) on the constraint curve where the gradient vectors V f ( x 0 , Yo) and 
Vg(x0 , y0 ) are parallel, that is, 
for some number {3. 
The number {3 is called a LaGrange multiplier [Anton 1988, Section 16.10]. For 
each constraint there is an associated LaGrange multiplier ( or shadow price, in economic 
terms). 
B.2 USING LAGRANGE MULTIPLIERS AS MARGINAL 
PRICES 
The following discussion focuses on only one power system variable and one constraint. 
Including all variables and constr?'ints from Equations D.2 to D.17 provides no advant-
age in demonstrating tha.t LaGrange multipliers are the marginal prices of a power 
system. 
Let the objective function equal the cost of reactive power generation at a generator 
Node i: 
c6; is the cost of the next unit of reactive power generation. Equation D.16 says that 
the load at Node i must equal some value set by the customer: 
Q _ Qset(- Q* ) Di - Di - Di 
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Hence, the constraint g(x, y) becomes: 
(B.1) 
At a generator node, demand is equal to negative generation: 
Therefore, the objective function becomes: 
(B.2) 
A LaGrange equation can be formed from the objective function and constraint 
equation [Wood and Wollenberg 1996]. For one variable, this is written as: 
where the first partial derivatives are continuous. /3q; is the LaGrange multiplier or 
shadow price on Equation D.16. By Theorem B.1 (and in Wood and Wollenberg [1996]) 
the gradient of this equation is zero when the dispatch is optimised by minimising the 
objective function: 
(B.3) 
This is known as the 'Gradient method' of solution. 
If the LaGrange equation (B.3) is rearranged and the partial derivatives Equa-
tions B.1 and B.2 are s~bstutited into it, the following is obtained: 
This demonstrates the LaGrange multiplier is equal to the increment in the total gen-
eration cost (!), with respect to an incremental change in reactive power load at a 
generator node. Economically, the shadow price is equal to the unit generation cost 
(marginal price) of reactive power at the generator node. 
In the full ex post OPF formulation of this thesis (Equations D.2 to D.17) there are 
15 constraint equations, each with its own shadow price. If a primal equality constraint 
is not binding, the location of the constrained relative minimum in space is not changed 
by this primal constraint, and the corresponding dual shadow price is zero (Duality 5.5). 
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Wood and Wollenberg [199(;>, Section 13.2] provide a similar discussion using all power 
system variables and constraints. 
The value of every multiplier is dependent on every other multiplier because multi-
constraint, multi-variable LaGrange multiplier problems are simultaneous in nature. 
for example, the shadow price of reactive power demand (/3q;) at a pq node will be 
dependent on the shadow prices of any binding constraints such as the shadow price 
of a voltage constraint (µvn) at a node n. /3q; is also influenced by all other non-zero 
shadow prices. 
Appendix C 
THE ORIGINAL DISPATCH BASED PRICING 
MODEL 
C.1 INTRODUCTION 
This appendix contains the original non-linear OPF formulation (Equations C.1 
to C.13) and the consequential Dispatch Based Pricing model (Equations C.14 to C.22) 
proposed by Read and Ring (see Read and Ring (1995d], and Ring (1995]). The deriv-
ation process used by Read and Ring to derive their original Dispatch Based Pricing 
model from their original non-linear OPF formulation, is summarised in Chapters 3 
to 5 and Appendix D. 
Read and Ring used power-flow terminology to describe the behaviour of the dif-
ferent types of power system nodes. Thus, generator nodes are described as PV nodes 
and non-generator nodes are described as PQ nodes. Furthermore, the power-flow 
swing bus (denoted by 'S') is included in their non-linear OPF formulation and in 
their Dispatch Based Pricing equations. 
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THE ORIGINAL NON-LINEAR OPF FORMULATION 
subject to: 
Minimise 
PXS PXS PXS PXS PXS 
PD ,QD ,PG ,QG ,V 
CONSERVATION OF POWER 
'""' ( PX PX PQ PQ PVS) 
L.t (Pa; - PD;) - LP Pa - Po , Qa - Qo , V = 0 
iEPXS 
'""' (Q . _ Q .) _ L (PPX _ PPX QPQ _ QPQ VPVS) = O 
D Gi Di Q G D ' G D ' 
iEPXS 
DEPENDENT REACTIVE POWER INJECTION AT PV NODES 
( 
PX PX PQ PQ PVS) 
-Qn p G - po 'QG - QD , V + (QGn - QDn) = 0 Vn E PV 
DEPENDENT VOLTAGE AT PQ NODES 
_ V (PPX _ PPX QPQ _ QPQ VPVS) V = O 
n G o' G o' + n 
TRANSMISSION LINE Fiows 
-P (PPX _ PPX QPQ _ QPQ VPVS) p = O 
k a o' a o' + k 
-Q- (PPX _ PPX QPQ _ QPQ VPVS) Q- = O 
k a o' a o' + k 
REAL AND REACTIVE" GENERATION AND VOLTAGE SETTINGS 
pmin <P pmax 
Gi - Gi ~ Gi 
min < . < max 
QGi _QG, - QGi 
vmin v vmax 
i ~ i ~ i· 
REAL AND REACTIVE POWER LOAD SETTINGS 
p . = pset 
D, Di 
set 
QDi = QDi 
TRANSMISSION LINE THERMAL LIMITS 
-2 -2 max 
pk+ Qk ~ Tk 
Vn E PQ 
Vk EK 
Vk EK 
Vi E PXS 
Vi E PXS 
Vi E PXS 
Vi E PXS 
















THE ORIGINAL DISPATCH BASED PRICING MODEL 
MAXIMISE 
K +PXS _PXS +PXS _PXS +PXS _PXS 
x ,vp ,vp ·,v0 ,v0 ,v.v ,vv 2;0 
PV PQ PXS PXS 
>..p,>..0 ,µ0 ,µv ,/3p ,/30 
A DUAL OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
(See Read and Ring {1995d}) 
Marginal Price Equations 
µQn = j3Qn - AQ 




Vi E PVS (C.17) 
Vn E PVS (C.18) 
Vn E PQ (C.19) 
Vi E PXS (C.20) 
Vi E PXS (C.21) 
Vi E PXS (C.22) 
Appendix D 
THE PRIMAL AND DUAL LINEAR PROGRAMS 
The aim of the Dis.patch Based Pricing model is to calculate ex post marginal prices for 
an observed dispatch. Ring [1995] derived this model by linearising their original non-
linear OPF equations (D.2-D.17), around an operating point to obtain a primal linear 
programming problem. The operating point is the observed (or existing) dispatch. 
The primal problem was used to form a dual linear program, from which the ex post 
marginal prices can be solved directly. 
This appendix summarises the linearisation process detailed in Read and 
Ring [1995d], but with respect to the non-linear pq/PvG OPF formulation (Equa-
tions 4.1 to 4.13). After this, the primal problem and dual problem are presented. 
D.1 LINEARISING THE PRIMAL OPF PROBLEM 
The linearisation processes for the different pq/PvG OPF equations are summarised 
below. 
D.1.1 The Objective Function 
Theorem B.1 in Appendix B states that the first partial derivatives of the objective 
function must be continuous. In Dispatch Based Pricing analysis however, it is possible 
for the first derivatives of Equation 4.1 to be discontinuous. As an example, there is 
a discontinuity when the marginal generator is generating a full capacity, but where 
the demand for power is such that the next least expensive generator has not been 
dispatched. On one side of this discontinuity, the unit cost of generation is equal to 
the unit cost of the current marginal generator. On the other side, the unit generation 
cost is equal to the unit cost of the next marginal generator. Therefore, two linearised 
variables ( c + and c - ) are required to describe the cost of the next and last units of 
generation. Hence, the objective function becomes: 
Cost (PG, QG) ==? Cost ( P:, Q:) 
+ -L (c;ip;i - c;;p~;) 
iEPX 
+ L (c;;Q:; - c~;Q~i) 
iEPX 
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In this objective function, the real and reactive power generation variables have also 
been linearised. For example, reactive power generation at Node i becomes: 
• + -
QGi = QGi + QGi - QGi (D.1) 
where: 
• Q:i indicates the observed reactive power generation, and 
• Q:;and Q~i describe the next and last units of reactive power generation. 
The'*' symbol indicates the values of the observed dispatch around which the pq/PvG 
OPF equations are linearised. This point of linearisation corresponds to point (x0 , yo) 
in Appendix B. 
D.1.2 The Constraints 
The constraint equations are linearised using a first order Taylor expansion. For ex-
ample, a general constraint equation g(x) is linearised thus: 
• ~ 89 ( *) g(x) = g(x ) + L.J Bxi Xi - xi 
iEI 
Applying this to the reactive power energy conservation constraint (Equation 4.3) pro-
duces: 
iEPX 
Note that the variables P; and Qi have been linearised according to the method demon-
strated by Equation D.1. 
Inequality constraints are linearised in the same way. For example, the constraint 
describing the reactive power generation at Node i: 
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linearises to: 
Demand functions for power ( e.g. Q D) are already linear functions. 
D.2 THE PRIMAL, LINEAR PROGRAMMING FORMULATION 
Equations D.2 to D.17 are the linearised optimal power flow equations. They form the 
primal linear programming problem. The primal problem has been simplified. Common . 
multiples have been cancelled out of the equations, and all constant terms have been 
transferred to the right hand side of the equations. All inequality constraints are 
arranged as 'greater than or equal to' inequalities. This format is called·the 'canonical' 
form and simplifies the process of forming the dual. The example in Section 4.4.2 is 
also formulated in the canonical form. 
The variable to the right of each primal constraint is the shadow price (i.e. LaG-
range multiplier or dual variable) for that constraint. 
D.3 THE DUAL, LINEAR PROGRAMMING FORMULATION 
The process used to derive the dual, linear programming pricing equations from the 
primal pricing equations is the same as that used to obtain the example dual linear 
program in Section 5.2. Most linear programming texts, such as Bazaraa and Jar-
vis [1977], provide more information on linear programming duality theory. However, 
the .following steps summarise the process of obtaining the dual equations. Each item 
below has a corresponding superscripted number. These numbers also appear in the 
primal and dual equations. They identify the part of the equation being· described by 
the corresponding item. 
• the right hand sid~ of each primal constraint becomes the coefficient of the cor-
responding. shadow price in the dual objective function1; 
• each primal objective function coefficient becomes the right hand side of the dual 
constraint that corresponds to the original primal variable2 ; 
• for each primal variable, the coefficients are multiplied by the shadow prices of 
the primal constraints in which they are found. These terms are then summed 
to produce a dual constraint. The shadow price (i.e. Lagrange multiplier) of this 
new dual constraint is the original primal variable3 . 
The dual linear programming problem obtained by this process is described by 
Equations D.18 to D.28. Chapter 5 reports a simplified set of these equ~tions (5.1-
5.9), which is the final pq/PvG Dispatch Based Pricing model. 
THE pq/PvG PRIMAL LINEAR .'PROGRAM 
(D.2) 
subject to: 
CONSERVATION OF POWER 
~ ( + - '\ ~ &LP ( + - ) ~ &LP ( + - lni3) ~ &LP 
L..t PGi - PGi - PDij - L..t &P. PGi - PGi - PDi - L..t &Q. QGi - QGi - ~ - L..t &V v; 
iEPX . iEPX ' iEpq 't iEPvG ' 
(D.3) 
(D.4) 
DEPENDENT REACTIVE POWER INJECTION AT PvG NODES 
~ fJQ n ( + - ) ~ fJQ n ( + - lni3) ~ fJQ n ( + - ) 
- L..t f)P. pGi - pGi - pDi - D fJQ. QGi - QGi - ~ - L..t f)V v; + QGn - QGn - QDn 
iEPX ' iEpq t iEPvG t 
Vn E PvG 
(D.5) 
Continued overleaf 
THE pq/PvG PRIMAL LINEAR PROGRAM (CONTINUED) 
Vn Epq (D.6} 
TRANSMISSION LINE FLOWS 
"'°""' a Pk ( + - ) "'°""' a Pk ( + - fnl3) "'°""' a Pk r -- L.t aP PGi-PGi-PDi -.L.taQ. Qai-QGi-~ - L.t av i1;+Pk 
iEPX ' iEpq ' · iEPvG ' 
: 'T]pk Vk EK (D.7) 
= Q-· "'°""' a(Jk p* "'°""' a(Jk Q. _ "'°""' a(Jk v· 
k + L.t aP Di+ L.t aQ. Di L..t av i 
iEPX ' iEpq ' iEPvG ' 
(D.8) Vk EK 
Continued overleaf 
. 
THE pq/PvG PRIMAL LINEAR PROGRAM (CONTINUED) 
REAL AND REACTIVE GENERATION AND VOLTAGE SETTINGS 
+ > . max • + Vi E PX (D.9) - PGi - -PGi + PGi ;·vPi > 
'1:J 
-P- > P';;/-P;i Vi E PX (D.10) 
'1:J 
; VPi trj \ Gi - z 
+ max * + Vi E PX (D.11) t:J - QGi ~ -QGi + QGi : VQi H ;:,-; 
-Q- > Qmin _ Q* Vi EPX (D.12) t:J Gi - Gi Gi : VQi 
1-3 
-V > -Vmax + Vi E PX (D.13) ::c: 
i - i ; VVi trj 
vmin 
'1:J v: ~ : VVi Vi E PX (D.14) ?:1 H 
' ;::: 
REAL AND REACTIVE POWER LOAD SETTINGS > t'" 
PDi ;,,,p;i ; {3Pi Vi E PX (D.15) > z 
jQDir = Q~i 
t:J 
: {3Qi Vi E PX (D.16) t:J c 
> 
TRANSMISSION LINE THERMAL LIMITS t'" 
t'" 
-• - -* - max -•2 -•2 
Vk EK (D.17) 
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K +PX PX +PX PX +PX PX 
x ,vp ,vp ,vQ ,vC/ ,vv ,vv 2:0 
PX PX PvG pq K K 







• "'"""' 8 L Q • "'"""' 8 L Q • "'"""' 8 L Q • "'"""' • ) 
+>..Q LQ + .~ aP; PD,+ .t. aQ, QD, - ,;;:G av; v; - .~ QG, 
~ ...... z 
G) 
'"rj 
"'"""' ( • "'"""' aQ" • "'"""' aQ n • "'"""' aQ n • ) + 0 µQn -QDn + 0 [)p_-PDi + 0 aQ. QDi - 0 [)V. V: 




"'"""' ( ; "'"""' av • "'"""' av • "'"""' av • ) + 0 µVn vn + 0 [)P. PD,+ 0 aQ.QDi - 0 av.V. 




0 z + 1=11Pk (P: + _1= ~; P;i + 1= :~: Q~. - _1= ~ v:·) 
kEK 1.EPX •Epq 1.EPvG 
+ 1= 11Qk (Q: + _1= ~~: P;i + ~ ~~: Q~. - _1= ~i: v.·) 
kEK 1.EPX 1.Epq 1.EPvG 
+ L (v;, ( -P';"z + P;,) + v;i (P';in - P;i )) 
iEPX 
"'"""' ( + ( m<iz • ) - ( min • )) "'"""' ( + m<iz - min) + 0 VQi -QGi +QG, +vQi QGi -QGi . + 0 -Vv;V: +vv,V: 
iEPX iEPX 
+ L /3p,P;i + L /3Q,Q~. + L xk (-T::<iz -P:2 -Q:2) 
iEPX iEPX kEK 
Continued overleaf 
THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE pq/PvG DUAL LINEAR PROGRAM 
subject to: 
MARGINAL PRICES DEFINED BY OPF DEMAND TERMS 
: PD, Vi E PX (D.19) 
: IQn,\ Vi E pq (D.20) 
: Qn, Vi E PvG (D.21) 
MARGINAL PRICE CONSTRAINTS SET BY UNIT GENERATION COSTS 
± 
:PG, Vi E PX (D.22) 
± 
: QG, Vi E pq (D.23) 
± 
: QGn Vn E PvG (D.24) 
Continued overleaf 
THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE pq/PvG DUAL LINEAR PROGRAM (CONTINUED) 
VOLTAGE CONSTRAINT COST RELATIONSHIPS 
PRICING RELATIONSHIPS 
FOR THE OPF TRANSMISSION LINE CONSTRAINTS 
'T/pk - 2P: xk = o 
'T/Qk - 20:xk = o 
: v; Vi E PvG 
: Vn Vn E pq 
: f>k Vk EK 





































TEST POWER SYSTEMS 
E.1 DESCRIPTION 
This appendix contains the schematics and raw data describing the three test power 
systems used for all experiments within this thesis. The test power systems are: 
• the 9-bus power system from Cornell University. This accompanied the Matpower 
software (Figure E.1); 
• the IEEE 14-bus power system representing the American electric power system 
(Figure E.2); 
• the IEEE 30-bus power system representing the American electric power system 
(Figure E.3). 
For the 14-bus and 30-bus power system, the raw data has been converted from the 
IEEE Common Data Format to the modified PSS/E data format required by Matpower 
and QOPF [CDF .1973]. The actual numerical values of the data describe .a power-flow 
dispatch rather than an optimal power flow dispatch. Additional information such as 
reactive power generation limits and cost function data was added during conversion. 
E.2 NOMENCLATURE. 
The Dispatch Based Pricing nomenclature has been used for all discussions within 
the thesis. Therefore, the Dispatch Based Pricing nomenclature is used to indicate any 
changes that have been made to the power system data, so as to avoid confusion during 
discussions. However, this nomenclature is easily translated. For example: 
• Pv4 is the 'Pd' (real power load) field for Bus 4; 
• Q;;" is the 'Qmax' (maximum reactive power generation) field for Generator 2; 
• vtn is the 'Vmin' (minimum voltage limit) field for Bus 1. 
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Figure E.1 Schematic of the Cornell University 9-bus Power System 
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Figure E.3 Schematic of the IEEE 30-bus Power System 
E.3 RAW DATA FOR THE CORNELL UNIVERSITY 9-BUS POWER SYSTEM 
function [baseMVA, bus, gen, branch, area, gencost] = case 
%CASE Defines the power flow data in a format similar to PTI. 
% [baseMVA, bus, gen, branch, area, gencost] = case 
% The format for the data is similar to PTI format except where noted. 
% An item marked with(+) indicates that it is included in this data 
% but is not part of the PTI format. An·item marked with(-) is one that 
% is in the PTI format but is not included here. 
% 














% I (-) 
bus number (1 to 29997) 
bus type 
PQ bus = 1 
PV bus 2 
reference bus 3 
isolated bus 4 
Pd, real power demand (MW) 
Qd, reactive power demand (MVAR) 
Gs, shunt conductance (MW (demanded?) at V 1.0 p.u.) 
Bs, shunt susceptance (MVAR (injected?) at V = 1.0 p.u.) 
area number, 1-100 
Vm, voltage magnitude (p.u.) 























10 baseKV, base voltage (kV) 
11 zone, loss zone (1-999) 
(+) 12 maxVm, maximum voltage magnitude (p.u.) 
(+) 13 minVm, minimum voltage magnitude (p.u.) 
















(machine identifier, 0-9, A-Z) 
Pg, real power output (MW) 
Qg, reactive power output (MVAR) 
Qmax, maximum reactive power output (MVAR) 
Qmin, minimum reactive power output (MVAR) 
Vg, voltage magnitude setpoint (p.u.) 
(remote controlled bus index) 
mBase, total MVA base of this machine, defaults to baseMVA 
(machine impedance, p.u. on mBase) 
(step up transformer impedance, p.u. on mBase) 
(step up transformer off nominal turns ratio) 
status, 1 - machine in service, 0 - machine out of service 
(% of total VARS to come from this gen in order to hold Vat 
remote bus controlled by several generators) 
% 9 Pmax, maximum real power output (MW) 
% , 10 Pmin, minimum real power output (MW) 
% 





















f, from bus number 
t, to bus number 
(circuit identifier) 
r, resistance (p.u.) 
x, reactance (p.u.) 
b, total line char,ging susceptance (p.u.) 
rateA, MVA rating A (long term rating) 
rateB, MVA rating.B (short tefm rating) 
rateC, MVA rating C (emergency rating) 
ratio, transformer off nominal turns ratio 
% 10 angle, transformer phase shift angle (degrees) 





(Bf, shunt susceptance at from bus p.u.) 
(Gt, shunt conductance at to bus p.u.) 
% (-) (Et, shunt susceptance at to bus p.u.) 
% 11 initial branch status, 1 - in service, 0 - out of service 
% 






i, area number 
price_ref_bus, reference bus for that area 




NOTE: If gen has n rows, then the first n rows of gencost contain 
the cost for active power produc~d by the corresponding generators. 












power costs in the same format. 
1 model, 1 - piecewise linear, 2 - polynomial 
2 startup, startup cost in US dollars 
3 shutdown, shutdown'cost in US dollars 
4 n, number of cost parameters to follow 
5 and following, cost data, piecewise linear data as: 
xO, yO, x1, y1, x2, y2, 
' and polynomial data a·s, e.g. : 
c2, c1, cO 
where the polynomial is cO + c1*P + c2*P-2 
'!. « this file created [97-Aug-26 12:29:15] by PS::System version 1.3 » 
%%----- Power Flow Data -----%% 
%% system MVA base 
baseMVA = 100.0000; 
'!.'!. bus data 
'/.bus type Pd Qd Gs Bs area Vm Va baseKV zone 
bus = [ 
1 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1.0000 0.0000 
2 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1.0000 0.0000 
3 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1.0000 0.0000 
4 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1.0000 0.0000 
5 1 90.00 30.00 0.0 0.0 1 1.0000 0.0000 
6 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1.0000 0.0000 
Vmax Vmin 
345.0000 1 1.0000 1. 0000; 
345.0000 1 1.1000 0.9000; 
345.0000 1 1.1000 0.9000; 
345.0000 1 1.1000 0.9000; 
345.0000 i' 1.1000 0.9000; 
345.0000 1 1.1000 0.9000; 




8 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1.0000 0.0000 345.0000 1 1.1000 0.9000; 
9 1 125.00 50.00 0.0 0.0 1 1.0000 0.0000 345.0000 1 1.1000 0.9000; 
]; 
%% generator data 
%bus Pg Qg Qmax Qmin Vsp base status Pmax Pmin 
gen= [ 
1 0.0000 0.0000 300.0000 -300.0000 1.0000 100.0000 1 250.0000 10.0000; 
2 163.0000 0.0000 300.0000 -300.0000 1.0000 100.0000 1 300.0000 10.0000; 
3 85.0000 0.0000 , 300.0000 -300.0000 1.0000 100.0000 1 270.0000 10.0000; 
J; 
%% branch data 
%fbus tbus r x b rate a rateb ratec ratio angle status 
branch= [ 
1 4 0.0000 0.0576 0.0000 250.0000 250.0000 250.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1 · > 
' "cl 






5 6 0.0390 0.1700 o·.3580 150.0000 150.0000 150.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1 · t:I ...... ' ;x: 
3 6 0.0000 0.0586 0.0000 300.0000 300.0000 300.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1· 
' 
t_'.Ij 
6 7 0.0119 0.1008 0.2090 150.0000 150.0000 150.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1 · >-3 
' t_'.Ij 
7 8 0.0085 0.0720 0.1490 250.0000 250.0000 250.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1· 
(I.) 
' >-3 
8 2 0.0000 0.0625 0.0000 250.0000 250.0000 250.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1 · 
"cl 
0 ' ~ 
8 9 0.0320 0.1610 0.3060 250.0000 250.0000 · 250.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1· t_'.Ij 
' ;:i:1 








%%----- OPF Data -----%% 
%% area data 




%% generator cost data 
gencost = [ 
% Real 
2 0.00 0.00 
2 0.00 0.00 
2 0.00 0.00 
%Reactive 
2 0.00 0.00 
2 0.00 0.00 
2 0.00 0.00 
]; 
return; 
3 0.0 10.7000 0.0; 
3 0.0 10.9000 0.0; 
3 0.0 11. 0000 0.0; 
3 0.0 1.07000 0.0; 
3 0.0 1.09000 0.0; 
3 0.0 1.10000 0.0; 
E.4 RAW DATA FOR THE IEEE 14-BUS POWER SYSTEM ts:> I-' 0 
% Reactive power generation limits adjusted to produce an unconstrained 
% optimal solution using runopf. Andrew Ware} 8/12/97 
function [baseMVA, bus, gen, branch, area, gencost] = ieee14 
% 09/25/93 UW ARCHIVE 100.0 1962 W IEEE 14 Bus Test Case 
% The system data was originally in IEEE GDF, 
% converted to matpower format by cdf2matp. 
baseMVA = 100.0; 
%bus type Pd Qd Gs ~ Bs area Vm Va baseKV zone Vmax Vmin 
bus= [ 
1 3 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 1 1.06000 0.000 0.00 1 2.06000 0.94000; 
2 2 21.70 12.70 0.000 0.000 1 1.04500 -4.980 0.00 1 2.06000 0.94000; 
3 2 94.20 19.00 0.000 0.000 1 1.01000 -12.720 0.00 1 2.06000 0.94000; 
> 
4 1 47.80 -3.90 0.000 0.000 1 1.01900 -10.330 0.00 1 2.06000 0.94000; ~ 
~ 
5 1 7.60 1.60 0.000 0.000 1 1.02000 -8.780 0.00 1 2.06000 0.94000; 
trl z 
t:I 
6 2 11.20 7.50 0.000 0.000 1 1.07000 -14.220 0.00 1 2.06000 0.94000; ...... ;:x: 
7 1 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 1 1.06200 -13.370 0.00 1 2.06000 0.94000; trl 
8 2 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 1 1.09000 -13.360 0.00 1 2.06000 0.94000; 
>-3 
trl r.n 
9 1 29.50 16.60 0.000 19.000 1 1.05600 -14.940 0.00 1 2.06000 0.94000; >-3 
~ 
10 1 9.00 5.80 0.000 0.000 1 1. 05100 -15.100 0.00 1 2.06000 0.94000; 0 ~ 
11 1 3.50 1.80 0.000 0.000 1 1.05700 -14.790 0.00 1 2.06000 0.94000; trl ~ 
12 1 6.10 1.60 0.000 0.000 1 1.05500 -15.070 0.00 1 2.06000 0.94000; 
r.n 
-< r.n 
13 1 13.50 5.80 0.000 0,000 1 1.05000 -15.160 0.00 1 2.06000 0.94000; >-3 trl 
':14 1 14.90 5.00 0.000 0.000 1 1.03600 -16.040 0.00 1 2.06000 0.94000; 
is:: 
r.n 
] ; trj ;is. 
%bus Pg Qg Qmax Qmin Vsp base status Pmax Pmin ~ 
gen= [ ~ 
232.40 -16.90 20.00 -20.00 1.06000 100.00 1 332.40 0.00; tJ 1 ~ 
2 40.00 42.40 50.00 -40.00 1.04500 100.00 1 140.00 0.00; > 
"rj 
3 0.00 23.40 40.00 -10.00 1.01000 100.00 1 100.00 0.00; 0 ~ 
6 0.00 12.20 24.00 -6.00 1.07000 100.00 1 100.00 0.00; >-3 ::i:: 
trj 
8 0.00 17.40 24.00 -6.00 1.09000 100.00 1 100.00 0.00; ...... 
trj 
] ; trj trj 




branch= [ c:: 
Cf.l 
1 2 0.01938 0 .05917 0.05280 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1 · 'a 
' 0 
1 5 0.05403 0.22304 0.04920 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· ~ 
' trj 
2 3 0.04699 0.19797 0.04380 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· ~ 
' Cf.l >-< 2 4 0.05811 0.17632 0.03740 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1 · Cf.l 
' >-3 
2 5 0.05695 0.17388 0.03400 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· 
trj 
' ~ 
3 4 0.06701 0.17103 0.03460 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· 
' 
4 5 0.01335 0.04211 0.01280 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· 
' 
4 7 0.00000 0.20912 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.97800 0.000 1· 
' 
4 9 0.00000 0.55618 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.96900 0.000 1 · ' 
5 6 0.00000 0.25202 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.93200 0.000 1· 
' 
,6 11 0.09498 0.19890 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· ' 
,6 12 0.12291 0.25581 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1; 
6 13 0.06615 0.13027 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· 
' 
7 8 0.00000 0.17615 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1; tv ...... ...... 
I 
"" 7 9 0.00000 0 .11001 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· ,-I 
' "" 9 10 0.03181 0.08450 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· 
' 
9 14 0.12711 0.27038 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· 
' 
10 11 0.08205 0.19207 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 .0.000 1· ' 
12 13 0.22092 0.19988 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· 
' 







gencost = [ 
%Real 
2 0.00 0.00 3 0.0 10.7000 0.0; 
2 0.00 0.00 3 0.0 10.7000 0.0; 
2 0.00 0.00 3 0.0 11. 0000 0.0; :> 'ti 
'ti 
2 0.00 0.00 3 0.0 10.9000 0.0; t,:rj z 
2 0.00 0.00 3 0.0 11.'1000 0.0; t:1 >-< 
~ 
%Reactive t,:rj 
2 0.00 0.00 3 0.0 1.07000 0.0; >-3 
t,:rj 
2 0.00 0.00 3 0.0 1.07000 0.0; r:n >-3 
0.0 1.10000 0.0; 
'ti 2 0.00 0.00 3 0 
2 0.00 0.00 3 0.0 1.09000 0.0; ~ t,:rj 
~ 
2 0.00 0.00 3 0.0 1.11000 0.0; r:n 
><:: 




E.5 RAW DATA FOR THE IEEE 30-BUS POWER SYSTEM ~ 
°' 
::0 
function [baseMVA, bus, gen, b~anch, area, gencost] = ieee30 ~ 
tJ 
% 09/25/93 UW ARCHIVE 100.0 1961 W IEEE 30 Bus Test Case ~ 
% The system data was originally in IEEE ~DF, >rj 
0 




baseMVA = 100.0; ..... tt:l 
tt:l 




bus= I b:I 
1 3 0.00 0.00 0 .. 000 0.000 1 1.06000 0.000 132.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; <:::: en 
>rj 
2 2 21.70 12.70 0.000 0.000 1 1.04300 -5.480 132.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; 0 
~ 
3 1 2.40 1.20 0.000 0.000 1 1. 02100 -7.960 132.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; tt:l 
::0 
4 1 7.60 1.60 0.000 0:000 1 1. 01200 -9.620 132.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; en >< en 
5 2 94.20 19.00 0.000 0.000 1 1.01000 -14.370 132.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; ~ 
tt:l 
6 1 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 1 1.01000 -11.340 132.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; ~ 
7 1 22.80 10.90 0.000 0.000 1 1.00200 -13.120 132.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; 
8 2 30.00 30.00 0.000 0.000 1 1.01000 -12.100 132.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; 
9 1 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 1 1.05100 -14.380 1.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; 
10 1 5.80 2.00 0.000 19.000 1 1.04500 -15.970 33.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; 
11 2 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 1 1.08200 -14.390 11.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; 
:L2 1 11.20 7.50 0.000 0.000 1 1.05700 -15.240 33.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; 
•13 2 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 1 1.07100 -15.240 11.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; 
14 1 6.20 1.60 0.000 0.000 1 1.04200 -16.130 33.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; 
tv 
15 1 8.20 2.50 0.000 0.000 1 1.03800 -16.220 33.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; I-' <:,:, 




: 17 1 9.00 5.80 0.000 0.000 1 1.04000 -16.140 33.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; 
18 1 3.20 0.90 0.000 0.000 1 1.02800 -16.820 33.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; 
19 1 9.50 3.40 0.000 0.000 1 1.02600 -17 .000 33.00 .1 1.06000 0.94000; 
20 1 2.20 0.70 0.000 0.000 1 1.03000 -16.800 33.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; 
21 1 17.50 11.20 0.000 0.000 1 1.03300 -16.420 33.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; : 
22 1 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 1 1.03300 -16.410 33.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; 
23 1 3.20 1.60 . 0.000 0.900 1 1.02700 -16.610 33.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; 
24 1 8.70 6.70 0.000 4.300 1 1. 02100 -16.780 33.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; 
25 1 0.00 0.00 o.poo 0.000 1 1.01700 -16.350 33.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; 
26 1 3.50 2.30 0.000 0.000 1 1.00000 -16.770 33.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; 
27 1 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 1 1.02300 -15.820 33.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; 
28 1 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 1 1.00700 -11. 970 132.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; 
29 1 2.40 0.90 0.000 0.000 1 1.00300 -17.060 33.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; 
30 1 10.60 1.90 0.000 0.000 1 0.99200 -17 .940 33.00 1 1.06000 0.94000; > 'ti 
J ; 'ti l:rj 
z 
%bus Pg Qg Qmax Qmin Vsp base status Pmax Pmin t:J >--< 
>< gen= [ l:rj 
1 260.20 -16.10 10.00 -10.00 1.06000 100.00 1 360.20 0.00; >-3 
l:rj 
2 40.00 50.00 50.00 -40.00 1.04500 100.00 1 140.00 0.00; (/) >-3 
5 0.00 37.00 40.00 -40.00 1. 01000 100.00 1 100.00 0.00; 'ti 0 
8 0.00 37.30 40.00 -10.00 1. 01000 100.00 1 100.00 0.00; ~ l:rj 
~ 
11 0.00 16.20 24.00 -6.00 1.08200 100.00 1 100.00 0.00; (/) 
><: 
13 0.00 10.60 24.00 -6.00 1. 07100 100.00 1 100.00 0.00; (/) >-3 
l:rj 
J ; ' !;;;,' ""' (/) 
%£bus tbus r x b rat ea rateb ratec ratio angle statu ~ 
°' 
branch = [ ~ 
1 2 0.01920 0.05750 0.05280 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· 
' ~ 
1 3 0.04520 0.18520 0.04080 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· t:J 
' ~ 
2 4 0.05700 0.17370 0.03680 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· > 
' >:t:j 
3 4 0.01320 0.03790 0.00840 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1 · 0 ' ~ 
2 5 0.04720 0.19830 0.04180 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1; '"'.l ::r: 
\ trl 
2 6 0.05810 0.17630 0.03740 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· ..... 
' trl 
4 6 0.01190 0.04140 0.00900 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· trl 
' trl c,:, 
5 7 0.04600 0.11600 0.02040 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1; 0 I 
to 




6 8 0.01200 0.04200 0.00900 9900.00 0.00. 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1; "O 0 
6 9 0.00000 0.20800 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.97800 0.000 1· ~ 
' trl 
6 10 0.00000 0.55600 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.96900 0.000 1· ~ 
' Cl) -< 9 11 0.00000 0.20800 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· Cl) 
' '"'.l 
9 10 0.00000 0.11000 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· trl 
' ;::::: 
4 12 0.00000 0.25600 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.93200 0.000 1· 
' 
12 13 0.00000 0.14000 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1 · ' 
12 14 0.12310 0.25590 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· 
' 
12 15 0.06620 0.13040 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· 
' 
12 16 0.09450 0.19870 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.0.00 1· 
. ' 
14 15 0.22100 0.19970 0.00000 
I 
9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· 
' 
,16 17 0.08240 0.19230 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1 · ' 
15 18 0.10730 0.21850 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1; 
18 19 0.06390 0.12920 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· !:-:> ,..... 
' Cll 
' t...:> 19 20 0.03400 0.06800 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· f-' 
I ' 0) 
: 10 20 0.09360 0.20900 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· 
' 
10 17 0.03240 0.08450 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1 · ' 
10 21 0.03480 0.07490 0.00000 9900.09 0.00 0.00 0.00000 .0.000 1· 
' 
10 22 0.07270 0.14990 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· 
' 
21 22 0.01160 0.02360 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· 
: ' 
15 23 0.10000 0.20200 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· 
' 
22 24 0 .11500 0.17900 . 0 .00000 9990.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1 · 
' 
23 24 0.13200 0.27000 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· 
' 
24 25 0.18850 0.32920 o.poooo 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1 · 
' 
25 26 0.25440 0.38000 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· 
' 
25 27 0.10930 0.20870 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· 
' 
28 27 0.00000 0.39600 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.96800 0.000 1· 
' 
27 29 0.21980 0.41530 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1 · 
' 
27 30 0.32020 0.60270 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1 · > ' "d "d 29 30 0.23990 0.45330 0.00000 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· J:t::l 
' z 
8 28 0.06360 0.20000 0.04280 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· t:1 .... ' :>< 
6 28 0.01690 0.05990 0.01300 9900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.000 1· 
' J:t::l 
J ; >-3 
J:t::l 
[ (/) area= >-3 
1 1· "d 0 ' _.. 
]; <: J:t::l 
:::0 
gencost = [ (/) 
><! 
%Real (/) >-3 
J:t::l 
,2 0.00 0.00 3 0.0 10.8000 0.0; ~ 
(/) 
2 0.00 0.00 3 0.0 10.6000 0.0; ~ c,, 
2 0.00 0.00 3 0.0 i1.oooo 0.0; ~ 
2 0.00 0.00 3 0.0 10.9000 0.0; ~ 
2 0.00 0.00 3 0.0 11.1000 0.0; 0 
~ 




2 0.00 0.00 3 0.0 1.08000 0.0; ...;i ::i::: 




2 0.00 0.00 3 0.0 1.10000 0.0; t:rJ t:rJ 
0.00 3 
c.,.:, 
2 0.00 0.0 1.09000 0.0; 0 
I 
IJ:I 
2 0.00 0.00 3 0.0 1.11000 0.0; e 
en 
2 0.00 0.00 3 0.0 1.07000 . 0.0; '"u 
0 









EXAMPLE OF MARGINAL PRICES 
F.1 INTODUCTION 
This appendix presents the outputs from QOPF and NODAL2, for the optimal dispatch 
of the IEEE 14 bus power system. This dispatch is typical of: 
• the dispatches used to ensure that the N ODAL2 source code is reliable, 
• the dispatches used to develop tl1e pq and PvG pricing models, and 
• the dispatches used to investigate the behaviour of reactive power marginal prices. 
These dispatches were only possible once QOPF and Matpower had been developed. 
The procedures used to obtain outputs from QOPF and NODAL2 are described. 
Then, outputs are presented for a specific dispatch. 
F.2 THE QOPF OUTPUT 
The dispatch of the 14-bus power system was optimised with QOPF. The power system 
data used by QOPF to obtain this dispatch are is presented, verbatim, in Appendix E. 
In this dispatch, all generator voltage magnitudes were fixed at the levels spe-
cified in Appendix E. The generator voltages were fixed using the QOPF 'Standard, 
Polynomial Fixed Generator Voltage'· option. This option produces a slightly different 
dispatch to that obtained by setting Vmin = Vmax for all generator nodes. When this 
• • 
option is used QOPF does not display in the 'Voltage Constraints' section, the non-zero 
shadow prices associated with the fixed generator voltages. 
The objective function minimised by QOPF is: 
Total Generation Cost= 10.7P01 + 10.7Pa2 + ll.0Pa3 + 10.9Pa6 + ll.1Pa8 
+ 1.07QG1 + 1.Q7QG2 + 1.1QG3 + 1.Q9QG6 + 1.11QG8 
In the QOPF output (Section F.4) the marginal price at each generator node is 
equal to the unit generation cost of that generator. This indicates that all generators 
a_re marginal for real power and reactive power. This is also evident in the 'Generation 
Constraints' part of the output. 
220 APPENDIX F EXAMPLE OF MARGINAL PRICES 
F.3 THE NODAL2 OUTPUT 
NODAL2 was used to calculate ex post marginal price sets for the (observed) dispatch 
calculated_ by QOPF. This was achieved by running the dispatch through NODAL2, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
Price sets are presented in Sections F.5 and F.6. They are generated by the pq 
and PvG pricing models respectively. Both models are implemented by the N ODAL2 
software. N ODAL2 implements the pq pricing model when the real and reactive power 
generation data, from the QOPF output, are converted to negative demands when 
specified in BusDATA.DAT. That is: 
and QDi =} -QGi 
Otherwise, N ODAL2 implements the PvG pricing model. 
The marginal data and constraint commands used to obtain a price set from the 
pq pricing model output are presented in Table F.1. No voltage constraint has been 
specified for Node 1 because NODAL2 automatically applies a voltage constraint to the 
ref'erence node. All generators have been formulated as marginal for reactive power, 
via the 'X' and 'Y' commands. Only Generator 8 has been formulated as marginal for 
real power, via the 'P' command. 
Table F .1 MARGINAL.DAT commands required by Nodal2 to calculate marginal prices for the dispatch 
of the IEEE 14-bus system, using the pq pricing model.· 
s Node 1 0.000 x Node 6 1.090 
p Node 8 11.100 y Node 6 1.090 
x Node 1 1.070 x Node 8 1.110 
y Node 1 1.070 y Node 8 1.110 
x Node 2 1.070 v No9-e 2 
y Node 2 1.070 v Node 3 
x Node 3 1.100 v Node 6 
y Node 3 1.100 v Node 8 
The marginal data and constraint commands used to obtain a price set from 
the PvG pricing model output are presented in Table F.2. Again, all generators 
have been formulated as marginal for reactive power and only Generator 8 has been 
formulated as marginal for real power. There are no voltage constraints because 
N ODAL2 automatically fixes V at all PvG nodes. 
Table F.2 MARGINAL.DAT commands required by Nodal2 to calculate marginal prices for the dispatch 
of the IEEE 14-bus system, using the PvG pricing model. 
s Node 1 0.000 x Node 3 1.100 
p Node 8 11.100 y Node 3 1.100 
x Node 1 1.070 x Node 6 1.090 
y Node 1 1.070 Y. Node 6 1.090 
x Node 2 1.070 x Node 8 1.110 
y Node 2 1.070 y Node 8 1.110 
F.4 AN OUTPUT FROM QOPF 
Filename of the OPF case study: example.m 
OPF run on: 5-0ct-98 at 13: 5:19 
Dispatch Description: This is -a voltage c~nstrained example because all 
generator voltages are fixed. All generators marginal for real and reactive 
power. 
Converged in 24.50 seconds 
--- Objective Function Value ---
f = 2873.6690 $/hr 
-------------------------------- Bus Data -----------------------·-------------
Bus Voltage Generation Load Lamda. ($/MVA-hr) 
# Mag(pu) Ang(deg) p (MW) Q (MVAR) p (MW) Q (MVAR) p Q 
------- ------- ------- -------- -------- -------- -----·-- -------
1 1.0600 0.0000 28.5952 27. 5917 10.7000 1.0700 
2 1.0450 -0.0474 84.9285 -3.3396 21.7000 12.7000 10.7000 1.0700 
3 1. 0100 -2.1406 73.0356 -8.3524 94.2000 19.0000 11. 0000 1.1000 
4 1.0281 -2.6668 47.8000 -3.9000 11.11:31 1.0727 
5 1.0308 -1.9821 7.6000 1.6000 10.9919 1.1001 
6 1.0700 -2.4043 49.1221 1.5796 11. 2000 7.5000 10.9000 1.0900 
'7 1.0648 -3.0249 11.1868 1.1241 
8 1.0900 -0.8010 25.5686 16.0797 11.1000 1.1100 




10 1. 0516 -4.5374 9.0000 5.8000 11.2994 1.1926 tv tv 
;1.1 1.0568 -3.6143 3.5000 1.8000 11.1495 1.1663 
12 1.0555 -3.3637 6.1000 1.6000 11.1205 1.1655 
13 1.0502 -3.5553 13 -~5000 5.8000 11.2109 1. 2055. 
14 1.0360 -5.1721 14.9000 5.0000 11.5343 1.2763 
----------------------------- Branch Data ------------------------------------
From To Avg. Flow Loss "From" End "To" End 
Bus Bus P(MW) Q(MVAR) P(MW) Q(MVAR) P(MW) Q(MVAR) P(MW) Q(MVAR) 
------- ------- ------- -------- --------- --------
1 2 9.29 23.60 0.113 -5.50 9.3470 20.8446 -9.2342 -26.3493 
1 5 19.14 8.98 0.222 -4.46 19.2482 6.7471 -19.0265 -11.2100 > 
1-ij 
2 3 22.52 12.74 0.299 -3.37 22.6656 11. 0593 -22.3667 -14.4256 1-ij t,:j 
2 4 28.06 0.63 0.426 -2.72 28.2781 -0.7368 -27.8517 -1. 9881 
z 
ti ..... 
2 5 21.40 1.45 0.243 -2.92 21.5189 -0.0129 -21.2756 -2.9072 x 'rj 
3 4 1.16 -11.24 0.083 -3.38 1.2023 -12.9268 -1.1195 9.5446 t,:j 




4 7 3.35 -6.85 0.000 0.11 3.3462 -6.7969 -3.3462 6.9055 1-ij 
~ 
4 9 6.96 0.74 0.000 0.24 6.9590 0.8606 -6.9590 -0. 6177 
t,:j 
0 
5 6 3.46 15.54 0.000 0.54 3.4598 15.8119 -3.4598 -15.2721 
'rj 
~ 
6 11 12.51 1.06 0.132 0.28 12.5774 1.1961 -12 .4450 -0.9188 > ~ 
8.3998 2.0972 -8.3194 -1.9298 
C) 
6 12 8.36 2.01 0.080 0.17 ..... z 
6 13 20.27 5.80 0.262 0.52 20.4046 6.0584 -20.1428 -5.5429 > ~ 
1-ij 
7 8 -25.57 -15.40 0.000 1.35 -25.5686 -14.7271 25.5686 16.0797 ~ ..... 




9 10 0.12 6.84 0.013 0.04 0.1277 6.8557 -0.1143 -6.8202 
>'rj 
;i,. 
9 14 6.21 5.27 0.077 0.16 6.2461 5.3472 -6.1692 -5.1836 >--z 
10 11 -8.92 0.95 0.059 0.14 -8.8857 1.0202 8.9450 -0.8812 0 




13 14 8.79 -0.06 0.121 0.25 8.8522 0.0636 -8.7308 0.1836 c J-3 
>'rj 
~ 






---------- Voltage Constraints --------- >'rj 
Bus# Vmin mu Vmin IVI Vmax Vmax mu 
------- -------
1 1.060 1.060 1.060 
2 0.940 1.045 2.060 
3 0.940 1.010 2.060 
4 0.940 1.028 2.060 
5 0.940 1.031 2.060 
6 0.940 1.070 2.060 
7 0.940 1.065 2.060 
8 0.940 1.090 2.060 
9 0.940 1.057 2.060 
10 0.940 1.052 2.060 
11 0.940 1.057 2.060 
I 
1,2 0.940 1.055 2.060 
13 0.940 1.050 2.060 





















Active Power Limits 
Pmin p Pmax 
-------- -------- --------
0.00 28.60 332.40 
0.00 84.93 140.00 
0.00 73.04 100.00 
0.00 49.12 100.00 
0.00 25.57 100.00 
Reactive Power Limits 
Qmin Q Qmax 
-------- -------- --------
-20.00 27.59 40.00 
-40.00 -3.34 50.00 
-10.00 -8.35 40.00 
-6.00 1.58 24.00 





Line Flow Constraints 
'rj ----------------- ------------------ ;i:.. 
From "From" End Limit "To" End To > z 
Bus !Sf! mu !Sf! ISmaxl !St I !St! mu Bus 0 c: ------- -------- -------- -------- ------- >-3 
'"Cl 
1 22.84 9900.00 27.92 2 c: >-3 




2 25.22 9900.00 26.62 3 ~ 
' .D 2 28.29 9900.00 27.92 4 0 
'"Cl 
2 21.52 9900.00 21.47 5 'rj 
3 12.98 9900·. 00 9.61 4 
4 29.22 9900.00 29.43 5 
4 7.58 9900.00 7.67 7 
4 7.01 9900.00 6.99 9 
5 16.19 9900.00 15;66 6 
6 12.63 9900.00 12.48 11 
6 8.66 9900.00 8.54 12 
6 21.29 9900.00 20.89 13 
7 29.51 9900.00 30.20 8 
7 29.95 9900.00 29.74 9 
9 6.86 9900.00 6.82 10 
9 8.22 9900.00 8.06 14 
10 8.94 9900.00 8.99 11 
I 
,12 2.24 9900.00 2.23 13 




F.5 AN OUTPUT FROM THE pq PRICING MODEL (NODAt2) 
Trans Power Transmission System Pricing Model (full model), Compiled on Jun 26 1997, @10:53:37 
5/10/1998 13:17:45: Price and Power Injection Data for, pq pricing model example 
Transmission Rentals, Objective= MINIMISE, Pat PV, Pat PQ, Pat S, Q at PV, Q at PQ, Q at S 
Active Power Rentals=, 32.5. $ 
Active Power Payments=, -1679.7 $ 
Active Power Earnings=, 1712.1\$ 
Reactive Power Rentals=, 76.9 $ 
Reactive Power Payments 5.8 $ 
Reactive Power Earnings 71.1 $ 
Voltage Rentals=, 2.6 $ 
Voltage Payments 2.6 $ 
Voltage Earnings 0.0 $ 
Other Rentals=, 0.0 $ 
Other Payments 0.0 $ 
Other Earnings 0.0 $ 
Total Generation=, 0.000000, MW, 0.000000, MVAr 
Losses= 2.249915 MW, -39.940858 MVAr 
Swing/Marginal bus=, G_1 
LarhbdaP 10.7000 $/MW 
LambdaQ =, 1.0700 $/MVar 
Production Cost (Min & Max) for Active Power Known at: 
G_1, 0.000, 100000000000000000000.000 
G_8, 11.100, 11.100 
Production Cost (Min & Max) for Reactive Power Known at: 
G_1, 1.070 1.070 
G_2, 1.070 1.070 







Voltage Congestion at Nodes: 
G_2, Cost 1.597 has reached an UPPER constraint 
G_3, Cost 1.940 has reached an UPPER constraint 
G_6, Cost 0.725 has reached an UPPER constraint 
G_8, Cost -0.222 has reached a LOWER constraint 
Price Data for P,Q Buses Follows: 
Bus, MW Inj, MW Price, Q, Volt Price, 
D_10 -9.00, 11. 2994, -5.8000, 0.0000, 
D_11 -3.50, 11.1495, -1.8000, 0.0000, 
D_12 
I 
-6.10, 11.1205, ' -1,6000, 0.0000, 
D_,13 -13.50, 11.2109, -5.8000, 0.0000, 
D_14 -14.90, 11.5343, -5.0000, 0.0000, 
D_4 -47.80, 11.1131, 3.9000, 0.0000, 
Reac Price, Voltage 
1.1926, 1. 0516 
1.1663, .1.0568 
1.1655, 1.0555 
1. 2055, 1.0502 
1. 2763, 1.0360 
1. 0727, 1.0281 
D_5 -7.60, 10.9919, -1.6000, 0.0000, 1.1001, 1.0308 
D:....7 0.00, 11.1868, 0.0000, 0.0000, 1.1241, 1.0648 
D_9 -29.50, 11.2826, -16.6000, 0.0000, 1.1550, 1.0572 
G_2 63.23, 10.7000, -1§.0396, 1. 5975, 1.0700, 1.0450 
G_3 -21.16, 11. 0000, -27.3524, 1. 9402, 1.1000, 1.0100 
G_6 37.92, 10.9000, -5.9204, 0.7247, 1.0900, 1.0700 
G_8 25.57, 11.1000, 16.0797, -0.2217, 1.1100, 1.0900 
Voltage, Price Data for Voltage Controlled Buses Follows: 
Bus, MW Inj, MW Price, Q, Volt Price, Reac Price, Voltage 
G_1 28.60, 10.7000, 27.5917, -2 .4212, 1.0700, 1.0600 
The End 
F.6 AN OUTPUT FROM THE PvG PRICING MODEL (NODAL2) 
Trans Power Transmission Syste~ Pricing Model (full model), Compiled on Jun 26 1997, @10:53:37 
5/10/1998 13:19:45: Price and Power Injectjon Data for, PvG pricing model example 
Transmission Rentals, Objective~ MINIMISE, Pat PV, Pat PQ, Pat S, Q at PV, Q at PQ, Q at S 
Active Power Rentals=, 30.9 $ 
Active Power Payments=, -1665.6 $ 
Active Power Earnings=, 1696.5 $ 
Reactive Power Rentals=, 40.9. $ 
Reactive Power Payments 0.0 $ 
Reactive Power Earnings 40.9 $ 
Voltage Rentals=, -2.3 $ 
Voltage Payments 0.0 $ 
Voltage Earnings -2.2 $ 
Other Rentals=, 0.0 $ 
Other Payments 0.0 $ 
Other Earnings 0.0 $ 
Total Generation=, 134.149915, MW, -5.640934, MVAr 













G_8, 11.000, 11.000 










G_6, 1.090 1.090 
G_8, 1.110 1.110 




Bus, MW Inj, .MW Price, Q, Volt Price, Reac Price, Voltage z t:l ...... 
D_10 -9.00, 11.1922, -5.8000, 0.0000, 1.1903, 1.0516 ~ "l:j 
D_11 -3.50, 11. 0380, -1. 8000, 0.0000, 1.1648, 1.0568 t_:rj 




D_13 -13.50, 11. 0950, -5.8000, 0.0000, 1. 2041, 1.0502 "'d 
t" 
D_14 -14.90, 11.4224, -5.0000, 0.0000, 1.2736, 1.0360 
t_:rj 
0 
D_4 -47.80, 11. 0190, 3.9000, 0.0000, 1.0735, 1.0281 
"l:j 
~ 
""' D_5 -7.60, 10.8998, -1.6000, 0.0000, 1.1008, 1.0308 > ?:i 
D_7 0.00, 11.0852, 0.0000, 0.0000, 1.1230, 1.0648 
c;) ...... z 






Voltage, Price Data for Voltage Controlled Buses Follows: 
Bus, MW Inj, MW Price, Q, Volt Price, Rea.c Price, Voltage 
G_1 28.60, 10.6271, 27.5917, -2.4706, 1.0700, 1.0600 
G_2 63.23, 10.6186, -16.0396, 1.4419, 1. 0700, 1.0450 
G_3 -21.16, 10.9016, -27.3524, 2.2143, 1.1000, 1.0100 
G_6 37.92, 10.7857, -5.9204, 1. 0815, 1. 0900, 1.0700 
G_8 25.57, 11.0000, 16.0797, -0.0157, 1.1100, 1.0900 
The End 
Appendix G 
MERIT ORDER DISPATCH AND MULTIPLE 
MARGINAL GENERATORS 
G.1 INTRODUCTION 
The configuration of a power system, unit generation costs, real and reactive power 
generation capacity, and binding constraints all have an effect of the dispatch of reactive 
power. Emnomic theory dictates that reactive power must be dispatched according to 
a merit order in a reactive power market, in the absence of binding power system 
constraints (see Definition DBP 5.4 in Chapter 5). In this thesis however, the cases 
where QOPF has been used have generally resulted in 'out-of-merit-order dispatches'. 
Out-of-merit-order dispatches cause multiple marginal generators for real and 
reactive power, even though the system appears to be unconstrained. Hence, the pur-
pose of this appendix is to demonstrate that reactive power is dispatched according to 
a merit order. However, the reasons for the occurrence of multiple marginal generators 
f 
for reactive power are also described . 
. 
Case studies are used to show that multiple marginal generators for reactive power 
occur when dispatching reactive power, if several constraints are binding (in particular, 
fixed generator voltages). Also, reactive power losses are shown to contribute to the oc-
currence of multiple marginal generatQrs for real and reactive power. Before presenting 
these reactive power cases however, cases are presented to identify the primary cause 
of multiple marginal generators for real power. 
All cases are based on the dispatch of the IEEE 14 bus power system. For each 
case, any changes made to the original data for this power system are specified. 
G.2 MULTIPLE MARGINAL GENERATORS FOR REAL 
POWER 
Read and Ring [1995b] clearly demonstrated that real power is dispatched according to 
a merit order, in the absence of binding constraints. Ring [1995] however, commented 
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that losses can cause an out-of-merit-order dispatch, resulting in multiple marginal 
generators for real power. The purpose of Cases 1 and 2 is to verify this comment. 
For these cases, the IEEE 14-bus power system is used. When dispatching this 
power system, reactive power has a zero unit generation cost. This ensures that the real 
power dispatch is not affected by reactive power costs. For both cases, the generator 
voltage magnitudes were fixed when using QOPF to determine optimal dispatches. 
Figure G.l shows the real and reactive power generation from each generator, for both 
cases. 
Case 1 
Case 1 is used as a ref~rence case for Case 2. Case 1 is an example of an uncon-
strained dispatch where multiple marginal generators of real power have occurred. The 
following lower and upper reactive power generation limits in the original IEEE 14-
bus power system were relaxed sufficiently, to prevent the generators from becoming 
non-marginal for reactive power: 
• Qmin = -400 MVAr 
Gl,2,3,6 18 
• Qmax = 200 MVAr 
Gl 
The real power generation limits did not need to be changed. 
The unit generation costs of real and reactive power generation for each generator 
are: 
CPl = $10.7 /MW, CP2 = $10.8/MW, Cp3 = $11.0/MW 
CP6 = $10.9/MW, CPS = $11.1/MW 
cQ 1,2 ,3 ,6 ,s ·= $0/MVAr 
These unit generation costs f~n·m the following objective function, used by QOPF: 
f (cost) = cP1 Pai + cP2 Pa2 + cP3 Pa3 + cP~ Pa6 + cPs Pas + cQ1 2 3 6 s Qo1 2 3 6 s P,Q I JI, I JI' 
(G.l) 
= 10.7 P01 + 10.8 P02 + ll.OP03 + 10.9 P06 + 11.1 Pas+ 0 Q01 ,2,3 ,6,s (G.2) 
This case resulted in an unconstrained dispatch of the power system ( aside from 
the fixed generator voltages). However, all generators have been made marginal in 
order to supply the real power loads of the power system. 
Case 2 
This case demonstrates that resistance, and hence real power losses, are a majqr 
factor in the occurrence of multiple marginal generators for real power. The real power 
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Figure G.1 Optimal dispatch of real power, with and without branch series resistances. Re-
active power has a zero unit generation cost. 
losses are removed by setting to zero the ::;eries resistances of all the power system 
branches. Hence, the changes made to the 14-bus power system are: 
min A 
• Qa1,2,3,6,s = -400 MV r 
• Qmax = 200 MVAr 
Gl 
• Rk = O pu Vk EK 
• 
Rk is the series resistance of Branch k, and K is the set of all branches in the power 
system. The marginal unit costs for this case a,re the same as that of Case-1 (i.e. Equa-
tion G .1 still applies). Case 2 has resulted in an unconstrained dispatch, apart from the 
fixed generator voltages. Figure G.l(a) shows that Generator 1 is the only marginal 
generator for Case 2. 
Discussion 
With respect to definition DBP 5.6, the five fixed generator voltage constraints are 
explained by all five generators being marginal for reactive power and Generator 1 being 
marginal for real power; this applies to both cases. In Case 1 however, Generators 2, 
3, 6 and 8 are also marginal for real power, but with no extra constraints to explain 
why they are marginal. 
Figure G.l(a) reveals that a merit order dispatch for real power is the outcome 
(i.e. Generators 21 3, 6 and 8 become non-marginal) when the real power losses are 
removed in Case 2. Therefore, when determining an optimal dispatch of I"ea! power, 
real power losses can act as implicit constr_aints through the unit generation costs in the 
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Figure G.2 A merit order dispatch of reactive power. Generator voltages are variable. Gen-
erators 1, 2, 3 and 6 are non-marginal for reactive power. 
objective function. These implicit loss constraints economically justify the occurrence 
of the real power marginal generators: 2, 3, 6 and 8. 
The fact that the generator voltages are fixed for both cases indicates that gener-
ator voltage constraints have no influence in causing multiple marginal generators for 
real power. This was confirmed by rerunning Case 1 with variable generator voltages 
(~ was fixed to 1.06 pu as a reference voltage to prevent voltage drift). In this new 
unconstrained dispatch, Generators 2, 3, 6 and 8 were still marginal for real power. 
The multiple marginal generators for reactive power can be explained by the con-
clusions of C~ses 3 to 5. These multiple marginal generators for reactive power are the 
result of the fixed generator voltages. When the generat~r voltages are allowed to vary, 
the multiple marginal generators for reactive power disappear. 
G.3 MERIT ORDER DISPATCH OF REACTIVE POWER 
In the pq pricing model, Equation 7.14 and Equation 7.15 have equivalent formats. 
That is, reactive power marginal prices and real power marginal prices have the same 
structure in a pq-type market. This infers a pq-type OPF will dispatch reactive power 
in the same way as real power. That is, according to a merit order dispatch. In this 
section, Case 3 is used to validate this inference. The real and reactive power generator 
outputs of the Case 3 dispatch are depicted in Figure G.2. 
Case 3 
The following changes have been made to the IEEE 14-bus power system: 
• ·vlmin = ~max = 1.06 pu (used as a reference voltage for the power system) 
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• Set PD = 0 and Qv = 0 for all nodes, except for setting a new reactive power 
load at Node 13: Qv13 = 35.8 MVAr 
• Qmin = -lOOMVAr 
Gl,2,3 16 18 
• Qmax = 50MVAr 
Gl 
• Qmax = 35 MVAr 
G6 
The values chosen for the generation limits are arbitrary, They have been made the 
same as the changes made in Cases 4 to 8. This enables the dispatch of this case and the 
dispatches of subsequent cases to be compared. The negative lower generation limits 
(i.e. -100 MVAr) have been used so that generators forced against their lower limits are 
easily identified. This however, produces as unrealistic dispatch. Figure G.2(b) shows 
that the companies owning Generators 1 and 8 are paying the system to absorb reactive 
power. Generally, the generating companies would increase their Q;in to O MVAr, in 
order to avoid paying this cost. 
All real and reactive power loads have been replaced by one reactive power load 
at Node 13. Having only one ioad enables the behaviour of the optimal reactive power 
dispatch to be observed more clearly. 
This modified 14-bus power system has been dispatched with variable generator 
voltages. The dispatch has been optimised with respect to the following unit generation 
costs for real and reactive power (ref. Equation G.1): 
CPl,2,3,6,8 = $10.7/MW, $10.7/MW, $11.0/MW, $10'.9/MW, $11.1/MW 
Gq 1,2 ,3 ,6 ,8 = $5.10/MVAr, $1.07 /MVAr, $2.10/MVAr, $1.09/MVAr, $4.10/MVAr 
A merit order dispatch favours cheap generators over expensive generators. Hence, 
Generators 2, 3 and 6 have been made cheaper than Generators 1 and 8, with respect 
to reactive power. All generators have different reactive power unit generation costs, 
so as to clearly demonstrate a merit o,rder dispatch. 
Figure G.2(a) depicts Generator 3 as being marginal for real power; the other 
generators have not been dispatched. Generator 8 is marginal for reactive power. The 
hatched bars indicate generators that are non-marginal for reactive power. Generator 1 
has been forced against its lower generation limit (i.e. Q:t = -100 MVAr). Gener-
ators 2, 3 and 6 have been forced against their upper generation limits (i.e. Q;;x = 
A max max A ) 50 MV r, Qa
3 
= 40 MVAr, Qa
6 
= 35 MV r . 
Discussion 
In this case, the three cheapest generators of reactive power have been dispatched 
before the two expensive generators. QOPF has used all the reactive power-fro!ll these 
three cheap generators, causing them to be fully loaded. Generator 8 is the next least 
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expensive generator. It haB been used to supply the balance of the power system's 
reactive power requirements, which cannot be supplied by the first three generators. 
This generator is not fully loaded. This means it is marginal for reactive power. 
Generator 1 is more expensive than Generator 8. It has therefore been forced 
against its lower generation limit because Generator 8 is still able to supply any mar-
ginal increase in reactive power demand. 
To conclude, a merit order dispatch of reactive power has occurred, as defined by 
definition DBP 5.4. The generators have been dispatched in the merit order defined by 
their reactive power unit generation costs. That is, the cheapest generators have been 
generated first (Generators 2, 3 and 6) and the most expensive last (Generator 1). 
There is a point of clar.ification. A merit order dispatch allows only one marginal 
generator at any point in time. But, there are two marginal generators in this dispatch. 
These are, Generator 3 for real power and Generator 8 for reactive power. The 'Mar-
ginal Price Criterion' (i.e. DBP 5.6) can be used to justify this observation. There is 
one binding constraint, which is the fixed generator voltage at Node 1. Accordingly, 
DBP 5.6 requires that two generators be marginal at any point in time. These are 
. Ge-nerators 3 and 8. 
G.4 MULTIPLE MARGINAL GENERATORS FOR REACTIVE 
POWER - MARGINAL LOSSES 
The extreme reactive power unit generation costs of Case 3 were contrived. They were 
used to demonstrate that reactive power is dispatched according to a merit order. In an 
actual market, competition can be expected to force the reactive power unit generation 
f . 
costs throughout a power system to be moderate and comparable with each other. In 
this section, two cases are used to shown that a merit qrder dispatch does not usually 
occur when reactive power marginal prices are comparable with each other. They show 
instead, that multiple marginal generators become marginal for reactive power. That 
is, an out-of-merit-order dispatch occurs. 
Case 4 is contrived, because real power is assigned a zero unit generation cost. It 
demonstrates that marginal losses are one cause of these multiple marginal generators 
for reactive power, when optimally dispatching the power system. Case 5 is used to 
show that the results of Case 4 apply to more realistic dispatches. 
The following changes have been made to the IEEE 14-bus power system, for both 
cases: 
vmin _ vmax _ l 06 
• 1 - 1 - • pu 
• Set Pn = 0 and QD ==; 0 for all nodes, except Qn 13 = 35.8 MVAr 
· "Qmin M A 
• Gl,2,3,6,8 = -100 V r 
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Figure G.3 Marginal reactive power losses cause multiple marginal generators for reactive 
power. Real power has a zero unit generation cost in Case 4. 
• nmax = 50 MVAr 
"lia1 
• Qmax = 35 MVAr 
G6 
The changes in the reactive power generation limits are arbitrary. The changes just 
ensure that all generators are marginal for reactive power. 
This modified 14-bus power system is dispatched with variable generator voltages 
in each case. The only differences between the two dispatches are the unit generation . 
costs. These are specified with each case. The real and reactive power generator 
outputs of the Ca:se 4 and Case 5 dispatches a_re depicted in Figure G.3 .. 
Case 4 
The unit generatiorr costs of real and reactive power for this case are: 
CP12368 = $0/MW 
I I I I 
cQ1,2,s,a,s = $1.07 /MVAr, $1.07 /MVAr, $1.10/MVAr, $1.09/MVAr, $1.11/MVAr 
The unit cost of real power is the same for all generators, that is $0/MW. This has 
been done to ensure that real power prices do not influence the dispatch of reactive 
power through the cost of real power losses. 
The resultant optimal dispatch only has one binding constraint. This is the fixed 
reference voltage at Node 1. Comparing the generator limit data with Figure G.3 shows 
that only Generators 6 and 8 are marginal for real power. All generators are I?arginal 
for reactive power. 
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Case 5 
The unit generation costs for this case are the unit generation costs specified in 
Section E.4: 
cPl, 2 ,3 ,6 ,8 = $10.7 /MW, $10.7 /MW, $11.0/MW, $10.9/MW, $11.1/MW 
cq 1,2 ,3 ,6 ,8 = $1.07 /MVAr, $1.07 /MVAr, $1.10/MVAr, $1.09/MVAr, $1.11/MVAr 
They represent unit generation costs typical of a competitive market. Hence, these 
unit generation costs are moderate and comparable with each other. 
Compare the specified generation limit data with the generator outputs ( depicted 
in Figure G.3). It is evident that only Generator 2 is marginal for real power, and that 
all generators are marginal for reactive power. 
Discussion 
In both cases, the fixed generator voltage at Node 1 is the only binding constraint. 
Thus, definition DBP 5.6 is violated in both cases. In Case 4 for example, DBP 5.6 
states there should be six binding constraints to explain the seven marginal generators. 
Or, there should be only two marginal generators because there is only on binding 
constraint. 
QOPF minimises the total cost of real and reactive power generation. In Case 4, 
Equation G.1 becomes: 
Vi E PQG 
This objective function illustrates that QOPF is minimising just the cost of reactive 
power generation. QOPF optimises the real and reactive power losses to help mini}Jlise 
the reactive power generation. 
Duality theory shows that only marginal losses for reactive power and the voltage 
constraint have an associated cost component in the marginal price of reactive power 
demand (ref. Equat'ion 7.15). The real power. marginal price component disappears 
because the unit generation cost (,\P) is zero: 
(G.3) 
(G.4) 
DBP 5.6 states that the voltage constraint term (µv 1 ) only accounts for two of 
the seven marginal generators. Hence, ,\Q :QLQ is the only cost component available 
13 
to economically justify the· other five marginal generators. In other words, QOPF 
optiniises the marginal reactive power losses (i.e. :QLQ ) to ensure that the reacti;e -
13 
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power unit generation costs of these five generators are consistent with each other 
(ref. DBP 5.1). 
The losses are optimised in such a way that the reactive power losses are minimised. 
Once optimised, the marginal real and reactive power losses cannot be optimised fur-
ther to further minimise the reactive power generation costs. Therefore, the marginal 
reactive power losses are acting as implicit constraints. They explain the five extra 
marginal generators, which are unaccounted for by DBP 5.1. 
The marginal real power losses (with respect to a change in reactive power demand) 
are only constraints, in that QOPF optimises them to help minimise the cost of reactive 
power generation. 
Case 5 demonstrates a more typical scenario. In this case, multiple generators have 
still been dispatched for reactive power. However, real power now has a unit generation 
cost. This is the only significant difference between Cases 4 and 5. This difference is 
evident in the changes in the generator outputs from Case 4 to Case 5 (see Figure G.3). 
The changes in the generator outputs have occurred because the real power mar-
ginal losses are now acting as implicit constraints, in the same way that reactive power 
marginal losses are already acting as implicit constraints. This is because, AP is no 
longer zero in Equation G.3 (i.e. AP =/= 0). Thus, the real power loss constraints and 
the reactive power loss constraints have combined to explain the occurrence of multiple 
mariinal generators for reactive power. 
Both cases oniy have a single reactive power load at Node 13. Actual p·ower systems 
however, have numerous real and reactive power loads. These extra loads only increase 
the likelihood of multiple marginal generators for reactive power. This is because, using 
moderately expensive local generatio~ to supply changes in a reactive power load can 
.. . 
result in a lower· total generation cost that using less expensive remote generation to 
supply those load changes. This can be demonstrated by dispatching with variable 
generator voltages, the unmodified 14-bus power system presented in Section E.4. 
When there are numerous loads, the optimal solution found by QOPF may be 
to use multiple reactive power generators. This is because the power system may 
become unstable if a single marginal generator is used to supply all changes in the 
numerous remote and local loads. In this scenario, consumers will be forced to use 
local generation, r~gardless of cost, in order to maintain their desired load profile. This 
means generating companies can set high reactive power unit generation costs _and the 
consumers will be forced to use this expe1;1sive reactive power. 
242 APPENDIX G MERIT ORDER DISPATCH AND MULTIPLE MARGINAL GENERATORS 
G.5 MULTIPLE MARGINAL GENERATORS FOR REACTIVE 
POWER - BINDING CONSTRAINTS 
Marginal tosses are not the only causes of multiple marginal generators ( and an out-
of-merit-order dispatch) for reactive power. Binding constraints also cause multiple 
i:narginal generators for reactive power. For example, the fixed generator voltage in the 
dispatch of Case 3 caused two generators to be marginal for reactive power. This section 
demonstrates that binding constraints and marginal loss constraints work together to 
cause multiple marginal generators for reactive power. 
When a power-flow problem is being solved, the voltages of all the generator nodes 
are always fixed. Following this procedure, fixed generator voltages are used as the 
binding constraints for the dispatch cases presented in this section. 
Case 6 is just Case 3 dispatched with fixed generator voltages. The generator 
voltages are fixed to the values specified in Section E.4 (refer to the "Generator Voltage 
Magnitude Setpoint" generator data field). The modifications made to the IEEE 14-
bus power system for this case, are specified in Section G.3. 
The following changes have been made to the IEEE 14-bus power system for 
Cases 7 to 9: 
• ~min = ~max = 1.06 pu 
• None of the loads have been changed or r~moved 
min 
• Qa1,2,s,6,s = -100 MVAr 
• Qmax = 50MVAr 
Gl 
• Qmax = 35 MVAr 
G6 
The only differences between the cases are the unit generation costs and the fixed or 
variable generator voltages. Increasing Q:~"' to 50 MVAr allows the fixed generator 
voltages of dispatches of Cases 6,_8 and 9 to converge. 
The real and reactive. power generator outputs of the Case 6 through Case 9 dis-
patches are depicted in Figure G .4. 
Case 6 
Case 6 shows the effect of numerous binding constraints when there is only one 
reactive power load. This dispatch is the fixed generator voltage equivalent of Case 3 
and the unloaded equivalent of Case 8. The unit generation costs for this dispatch are 
the same as those of the Case 3 dispatch: 
cPl,2 ,3 ,6 ,8 = $10.7/MW, $10.7/MW, $11.0/MW, $10.9/MW, $11.1/MW 
·cQi,2 ,3 ,6 ,8 = $5.10/MVAr, $1.07 /MVAr, $2.10/MVAr, $1.09/MVAr, $4.10/MVAr 
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Figure G.4 Binding constraints and marginal reactive power losses work together to cause 
multiple marginal generators for reactive power. 
Iu this fi.xed generator voltage dispatch, Generator 1 is marginal for real power and 
all generators are marginal for reactive power (see Figure G.4). 
Case 7 
This case is a loaded equivalent of Case 3. That is, none of the real and reactive 
power loads specified in Section E.4 have been changed or removed. The unit generation 
costs for this case are: 
~Pl,2,3,6,8 = $10.7 /MW, $10.7 /MW, $11.0/MW, $10.9/MW, $11.1/MW 
cQ1,2 ,3 ,6 ,8 = $5.10/MVAr, $1.07 /MVAr, $2.1,0/MVAr, $1.09/MVAr, $4.·10/MVAr 
The generator voltages are allowed to vary in this dispatch, except the reference 
voltage at Node 1. This case acts as a reference dispatch for Case 8. It enables the 
effect of fixing voltages to be observed. 
Figure G.4 identifies all generators as being marginal for real power and Gener-
ator 8 as being marginal for reactive power. The hatched bars indicate non-marginal 
generators. The three cheapest generators have been forced against their upper react-
ive power generation limits. The most expensive Generator 1 has been forced against 
its lower generation limit. 
Case 8 
This case is used in conjunction with Case 7. They demonstrate that numerous 
binding constraints cause multiple marginal generators for reactive power. Like Case 7, 
this case is a loaded equivalent of Case 3. However, the generator voltages are fixed for 
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this dispatch. Hence, this cp.3e is also the loaded equivalent of Case 6. 
The unit generation costs for this dispatch are: 
CPl,2,3,6·,8 = $10.7/MW, $10.7/MW, $11.0/MW, $10.9/MW, $11.1/MW 
cQ 1,2,a,a,s = $5.10/MVAr, $1.07 /MVAr, $2.10/MVAr, $1.09/MVAr, $4.10/MVAr 
In this dispatch, Generators 1, 3, 6 and 8 are marginal for real power. All generators 
are marginal for reactive power. 
Case 9 
In this case, the modified 14-bus power system has been dispatched with fixed gen-
erator voltages. The objective of this case is to demonstrate the effect on the dis_patch 
of changing the reactive power unit generation costs, when numerous constraints are 
binding. The unit generation costs for this dispatch are: 
CPl,2,3,6,8 = $10.7 /MW, $10.7 /MW, $11.0/MW, $10.9/MW, $11.1/MW 
c01 •2•3 ,6 ,8 = $1.07 /MVAr, $1.07 /MVAr, $1.10/MVAr, $1.09/MVAr, $1.11/MVAr 
These are the unit generation costs specified in Section E.4. 
This case represents a typical power system dispatch. This is because there are 
numerous real and reactive power loads in the power system, and because the unit 
generation costs are comparable (see Section G.4). 
Figure G .4 identifies all generators as being marginal for real power and all gener-
ators are being marginal for reactive power. 
Discussion 
In the Case 6 dispatch there are five binding constraints, one for each of the fixed 
generator voltages. By the 'Marginal Price Criterion' (i.e. DBP 5.6) only six marginal 
generators are allo"'.ed to be marginal for real.and/or reactive power. Therefore, the 
dispatch of Case 6 satisfies DBP 5.6 because all five generators are marginal for reactive 
power and Generator 1 is also marginal real power. 
An inspection of Figure G.4(b) reveals that more reactive power is being injected 
into the power system by the very expensive Generator 1 (at $5.10/MVAr) than by the 
cheap Generator 2 ( at $1.07 /MVAr). In fact, Generator 2 is drawing reactive power 
out of the power system. This preference for expensive generation can also be observed 
in the dispatches of Cases 8 and 9. 
The preference demonstrates that QOPF has determined this to be the most op-
timal way of dispatching reactive power, so as to maintain the fixed generator voltage 
profile. Alternatively written, QOPF cannot further minimise the costs of real power -
G.5 MULTIPLE MARGINAL GENERATORS FOR REACTIVE POWER- BINDING CONSTRAINTS245 
generation and reactive power generation without changing the generator voltage pro-
file. Therefore, the fixed generator voltages have forced an out-of-merit-order dispatch. 
That is, QOPF has been forced to make multiple generators, marginal for reactive 
power. 
When preparing the case studies for this thesis it has been observed that fixing 
the generator voltages generally results in all generators being marginal for reactive 
power. This can be observed in Case 6. It is possible this observation is the result of 
the strong relationship between 'voltage magnitude' and 'reactive power' and a high 
X/ R ratio (see Section 3.6). This needs to be proved rigorously. However, Cases 1 
and 2 provide some credibility for this observation. Fixing generator voltages does not 
cause multiple marginal generators for real power in those cases. This emphasises the 
weak relationship between 'real power' and 'voltage magnitude'. This. relationship is 
only weak for high X / R ratios. 
In Case 3, the variable generator voltage dispatch satisfied DBP 5.6. Likewise, the 
fixed generator voltage dispatch of Case 6 satisfied DBP 5.6. For Case 7, DBP 5.6 
states there should only be two marginal generators because only the Node 1 voltage is 
fixed. However, there are six marginai generators. Simiiariy for Case 8, there are nine 
marginal generators instead of the six generators stated by DBP 5.6. 
The only difference between Case 3 and Case 7, and between Case 6 and Case 8 
is that Cases 7 and 8 have numerous loads. QOPF has found it necessary to violate 
DBP 5.6 by making four extra generators marginal for Case 7 and three extra for 
Case 8. These extra marginal generators are required by QOPF to supply the numer-
ous demands, while maintaining the fixed generator voltage profiles. Hence, real and 
reactive power losses are acting as constraints. They work with the binding voltage 
constraints to prQduce more marginal generators than accounted for by DBP 5.6. 
In summary, the total number of marginal generators will always be at least one 
greater than the number of binding constraints (ref. DBP 5.6). However, as the num-
ber of binding constraints and/or loads increase, marginal losses also begin to act as 
constraints; When this occurs, QOPF will make the number of marginal generators 
greater than, the number of binding constraints plus one. That is, the only way for 
QOPF to work around all the binding constraints while supplying marginal changes in 
the load profile is to make more generators marginal for real or reactive power. It must 
be noted that it is not possible to distinguish between those generators marginal due 
to binding constraints and those generators marginal due to losses. 
Case 9 demonstrates a realistic optimal dispatch because the reactive power unit 
generation costs are comparable with each other. In this dispatch all of the generators 
are marginal for both real and reactive power. Therefore, this dispatch demonstrates 
that realistic dispatches are even more likely to result in multiple marginal_generators 
for real and reactive power than the contrived cases: 6, 7 and 8. 
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G.6 CONCLUSION$ 
Case 3 has been used to demonstrate that reactive power is dispatched according to a 
merit order. Both the reactive power dispatch and the real power dispatch are determ-
ined by the unit generation costs of the generators. However, it has been demonstrated 
that reactive power is generally dispatched out of merit order in realistic pq-type spot 
markets (modelled by QOPF). The evidence of an out-of-merit-order dispatch for 
reactive power is multiple marginal generators for reactive power. 
Two main causes of out-of-merit-order dispatches for reactive power have been 
identified: binding constraints and implicit loss constraints. Binding constraints cause 
multiple marginal generators for reactive power, but the 'Marginal Price Criterion' 
(i.e. DBP 5.6) is satisfied.· Marginal real and reactive power losses act as implicit 
constraints to cause multiple marginal generators for reactive power. However, the 
number of resultant marginal generators will violate DBP 5.6. Implicit marginal loss 
constraints have been demonstrated to coincide with numerous binding constraints 
and/ or numerous real and reactive power loads. 
Cases 1 and 2 demonstrated that multiple marginal generators for real power are 
primarily the result of implicit real power loss constraints. Fixed generator voltages do 
not cause multiple marginal generators for real power, subject to a high X/ R ratio. 
Appendix H 
TECHNICAL PAPERS 
The following tech'nical review has been published. 
A. G. Ward (1996) 'Nodal Pricing In Power Systems', In Post Graduate Research 
for New Zealand Industry, Third New Zealand Conference of Postgraduate Students 
in Engineering and Technology, July, pp. 331-332. 
The following technical papers are associated with the research of this thesis. 
They have been submitted for publication. 
A. G. Ward, A. J. Turner, N. R. Watson, B. J. Ring and C. P. Arnold. Inversion 
of Real Time Spot Prices in the Direction of Real Power Flow. Accepted to IEEE 
PES, subject to mandatory changes. These changes are yet to be implemented., 1998. 
A. G. Ward, C .. P. Arnold and N. R. Watson. Reactive Power Generation 
Costs and their Effect on Real and Reactive Power Spot Prices. Submitted to IP EC99 
conference., May 1999, Awaiting acceptance. 
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